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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
“The skill of making and maintaining Commonwealths consisteth in certain 
rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry; not, as tennis play, on practice only 
[…].”  
Thomas Hobbes (1651, pp. 128-129) in Leviathan 
In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes describes a government ruling a country led only by 
its own self-interest and whose legitimacy results from a social contract. Citizens 
give up rights and freedom to benefit from state protection (Hobbes, 1651, pp. 103-
106). This metaphor reflects an outdated understanding of an absolutist form of 
government. Nowadays, citizens may not approve such legitimacy of the government 
albeit being enforced in form of dictatorship. Instead, the legitimacy of the 
government stems from its role as a coordinator in efficiently redistributing wealth in 
order to stabilize in periods of recessions and to assure long-term growth (e.g., 
Phelps, 2014; Abulof, 2015).  
From an economic perspective, legitimacy of government intervention is rooted in 
the failure of markets as well as individuals to efficiently optimize (Bator, 1958; 
Stiglitz, 1989, 1998). Examples of market failures are the presence of externalities 
(Coase, 1937, 1960; Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962), asymmetric information 
between actors in the market (Akerlof, 1970) or imperfect competition (Tirole, 1988, 
pp. 277-299). One example of government policy to cope with market failures is the 
use of fiscal policy in the form of direct subsidies or tax incentives directly aiming at 
the individual level. Especially in times of economic downturns, the government 
supports the private sector by means of policy (Romer, 1993). But how firms adapt 
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to changes of economic conditions induced by fluctuations and policy is still up to 
debate.  
While the question of why public policy intervenes is more easily answered than the 
question of how public policy affects the economy. At the aggregate level, 
government policy may benefit the economy, which might be in contrast to its effect 
on entities at the individual level. The effect of public policy on individuals is 
ambiguous (Ziemann, Cournède, Garda, and Hoeller, 2015). Ziemann et al. point out 
that any change in economic conditions by public policy affects firm output and 
hence employment which in turn affects individual earnings. With growth in 
earnings, consumption might rise, while more volatility in earnings and consumption 
might dampen consumption growth. Henceforth, the welfare effect of public policy 
interventions may be the result of two opposing forces in volatility. But when does 
public policy do more harm than good? In two of the three studies, this thesis 
contributes to finding answers to this question. 
Government intervention is costly; hence spending has to be financed by tax revenue. 
Therefore, taxpayers might like spending but dislike the fiscal requirements by the 
government. Although taxpayers feel that they are entitled to benefits from the 
provision of public goods, taxes by legal definition do not entitle individuals to 
equivalent benefits that match the payment1 (e.g., German Federal Ministry of 
Finance, 2014). Also, taxpayers will try to maximize utility and, eventually, evade 
the taxes to be paid. Thus, this counteracts the government’s capacity to act 
effectively. A better understanding of the relationship between the government and 
                                                
1 “Taxes shall mean payments of money, other than payments made in consideration of the 
performance of a particular activity” (Sect. 3, article 1, sentence 1, The Fiscal Code of Germany, 
2014, translated and published by the German Federal Ministry of Finance). 
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taxpayers in the context of public policy may help in improving mutually beneficial 
economic outcomes for both parties.  
The field of public economics investigates behavioral interactions between public 
institutions and private entities, ultimately with the goal to understand how public 
policy should be designed to maximize welfare (Slemrod, 2010). The study of public 
economics is predominantly motivated by practical relevance of future policy design 
and past policy evaluation (Feldstein, 2002).  
1.2 The purpose of the study 
As the title of this dissertation suggests, I focus on the effect of government policies 
for the private sector. This dissertation studies the competing forces of the 
government in shaping fiscal and public policy. It also acknowledges its role in 
raising revenue to support long-term growth. I address three specific topics that 
currently challenge economic researchers while the focus of attention is twofold. 
First, this thesis focuses on evidence-based analysis of public policy. Second, it 
investigates the formation of attitudes of individuals towards taxes. Both focuses aim 
at ultimately enhancing economic outcomes.  
The goal of public policy is to sustain an environment that supports long-term growth 
in a country. With scarcity of resources and political uncertainty, there is higher 
demand for effective governmental decision-making (Smith, Nutley, and Davies, 
2012, p. 361). In contrast to ideology or faith-based legitimacy of governmental 
intervention, evidence-based policy is based on policy-relevant research. Moreover, 
with increasingly available access to administrative data on the micro-level and the 
availability of quasi-experimental or even field experiments, the evidence provided 
becomes more precise and reliable for effective policy-making (Head, 2010).  
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The first two studies of the thesis analyze firm behavior. From evidence-based policy 
perspective, firms are particularly interesting because they constitute important 
contributors to welfare in a state (Tachibanaki, 2007). For instance, firms invest, 
produce and create new products. Firms’ investments, however, depend not only on 
the prospective return but also have to handle uncertainties in the market (Baum, 
Caglayan, and Talavera, 2008). Firms face market failures, which justifies 
governmental intervention. However, the impact of governmental policy is 
ambiguous (Ziemann et al., 2015). In order to better understand the effects of policy 
interventions on the economy, research has to inform evidence-based policy. Hence, 
the first research question to be answered in this thesis is: 
How does public policy affect the real economic activity of private sector? 
And how do subsidies impact the longevity of such economic activity? 
To this end, this thesis investigates the effects of public policy in two settings. Both 
studies apply econometric methods to explain the impact of public policy on the 
behavior of firms.  
Nevertheless, public policy is only capable of acting when tax revenue is generated. 
The level of taxation in a country is determined by the level of public services 
provided and by the demand for income redistribution (European Commission, 2015, 
pp. 23-25). Understanding the behavior of taxpayers is of high interest to public 
policy because tax policy affects taxpayers’ decision in production as well as 
consumption to a great extent. For this reason, it is necessary to discern the far-
reaching consequences of tax compliance and tax evasion for the economy (see Alm, 
2012 for a literature review). In this context, studying the individual taxpayers’ 
attitudes towards compliance or evasion is especially beneficial to the understanding 
of tax behavior. 
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Given the complexity of tax systems, people tend to take antagonistic positions 
towards tax authorities (Kirchler, 2007, pp. 31-39). Consequently, taxpayers’ 
evaluation of the government’s quality affects the tax morale, i.e. the intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes (Feld and Frey, 2002, 2007; Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, 
McKee, and Torgler, 2009).  
Hence, another research question to be answered in this thesis is: 
How does taxpayers’ perception of government quality affect individual tax 
morale? And what shapes the way taxpayers perceive the government? 
While the topics of this dissertation might appear to be quite heterogeneous, the 
common and unifying feature of the three studies is the role of government policy in 
shaping behavior and attitudes of private entities. 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. It is divided in four main parts which can each 
stand for themselves: Chapter 2 reviews the literature and builds the theoretical 
foundation for the subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 is joint work with Sebastian 
Eichfelder and Kerstin Schneider. Chapter 4 is joint work with Paolo Bizzozero. 
Chapter 5 is a single-authored paper. And, Chapter 6 concludes and provides an 
outlook. 
In Chapter 2, Public policy, economic activity, and tax evasion, I review the 
theoretical background for the studies of the following chapters and important 
empirical findings. Although each study reviews contains a literature review, Chapter 
2 gives an overview on the theoretical considerations on which the empirical studies 
in the subsequent chapters build upon. As the spectrum of this thesis is wide, this 
chapter focuses on the role of the government in each study. 
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In Chapter 3, Long-term effects of fiscal policy and economic convergence: Evidence 
from German bonus depreciation2, we empirically investigate the effect of a bonus 
depreciation program on long-term firm growth of firms in Eastern Germany after 
German Unification. The German reunification required the government to facilitate 
the economic convergence of Eastern Germany to its Western counterpart, i.e. to 
increase growth in the Eastern part. One main component of the policy instruments 
was tax incentives. One of the largest interventions was the Development Area Law 
(DAL) that was used to subsidize business investment in the Eastern part of 
Germany. The DAL was enacted in 1991 and expired by the end of 1998. It granted 
generous bonus depreciation for tax purposes of up to 50% of the invested amount 
during the first year.  
Using German administrative plant-level data from 1995 to 2008, we find that bonus 
depreciation induced investments lead to overinvestment behavior and hence lower 
growth for plants in Eastern Germany than for Western plants. This study makes use 
of exogenous variation in tax regulation to investigate the effect of taxes on firm 
growth through the channel of increased tax-incentivized business investment. 
Findings demonstrate a positive relationship building investments during the time of 
the tax incentive in Eastern Germany and growth in the long-run. This however does 
not hold for equipment investments. Thus, tax incentives to achieve economic 
convergence of Eastern and Western Germany have induced inefficient investment 
behavior but accommodated the necessary infrastructure in the new German market.  
                                                
2 The paper benefitted from participants’ suggestions and comments of the Finanzwissenschaftlicher 
Workshop 2014 in Hagen, the 70th Annual Congress 2014 of the International Institute of Public 
Finance in Lugano, the Verein für Socialpolitik Jahrestagung 2014 in Hamburg and the 1st IIPF 
Doctoral School 2014 in Oxford. 
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In Chapter 4, R&D investment behavior during a crisis: What is the role of 
subsidies?3, we empirically investigate the effect of public subsidies on R&D activity 
of Swiss firms in the light of the financial crisis 2008. We analyze whether R&D 
investment behavior during the crisis affects the effectiveness of public R&D funds. 
This study goes beyond previous research on the effectiveness of subsidies by 
considering changes in firm behavior due to the crisis. Hence, we are able to analyze 
impact of the crisis and changes in firm behavior on the effectiveness of public 
subsidies on R&D activity. The results indicate that crowding out might be driven by 
uncertainties of the economic crisis. Also, we find that firms keeping R&D 
investment constant during the crisis may alleviate the crowding out. These findings 
illustrate the importance of considering economic fluctuations and its effect on firm 
behavior for the evaluation of public policy. 
In Chapter 5, Social capital, religiosity, and tax morale4, I empirically study the 
effect of social capital on tax morale. This study relates to previous attempts to 
explain tax compliance by shedding light on tax morale as the intrinsic motivation to 
pay taxes. The novelty of this study is the implementation of an instrumental variable 
approach. Using European individual-level data on socio-political and value-oriented 
survey, I estimate individuals’ attitudinal response towards taxes using an 
instrumental variable strategy, instrumenting for social capital with secularization 
and religiosity.  
The results indicate a large effect of social capital on tax morale, consistent with the 
existing literature, but less reliable effects for less secularized countries. The findings 
                                                
3 The paper benefitted from participants’ suggestions and comments of the Brown Bag Seminar at the 
University of Wuppertal in Winter 2015/16 and the DRUID Academy Conference 2016 in Bordeaux. 
4 The paper benefitted from participants’ suggestions and comments of the Brown Bag Seminar at the 
University of Wuppertal in Winter 2015/16 and the 6th Halle Colloquy on Local Public Economics at 
the IWH in 2015. 
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point to the relevance of enhancing trust between citizens and the government to 
secure tax revenues. For policymakers on the level of local public finances, this 
result emphasizes the importance of considering tax morale in tax compliance 
strategies and the promotion of institutional trust among citizens instead of 
increasing audit rates and penalties. 
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2 Public policy, economic activity, and tax evasion 
This literature review5 discusses theoretical and empirical findings that motivate the 
studies of this dissertation, which focuses on the interaction of government policy 
with firm and individual behavior. 
2.1 Tax incentives and subsidies for private investments 
The neoclassical investment model by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) provides the 
theoretical framework for the analysis of the impact of tax policy on business 
investment in this thesis. Jorgenson (1963, 1967) formulate an investment model 
based on the neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation6. Under the 
assumption of perfect capital markets, a firms’ goal is to maximize present value of 
the firm given the production technology by choosing the optimal level of 
investment. In the simplest case, firms produce one single output Q with one single 
input L and one single capital unit I. The corresponding prices are p, w, and q. Hence, 
the profit net of labor costs and investment expenditure of the firm in period t is  
)()()()()()()( tItqtLtwtQtptR −−= . (2.1) 
Assuming capital to be of infinite life and to depreciate along an exponential path by 
a constant and continuous discount rate r, the present value of the firm is 
 
dttReW rt )(
0
∫
∞
−= .  (2.2) 
                                                
5 Focusing on concepts and results of previous studies that build the base and intuitively introduce into 
the widespread topics of the thesis, this literature review does not claim general completeness. 
Furthermore, Section 2.1 relies to a great extent on previous work by Eichfelder and Schneider (2014).  
6 The notation and presentation of the model in Equations (2.1) to (2.25) draw on Jorgenson (1967) 
and Hall and Jorgenson (1967). 
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A firm maximizing its profit faces two constraints. First, the rate of change in the 
stock of capital in period t equals the investment in that period reduced by the 
depreciated capital stock. Thus, the first constraint reads7 
!K(t) = I(t)−δ K(t) , (2.3) 
with )(tK!  as the change in the stock of capital at time t and δ  being the rate of 
depreciation of the capital stock. This constraint holds in each period and hence one 
can for simplicity omit the time subscripts.  
Second, the technology is described by a production function  
0),,( =KLQF . (2.4) 
The production function is strictly convex and twice differentiable with positive 
marginal rates of substitution between inputs and positive marginal products of 
capital and labor.  
A firm maximizes its present value (2.2) with respect to the constraints (2.3) and 
(2.4). Thus, the Lagrangian function is 
ℓ = e−rtR(t)+ λo(t)F(Q,L,K )+ λ1(t)( !K − I +δ K )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦dt
0
∞
∫  
          = f (t)dt
0
∞
∫ .  
(2.5) 
In order to solve this Lagrangian function, Jorgenson (1967) relies on the Euler-
Lagrange equation8 with respect to output, labor input, investment, and capital 
                                                
7 The dot notation denotes the time derivative !K(t) = dK(t) / dt . 
8 Although the following derivation of the necessary conditions can also be obtained by partial 
integration, applying the Euler-Lagrange equation formulation is more convenient. In more detail, the 
necessary condition of function of type I(x) = F(x(t), x '(t), t)dt
a
b
∫  with F(α,β,γ ) , being a twice-
11 
 
services as well as the Lagrangian multipliers. Hence, the Euler necessary conditions 
are given in Equations (2.6), (2.9), and (2.10), 
∂f
∂Q = e
−rt p + λ0 (t)
∂F
∂Q = 0 , 
 
∂f
∂L = −e
−rtw + λ0 (t)
∂F
∂L = 0 , 
 
∂f
∂I = −e
−rtq − λ1(t) = 0 . 
(2.6) 
 
The Euler condition with respect to capital services results directly from the Euler-
Lagrange equation and reads  
∂f
∂K −
d
dt
∂f
∂ !K = 0 , 
(2.7) 
where its components are the derivatives with respect to K and K! , i.e. 
∂f
∂K = λo(t)
∂F
∂K + λ1(t)δ , 
 
 ∂f
∂ !K = λ1(t) . 
(2.8) 
Combining these two derivatives in the Euler-Lagrange Equation (2.7), one obtains 
the Euler necessary condition for capital services, i.e. 
∂f
∂K −
d
dt
∂f
∂ !K = λ0 (t)
∂F
∂K +δλ1, (t)−
d
dt λ1(t) = 0 . 
(2.9) 
Lastly, the Euler necessary conditions with respect to the Lagrangian multipliers are  
∂f
∂λ0
= F(Q,L,K ) = 0 , 
∂f
∂λ1
= !K − I +δ K = 0 . 
(2.10) 
                                                                                                                                     
differentiable function with respect to (α,β,γ )  and x : a,b[ ]⊂ℜ→ X , using the Euler-Lagrange 
equation to find the extremum equals ∂F∂x − ddt ∂F∂x ' = 0  (for proof, see, e.g., Hazewinkel, 1995). 
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By combining the first order conditions with respect to labor and output, we find the 
marginal productivity of labor to be 
p
w
L
Q =
∂
∂
. (2.11) 
Similarly, we derive the condition for the marginal productivity of capital. Solving 
(2.6) for λ 1(t)  gives 
λ1(t) = −e−rtq , (2.12) 
and rewriting the first order condition for capital (2.9) yields 
0)(0 =+−−∂
∂ −−− qeqreqe
K
Ft rtrtrt !δλ . (2.13) 
This condition combined with the first order condition for output gives the marginal 
productivity of capital  
p
c
p
qrq
K
Q =−+=
∂
∂ !)( δ
, (2.14) 
where the implicit rental value of capital services supplied by the firm to itself is  
c = q(r +δ )− !q . (2.15) 
The expression in (2.14) reflects that, ceteris paribus, one additional unit of capital K 
results in additional output Q, which equals the ratio of implicit rental value of 
capital services and the price of the output. The implicit rental value of capital 
services c in (2.15) depends positively on the output q, the discount rate r and the 
rate of depreciation δ  but decreases in the rate of change of the output price.  
The interpretation of the user cost of capital in (2.15) becomes more evident by 
relating the price of capital goods to the price of capital services. In more detail, the 
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flow of capital services over a time interval dt beginning at time t from a unit of 
investment goods acquired at time s is 
dte st )( −−δ . (2.16) 
With c(t) being the price of capital services at time t, its discounted price is e−rtc(t) , 
the value of the stream of capital services on the interval dt is 
dtetce strt )()( −−− δ . (2.17) 
Respectively, with qs as the price of capital goods at time s, its discounted price is 
)(sqe rs− , we derive the value of a unit of investment goods acquired at time s as 
)(sqe rs− . (2.18) 
However, the value of investment goods acquired at time s equals to the discounted 
value of all future capital services derived from these investment goods 
e−rsq(s) = e−rtc(t)e−δ (t−s) dt
s
∞
∫
= eδ s e−(r+δ )tc(t)dt.
s
∞
∫
 (2.19) 
Hence, solving for the price of capital goods, we obtain 
q(s) = e(r+δ )s e−(r+δ )tc(t)dt
s
∞
∫
= e−(r+δ )(t−s)c(t)dt.
s
∞
∫
 (2.20) 
In order to express the price of capital services, which is implicit in (2.17), we 
differentiate the price of capital goods with respect to time. This yields 
!q(s) = r(s)+δ[ ]q(s)− c(s) , (2.21) 
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and hence, the implicit rental value of capital services or user cost of capital is, as in 
Equation (2.15), 
qrqc !−+= )( δ . (2.22) 
Assuming static expectations about the price of investment goods, the user cost of 
capital becomes 
)( δ+= rqc . (2.23) 
Deriving the user cost of capital, which reflects the effective price of capital goods, 
allows the consideration of tax effects and tax incentives in investment decisions. 
Hall and Jorgenson (1967) introduce taxes in the neoclassical investment model by 
allowing for a constant marginal income tax rate and investment tax credits. The firm 
pays the proportional tax at rate τ on its income reduced by depreciation allowances. 
The tax-related deduction of the depreciation value of investment goods over time 
follows the depreciation function D(t). Since the future value of the investment goods 
decreases due to depreciation, current investments reduce future tax payments. The 
rate of the investment tax credit k reduces the price of capital goods. Hence, the 
equality between the price of investment good and the discounted value of capital 
services in the presence of taxation becomes 
[ ] )()()()()1()( )()( tqkdssDtqetcetq ts
s
tsr ⋅+⋅+−= −−
∞
−−∫ ττ δ . (2.24) 
Let z denote depreciation savings per euro invested. Then, the present value of 
depreciation savings is ∫
∞ −=
0
)(sDez rs . The first term in the bracket captures the 
after-tax user cost of capital while the second term represents the depreciation 
savings. Moreover, the last summand of the right-hand side represents the effect of 
investment tax credit on the discounted value of capital services.  
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By differentiating the price of investment goods with respect to time and solving for 
the rental value of capital services with taxes under static expectations 
cτ = q(r +δ )1−τ ⋅ z − k −τ ⋅ z ⋅k1−τ
= q(r +δ )1−τ ⋅ z − v1−τ ,
 (2.25) 
with k + τ ⋅ z ⋅ k as the effective rate of investment tax credit v. The fraction in (2.25) 
represents the tax effect on the cost of capital for investments. In detail, the after-tax 
cost of one euro of capital is one currency unit minus the depreciation saving and 
minus effective direct investment tax credits on one currency unit, (1 – τ ⋅ z – v). 
Dividing this term by (1 – τ) accounts for the effect of the marginal tax rate τ on 
after-tax user costs of capital. 
This theoretical finding implies that taxes decrease the incentive to invest by 
increasing the user costs of capital. Hence, tax incentive programs reducing the 
effective business tax rate should have a positive impact on private capital formation 
(Auerbach and Summers, 1979; Judd, 1985; Edge and Rudd, 2011).  
Other theoretical approaches that investigate business investment are the q-based 
(Hayashi, 1982) and the Euler-based approach (Shapiro, 1986; Bond and Meghir, 
1994). The q-based approach relates investment to firm market value adjusted for 
taxes and thus considers only publicly traded firms with available financial market 
information (Devereux, Keen, and Schiantarelli, 1994; Simmler, 2012). Euler-based 
approaches rely on dynamic optimization by incorporating adjustment costs, which 
are ignored in the static neoclassical model. Furthermore, dynamic approaches model 
forecast process and hence allow identification of temporal aspects of financial 
constraints (Simmler, 2012). Although the neoclassical investment model has, 
compared to the q-based and Euler-based models, a more ad-hoc characteristic and is 
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static, it is in terms of data requirement and assumptions imposed the most flexible 
for testing theoretical implications in empirical approaches.  
Henceforth, I rely on the neoclassical investment model of Hall and Jorgenson 
(1967) to analyze the effects of public policy on the economy. The evaluation of 
current policy measures is of great value for the design of future policy. If 
governments intervene in markets to promote sustainable economic growth, they rely 
on policy instruments such as tax incentives or subsidies for firms. Examples are the 
U.S. depreciation savings program granted in reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
(Cohen, Hansen, and Hassett, 2002) and the economic crisis in 2008/2009 (Dennis-
Escoffier, 2011) or U.S. investment tax credit (Hulse and Livingstone, 2010). 
Empirical findings however show mixed results on this relationship. While there is 
some stream of research suggesting a positive effect of the 2002 U.S. bonus 
depreciation on business investment, the evidence is not fully conclusive. Applying a 
difference-in-differences approach, Cohen and Cummins (2006) find mixed effects 
of the 2002 U.S. bonus depreciation on investment. Similarly, Hulse and Livingstone 
(2010) using firm level data by Compustat to analyze the effect of 2002 U.S. bonus 
depreciation policies on capital expenditure, find mixed effects. These results point 
to a potential mismatch of goal and effectiveness of public policy. Using the same 
data set, Dauchy and Martinez (2008) estimate a small effect implying an increase in 
the investment elasticity of 0.03. Another study by Edgerton (2010) reveals that 
responsiveness of tax incentives is higher with more cash flows. Potential 
explanations point to the importance of financing constraints because bonus 
depreciation may alleviate financing constraints. 
The literature offers at least three potential explanations for mixed empirical 
evidence. First, the 2002 U.S. bonus deprecation was restricted to equipment 
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investment. The present value of depreciation savings is higher for capital goods with 
long deprecation duration (Cohen et al., 2002) and thus effects from the 2002 U.S. 
bonus depreciation possibly are too small to be empirically relevant (Desai and 
Goolsbee, 2004). Second, investors possibly did not anticipate the program which 
lasted for a relatively short period (Hulse and Livingstone, 2010). With regard to 
investment adjustment costs, the time to adjust might have been too short to benefit 
from changes in the investment program. Third, restrictions in data could drive the 
lack of significant evidence such as Dauchy and Martinez (2008) or Hulse and 
Livingstone (2010) who are not able to differentiate between long-lived capital goods 
(with a high present value of depreciation savings) and short-lived assets. 
House and Shapiro (2008) emphasize that depreciation savings are especially 
relevant for long-term business investment. This is due to the fact that investors may 
shift investment from one period to another in order to receive the benefit. Using 
asset-level data, House and Shapiro show that investment in assets with the greatest 
benefit from bonus depreciation, i.e., assets with the longest depreciation period, 
increase in response to the incentives. Similarly, Eichfelder and Schneider (2014) 
show in a difference-in-differences approach for German bonus depreciation 
evidence for a significant positive effect. Also, using a difference-in-differences 
approach in combination with a weighting scheme as proposed by DiNardo, Fortin, 
and Lemieux (1996), Yagan (2015) finds that the 2003 dividend tax cut in the U.S. 
neither affects investment nor employee compensation.  
Considering equipment investments, Long and Summers (1991) highlight the 
relevance of capital formation for economic growth.  Hence, the impact of fiscal 
policy in the form of tax incentive programs on business investment is an important 
topic of economic research (Hassett and Hubbard, 2002).  
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Above all, the literature on tax policy on growth effects is scarce and focuses on 
aggregate macroeconomic analyses, e.g. Kneller, Bleany, and Gemmell (1999). In 
their study, Kneller et al. (1999) find that distortionary taxes and unproductive fiscal 
policy reduce growth. Arnold et al. (2011) find that the tax design has crucial 
implications for economic growth. In particular, income tax reductions of those on 
low income positively relate to increased growth and recovery in times of recession. 
In like manner, Aghion, Hémous, and Kharroubi (2014) find that countercyclical 
fiscal policy increases growth in more financially constrained industries. 
The importance of tax policy for business investment and the mixed findings 
presented in this section point to the need for more research on the effects of fiscal 
policy on the real economy. In Chapter 3, we take the German post-reunification 
setting to analyze the effect of bonus depreciation on the productiveness of 
investments.  
2.2 R&D activity, economic growth, and public subsidies 
With the shift from a traditional economy based on manufacturing and construction 
industries to knowledge and service-based economies, investments in intangible 
goods such as knowledge and patents are at least equally important to foster growth 
as investments in tangible investments such as equipment and structures. Thereupon, 
studying investments in knowledge is crucial in analyzing the development of an 
economy because they constitute of a potential gateway to productivity gains as a 
first step into innovative processes (Francois and Lloyd-Ellis, 2009). 
Based on the findings of the neoclassical growth model by Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956), where the stock of technological capacity and knowledge are exogenously 
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given, Romer (1986) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) extend the assumptions of the 
neoclassical growth model by endogenizing innovation.  
Building on the ideas of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model (Ramsey, 1928; Cass, 
1965; Koopmans, 1965; Aghion and Howitt, 2009, pp. 52-54), Romer (1986)9 
incorporates the idea of increasing returns to scale of knowledge compared to 
neoclassical models with constant returns to scale. The model’s main idea is that 
technological knowledge as capital good grows automatically as a byproduct with 
physical capital. 
Firms contribute to the accumulation of technological knowledge by accumulating 
capital. Instead of fixed coefficients in the production function, each firm 
j ∈ 1,2,...,N{ }  has the Cobb-Douglas-type production technology 
yj = AkjαLj1−α , (2.26) 
with kj  and Lj  being the firm’s usage of capital and labor respectively. Whereas A  
represents the aggregate productivity of the firms and depends on the total amount of 
capital accumulated by all firms, i.e. 
A = A0 ⋅ kj
j=1
N
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
η
, (2.27) 
where η  represents the extent of knowledge externalities generated by the firms. To 
simplify, one assumes 1=jL  for all firms j. The aggregate capital stock of all firms 
is expressed as  
                                                
9 The representation of the model by Romer (1986) relies on the discussion in Aghion and Howitt 
(2009, pp. 50-54).  
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K = kj
j=1
N
∑ . (2.28) 
Furthermore, aggregate output is 
Y = yj
j=1
N
∑ . (2.29) 
Due to the fact that all firms produce with the same technology and the same factor 
prices, they acquire factors in the same proportions, i.e. kj = K / N  for all j firms. 
This implies that aggregate productivity in equilibrium equals  
A = A0 ⋅Kη  (2.30) 
where 0 < η  < 1. Therefore, the output of an individual firm is 
yj = A0 ⋅Kη (K / N )α . (2.31) 
Hence, aggregate output equals 
Y = NA0 ⋅Kη (K / N )α . (2.32) 
which is equivalent to 
Y = A ⋅Kα+η , (2.33) 
with 
A = A0 ⋅N1−α . (2.34) 
The production function (2.32) emphasizes the increasing returns to scale in all input 
variables. Hence, it underlines the importance of technological progress for 
economic growth.  
In the process of capital accumulation in an economy, we assume a constant savings 
rate s so that the rate of change in capital becomes 
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!K = sY −δ K
= sAKα+η −δ K.
 (2.35) 
Thus, the growth rate of the capital stock equals 
δηα −== −+ 1/ sAKKKgK ! . (2.36) 
For simplicity, all individuals are engaged in production instead of selling their labor 
services and renting capital to firms. A representative individual, who is 
simultaneously worker-owner of her firm, faces an intertemporal utility 
maximization problem under the assumption that individuals do not internalize 
externalities related to the growth of knowledge. In the absence of depreciation and 
population growth, the owner of the representative one-worker firm optimizes10 
max u(ct )e−ρ t dt
0
∞
∫  subject to ckAk −= α! , (2.37) 
with k as the capital stock of the individual firm, αkAy =  is the firm’s output, 
tcc =  is the owner-worker’s consumption level and A  is aggregate productivity.  
Assuming a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the form 
ε
ε
−
−=
−
1
1)(
1ccu t , (2.38) 
where 0>ε  defines the individual’s smooth consumption over time independent of 
the level of consumption. Using the Hamiltonian to solve this maximization 
problem11 
                                                
10 This optimization problem is described in detail in Aghion and Howitt (2009, pp. 36-37). 
11 The Hamiltonian optimization approach is described in detail in Aghion and Howitt (2009, pp. 43-
45). 
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)(
1
11
kckA
c
eH tt
tt !−−+⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
−
−
=
−
− α
ε
ρ λ
ε
, (2.39) 
we obtain the first order conditions 
0=−= −− λερ t
t
c ceH , (2.40) 
Hk = − !λ⇔ !λ = −λ(αAkα−1) . (2.41) 
Taking the log of (2.40) and differentiating with respect to time yields 
0=−−−
λ
λερ
!!
c
c . (2.42) 
Solving this equation using the marginal product of capital represented in (2.41), we 
obtain the Euler condition 
.
,
1−−=−
+=−
ααρε
λ
λρε
kA
c
c
c
c
!
!!
 (2.43) 
With rational expectations, individuals will correctly anticipate that all firms will 
employ the same amount of capital in equilibrium (if firms are identical as is 
assumed in (2.30)) such that K = Nk and hence, the Euler condition can be written as 
.1−+−=− ηαηαρε kNA
c
c
o
!  (2.44) 
This equation relates the growth in consumption to the marginal product of capital, 
the discount rate and the individual’s time preference. The Romer (1986) model 
implies that individuals do not internalize spillover effects from investing in 
aggregate capital and therefore without policy intervention would underinvest. 
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Similarly, Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Aghion and Howitt (2009) present a 
growth model with endogenous technological change12. Reflecting Schumpeterian 
notions of creative destruction, the authors introduce an intermediate goods sector 
and put emphasis on technological change stemming from human capital. Instead of 
just one intermediate product, there is a continuum of intermediate goods, indexed on 
the interval [0,1]. Hence, the Cobb-Douglas-type production technology is 
dixALY tititt
ααα
,
1
0
1
,
1 ∫ −−= . (2.45) 
In order to produce one final good Yt, a firm needs M intermediate goods, xi,t, where i 
indexes the intermediate good. The quality or productivity of the intermediate goods 
is measured by Ai,t and a firm can introduce new intermediate products. Based on the 
final good production function (2.45), the production function of each intermediate 
good is  
Yi,t = (Ai,tL)1−α xi,tα . (2.46) 
Each intermediate product has its own monopoly and its price (measured in 
consumption goods) is equal to its marginal product in the final sector,  
pi,t =
∂Yi,t
∂xi,t
=α (Ai,tL)1−α xi,tα−1.  (2.47) 
Hence, a monopolist in sector i maximizes profits by setting quantity xi,t  
Πi,t = pi,t xi,t − xi,t =α (Ai,tL)1−α xi,tα − xi,t.  (2.48) 
The first-order condition is α 2 (Ai,tL)1−α xi,tα−1 −1= 0  and solving for xi,t  yields 
                                                
12 The model presented in Equations (2.45) to (2.63) relies on Aghion and Howitt (2009, pp. 85-90 
and pp. 92-96). 
24 
 
xi,tα−1 =
1
α 2 (Ai,tL)1−α
,  
xi,tα−1 =α −2 (Ai,tL)−(1−α ),  
xi,t* =α
2
1−αAi,tL . 
(2.49) 
Inserting the equilibrium quantity into the profit function yields the equilibrium 
profit  
Πi,t
* = πAi,tL . (2.50) 
where π = (1−α )α 1+α1−α . Aggregating the productivity Ai,t of all firms i, the aggregate 
productivity is At = Ai,t di0
1
∫  and can be interpreted as the unweighted numerical 
average of all individual productivity measures.  
Finally, inserting equilibrium quantity and aggregate productivity into the production 
function and considering an inelastic fixed stock of labor force L yields 
Yt =α
2α
1−αAtL . (2.51) 
The firms can conduct R&D by choosing optimal levels of R&D expenditure to 
generate new innovations in intermediate goods to reach higher levels of 
productivity. But the payoff of R&D spending depends on the probability of 
innovation success which the Cobb-Douglas form innovation production function 
takes into account  
φ(ni,t ) = λni,tσ , (2.52) 
where λ  is a parameter reflecting the research sector’s productivity, ni,t is the 
research expenditure in sector i relative to the target productivity in sector i, i.e. 
ni,t = Ri,t / A*i,t . The productivity parameter in case of success is A*i,t and σ  is the 
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research elasticity of innovation. The marginal product of (productivity-adjusted) 
research in generating innovations is positive but decreasing  
φ '(ni,t ) =σλni,tσ −1 > 0  and φ ''(ni,t ) =σ (σ −1)λni,tσ −2 < 0 . (2.53) 
By choosing its research expenditure Ri,t, the firm maximizes its net benefit 
φ
Ri,t
Ai,t*
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
Πi,t
* − Ri,t,  (2.54) 
where the profit in case of success is Πi,t
* . The first-order condition is  
φ ' Ri,tAt*
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
Πt
*
At*
−1= 0 . (2.55) 
Rewriting (2.55) by using (2.50), we obtain  
φ ' ni,t( )πL =1,  (2.56) 
which can be interpreted as a research arbitrage equation. Hence, the productivity-
adjusted research equals  
σσλπ −= 1
1
)( Ln , (2.57) 
and the frequency of innovation is given by 
µ = φ(n) = λ 11−σ (σπL) σ1−σ . (2.58) 
Both parameters are constant and hence the same in all sectors independent of the 
starting level of productivity Ai,t-1.  
Consequently, productivity of each sector i equals 
Ai,t =
γ Ai,t−1
Ai,t−1
with probability
with probability
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
µ
1− µ
. (2.59) 
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Taking this result to the aggregate economy-level, productivity At equals the 
weighted average productivity A1,t of sectors that innovated (µ) at t and average 
productivity A2,t of sectors that did not (1 - µ) at t 
At = µA1,t + (1− µ)A2,t . (2.60) 
Average productivity A2,t of sectors that did not innovate at t is unchanged and thus 
by random draw of sectors, it equals last period’s economy-wide average Ai,t-1. 
Similarly, the average productivity A1,t of innovating firms thus equals last period’s 
productivity times γ , the factor of higher productivity from innovating. Therefore, it 
holds 
At = µγ At−1 + (1− µ)At−1 . (2.61) 
Finally, as GDP per capita is proportional to the aggregate productivity measure, the 
economy’s growth rate is also proportional to the growth in aggregate productivity 
1
1
−
−−=
t
tt
t A
AAg . (2.62) 
Using Equation (2.61) and inserting it in (2.62), we obtain a constant growth rate 
)1( −⋅= γµg  (2.63) 
as a function of the frequency of innovation and the higher average productivity of 
the innovating sector. 
The two models presented show analytically the role of knowledge for economic 
growth. As much as capital investments in tangible assets matter for economic 
growth, investments in intangible assets such as knowledge are at least equally 
important. One way for firms to invest in knowledge is either to conduct research and 
development (R&D). The firms themselves can conduct R&D or they can outsource 
to universities or research organizations. Nowadays, developed economies are based 
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on knowledge and technological progress is an important driver of economic growth 
(Schumpeter, 1942). 
However as Hall and Lerner (2010) point out, R&D investments differ in three 
aspects from investments of other types. First, uncertainty of the outcome is more 
pronounced for R&D investments and information asymmetries between R&D 
conductors and investors make the evaluation of such investments more difficult 
(Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). Also, limited appropriability of R&D returns induces 
firms to be reluctant in revealing information regarding innovation projects and 
hence aggravates problems of information asymmetries (Arrow, 1962). Second, 
R&D projects require capital to finance high set-up costs; hence investments in R&D 
result in sunk costs that result in higher loss of foregoing benefits from initial 
investments. Consequently, firms with R&D investments are less likely to abandon 
innovation projects (Paunov, 2012). Third, R&D projects require a high labor cost 
for high-skilled scientists and engineers. The workers’ knowledge represents an 
intangible asset. As workers have specific knowledge on the business and its 
processes, firms attempt to maintain these knowledge workers in order to benefit 
from this intangible asset. Hence, the costs of R&D workers face high adjustment 
costs at the firm level (Hall, Griliches, and Hausman, 1986; Hall and Lerner, 2010).  
Hence, one main concern of R&D is that firms have the incentive to underinvest in 
R&D as they fear other firms benefit from their knowledge albeit not paying for it 
due to incomplete appropriability of R&D returns (Arrow, 1962). The public good 
characteristic of R&D investments (non-rivalry and non-excludability), therefore, 
calls for public policy intervention. Similar to tax incentives for capital investments, 
public policy may support private R&D investments by direct subsidies or tax 
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credits. Thus, public R&D subsidies reduce the user costs of capital and theoretically 
have a positive effect on private R&D investments (Auerbach, 1984).  
Several empirical studies analyze the effectiveness of public subsidies for R&D (for 
literature reviews, see David, Hall, and Toole, 2000; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014; 
Becker, 2015). The effects of public R&D subsidies point in two directions. When 
public R&D subsidies induce firms to increase private R&D expenditure, one refers 
to an additionality effect or a crowding in effect. In contrast, public R&D subsidies 
inducing firms to decrease private R&D expenditure is referred to as crowding out 
effect (David et al., 2000).  
Studies analyzing the effectiveness of public R&D subsidies until the end of the 
1990s in many cases neglected potential endogeneity problems by relying on simple 
regression models (David et al., 2000). Accounting for endogeneity of public R&D 
subsidies requires methodological advances. And hence, applying methods such as 
difference-in-differences, sample selection models, instrumental variables and 
matching methods have become crucial to determine the causal effect of public 
policy on firm R&D (Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). 
In a non-parametric matching approach, Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) find that 
public R&D subsidies stimulate private R&D activity of Eastern German firms. 
Using data on firms in Belgium, Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) reject full 
crowding out of public R&D subsidies. Further, the authors find that the effect of the 
subsidies on R&D activity does not vary over time, the number of grants does not 
lead to crowding out and finally, neither repeatedly receiving subsides nor support 
from other sources negatively affects R&D activity. Using panel data on Spanish 
manufacturing firms, Arqué-Castells (2013) finds positive and significant effects of 
public R&D subsidies by applying dynamic discrete models. Analyzing labor 
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productivity of Finish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), Karhunen and 
Houvari (2015) find no significant positive effect of public R&D subsidies. 
However, considering the effect over time, they find negative effects of productivity 
growth subsequent to the subsidy year.  
To sum up, drawbacks and heterogeneity of the studies’ results ascribe to lack of 
information and analysis regarding several methodological issues, geographical 
scope, measurement, and definition of variables and econometric methods applied 
(Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014). 
Previous studies on the effectiveness of public R&D subsidies are mixed and point to 
the need of taking individual firm behavior and the economic environment into 
consideration to evaluate government policy. Recent studies such as Hud and 
Hussinger (2015) or Paunov (2015) fill this gap but more research in this field is 
required to understand the interdependencies between firm investment behavior, 
government policy, and business cycles. 
2.3 Tax evasion, the tax compliance puzzle, and tax 
morale 
Policy-making in the form of fiscal policy cannot take place without raising tax 
revenue. Therefore, research on tax evasion and tax compliance contribute to our 
understanding. In this section, I review theoretical findings on the formation of tax 
evasion and its implications. 
The simple model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) formally explains tax evasion13. 
Their model builds on a rational individual, maximizing expected utility and whose 
                                                
13 The notation of Equations (2.64) to (2.70) is based on Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki 
(1974), Sandmo (2005) and Phoon (2012). 
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labor supply and hence income, W, are exogenously given. Taxes are levied at a 
constant rate, θ , on the amount of declared income, X, which the taxpayer is able to 
choose. Moreover, the expected utility of a taxpayer E(U) is the result of a tax 
evasion gamble, i.e. the utility of after-tax income (W – θ X) is weighted by the 
probability of not getting caught (1 – p) and the respective utility of after-tax and 
penalty-reduced income is weighted by the probability of getting caught (p). Sandmo 
(2005) emphasizes that the probability entering the model is the taxpayer’s subjective 
probability that does not reflect actual detection frequencies by the tax authority. The 
utility function U is increasing and concave implying risk-averse taxpayers. The 
penalty in case of being caught is the reduction in income by the penalty to be paid 
on the unreported income π(W – X)14. Thus, taxpayers maximize their expected 
utility by choosing the optimal level of income reported to the tax authority X*. The 
taxpayers expected utility equals 
E(U) = (1− p)U(W −θX)+ pU(W −θX −π (W − X)) . (2.64) 
For simplification, the taxpayer’s net income in case of not being detected and 
therefore not punished equals Y =W −θX.  Similarly, the taxpayer’s net income in 
case of being detected and punished equals Z =W −θX −π − (W − X) . Taking the 
derivative of E(U) with respect to X gives 
∂E(U)
∂X = −θ (1− p)U '(Y )− (θ −π )pU '(Z ) = 0.  (2.65) 
The second-order condition equals 
∂2E(U)
∂X 2 =θ
2 (1− p)U ''(Y )+ (θ −π )2 pU ''(Z ),  (2.66) 
                                                
14 In a modified version of the Allingham-Sandmo model, Yitzhaki (1974) points out that imposing 
the penalty on the amount of income evaded has different implications as compared to the case where 
the penalty is imposed on the evaded tax as in, for instance, American tax law. 
31 
 
with a positive first-order condition, i.e. ∂E (U )∂X > 0  and a negative second-order 
condition, i.e. 02
2 )( <
∂
∂
X
UE . Therefore, the expected utility function fulfills the 
assumption of concavity.  
Since the amount of income evaded X cannot be a priori assumed to lie between 0 
and W, one has to check whether the first order conditions evaluated at the corners 
X = 0 and X = W satisfy the conditions for an interior solution. This means 
∂E(U)
∂X X=0
= −θ (1− p)U '(W )− (θ −π )pU '(W (1−π )) > 0,  (2.67) 
and 
∂E(U)
∂X X=W
= −θ (1− p)U '(W (1−θ ))− (θ −π )pU '(W (1−θ )) < 0 . (2.68) 
Rewriting these conditions yields 
pπ >θ p + (1− p) U '(W )U '(W (1−π ))
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
,  (2.69) 
and 
pπ <θ . (2.70) 
Formally, these conditions give the upper and lower bound of unreported income X. 
The term in brackets in Equation (2.69) is positive but less than one and hence it 
ensures that the amount of reported income X is always positive (X > 0), i.e. the 
lower bound. The upper bound in Equation (2.70) implies that the taxpayer declares 
income below his actual income (X < W) only if the expected tax on the undeclared 
income is lower than the regular tax. 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) find the relation between reported income to both the 
penalty rate of tax and the detection probability to be negative implying that higher 
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detection probability and higher penalties discourage fraudulent tax behavior. The 
theoretical implication of the model is that tax-compliant behavior is the result of 
taxpayers’ fear of being caught when evading and hence compliance depends only on 
enforcement in the form of penalty fees and unannounced auditing. 
To illustrate the model’s implications, Sandmo (2005) suggests that a penalty rate 
twice as large as the regular tax rate implies a probability of detection greater than 
0.5.15 This probability of detection is abnormally higher than empirical estimates 
(Feld and Frey, 2002). Given the fact that the actual probability of audit and penalties 
are relatively low, rational individuals would underreport income and overstate 
deductions due to the low likelihood of being detected and penalized (Alm, 
McClelland, and Schulze, 1992; Frey and Feld, 2002; Alm, 2012). However, actual 
levels of compliance are higher than the model predicts and imply that governments’ 
enforcement measures do not account for compliance alone (Graetz and Wilde, 
1985). Accordingly, this pure economic approach to tax evasion does not provide an 
explanation for generally tax-compliant behavior and the inability to explain tax 
evasion leads to the question why people pay taxes. The literature refers to the 
overprediction of tax evasion as a tax compliance puzzle (Alm, McClelland, and 
Schulze, 1992). 
This central limitation led to several extensions such as incorporating individuals’ 
choices, alternative tax enforcement measures, uncertainty and complexity of tax-
related measures, public goods provision, social rewards (e.g. Andreoni, Erard, and 
Feinstein, 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Slemrod, 2007). All extensions 
however build on the enforcement as a main factor in determining tax compliance.  
                                                
15 Transforming the upper bound (2.70) to deter taxpayers from evasion equals p > θπ . Inserting a 
penalty rate twice as high as the regular tax rate gives p > θ2θ  and hence p > 12 . 
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Another strand of literature focusses on behavioral economics approaches to explain 
tax compliance using findings from other social sciences (Slemrod, 2010). The focus 
of such approaches is the use of psychological and sociological findings due to the 
dissatisfaction with standard economic approaches (Alm, 2012). The behavioral 
economic literature distinguishes two strands: first, some behavioral models build on 
the limited cognitive abilities of agents to explain individual behavior, e.g, bounded 
rationality, framing effects, loss aversion etc. (see Alm, 2010). Second, other studies 
focus on the social context of individuals to inform about individual behavior in 
groups or group behavior (Alm, 2012). This branch of behavioral economics 
attempts to explain tax compliance in social interaction by using concepts such as 
social norm, altruism or tax morale as main drivers (e.g., Traxler, 2010). 
The concept of tax morale is flexible in its definition. At the aggregate level, it refers 
to intrinsic motivations to comply with tax rules (Schmölders, 1960, pp. 36-37). At 
the individual level, it reflects each individual’s motivational postures and attitude 
towards paying taxes (Kirchler, 2007, p. 102). Linking tax morale to tax compliance 
requires a theoretical connection between the two concepts. One link may be the 
theory of reasoned action and planned behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 
1991). In an experimental setting Cummings et al. (2009) show that tax morale is an 
important factor for the actual compliance behavior. Therefore, investigating tax 
morale potentially contributes to solving the tax compliance puzzle. 
While the literature regards tax morale as a soft-fact based parameter in the 
determination of tax compliance, theoretical approaches to tax morale strengthened 
and emphasized its importance for tax compliance research in the last decade (e.g., 
Dell’Anno, 2009; Schnellenbach, 2006; Hashimzade, Myles, and Rablen, 2016). 
Instead of using tax morale as an exogenous variable in the analysis of tax 
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compliance, recent studies stress that tax morale is not a black box and should hence 
be treated as an endogenous variable (Feld and Frey, 2002).  
The building blocks of tax morale are multifaceted. Tax morale is the result of 
fairness perceptions, psychological costs and institutional determinants of the 
relationship and the fiscal exchange between taxpayers and the government (Torgler, 
2001; Feld and Frey, 2007; Dell’Anno, 2009). Building on Gordon’s (1989) tax 
evasion model of social stigma, Dell’Anno (2009) presents a theoretical model of tax 
evasion which incorporates various determinants of tax morale in the standard 
expected utility model. According to this model, an individual’s tax morale 
constitutes of moral rules or psychic costs and social stigma or reputational costs. 
Psychic costs arise when a taxpayer feels guilt or shame when underreporting income 
or overstating deductions when filling out tax return forms (Andreoni et al., 1998; 
Dell’Anno, 2009). In contrast, social stigma results from anticipated shame by social 
disapproving of contemplating underreporting. Taxpayers’ utility increases with 
consumption but decreases in psychic costs and reputational costs (social stigma or 
social disapproval):  
U(Ci,t )− Pi,t − Si,t , (2.71) 
where i indexes the taxpayer and t indexes the time period. A taxpayer’s 
consumption equals the after-tax gross income and the tax evasion gamble weighted 
by the detection probability, 
Ci,t = Y 1−τ t( )+
τ tEi,t
−λτ tEi,t
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
if not punished with probability (1-p)
if punished with probability p
. (2.72) 
The taxpayer receives gross income Y that is liable to a proportional tax rate τ t . 
Moreoever, Ei,t  is the amount of income evaded which is in the case of detection 
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subject to a penalty surcharge of λ . And p is the probability of detection and 
punishment. 
The second term of the utility function Pi,t refers to the psychic costs16. Honesty 
affects psychic costs in a simple linear relationship with evaded income Pi,t = vi Ei,t. 
The last term of the utility function Si,t in (2.71) reflects social stigma in the firm of a 
taxpayer’s reputational costs. The determinants of social stigma are fairness and the 
quality of the relationship between taxpayer and government. Fairness decreases with 
aggregated perceived tax evasion and hence positively affects social stigma. Further, 
the quality of the relationship between government and taxpayers depends on the 
effectiveness of meeting the taxpayers’ interests and captures macroeconomic 
taxpayers’ satisfaction with policy-making at the macroeconomic level. Formally, the 
function of social stigma given by Si,t = M f (1−TEt−1), r(Qt ),Ei,t⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  where TEt−1  is the 
perceived share on GDP in aggregate tax evasion of the previous period and tQ  is an 
index of perceived effectiveness in policy-making. The signs of the first derivatives 
of social stigma with respect to fairness, relationship, and tax evasion are positive. 
As a simplification, social stigma is a multiplicative function of fairness, 
relationship, and evasion. Hence, the expected utility of taxpayer i is given by 
EU Y (1−τ t )+ (1− p − pλ)τ tEt{ }− viEt − ftrtEt . (2.73) 
Maximizing taxpayers’ expected utilities with respect to tax evasion, one obtains the 
first order condition   
U ' Ct{ }(1− p − pλ)τ t − vi − ftrt = 0,  (2.74) 
                                                
16 Assuming that all individuals are honest at the same level of vi distributed according to a cumulative 
function F(v) on the interval (0, v ). 
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which describes the individual’s decision rule of evasion with 
dt ≡U ' Ct{ }(1− p − pλ)τ t  being the expected pecuniary benefit from tax evasion in 
period t and mt = ft rt,. Hence, the decision rule of taxpayers depends on the level of 
honesty. If vi < dt – mt, the taxpayer is dishonest and evades; if vi > dt – mt, the 
taxpayer is honest and does not evade; finally if vi = dt – mt, the taxpayer is 
indifferent and hence does not change its behavior.  
The model presented by Dell’Anno (2009) incorporates the determinants of tax 
morale to explain tax evasion, i.e., moral rules or honesty, fairness, and the 
relationship between taxpayer and government and simultaneously, the standard 
parameters of the standard model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), i.e. probability 
of detection, penalty charges, and the marginal tax rate.  
Recent empirical studies have paid particular interest in tax morale, e.g., Torgler and 
Schneider (2005), Torgler (2005, 2006), Alm and Torgler (2006), Torgler, Demir, 
Macintyre, and Schaffner (2008), Cummings et al. (2009), Filippin, Forio, and 
Viviano (2013), and others. These studies put tax morale as the dependent variable in 
the center of analysis. The findings so far point to a relationship between tax morale 
and various determinants but rarely reflect on causal relationships and thus neglect 
potential systematic biases from endogeneity. Consequently, Chapter 5 investigates 
the causal effect of social capital on tax morale. 
2.4 Outlook 
Existing studies on the effects of public policy on private economic activity primarily 
focus on the effectiveness of public support for private entities. So far, not much 
attention has been paid to the analysis of how firms’ behavior changes in the 
presence of public policy. The neoclassical model of Hall and Jorgenson (1967) 
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offers a gateway to considering direct tax effects in investment decisions. Chapter 3 
of this thesis picks up on this finding to explain the productivity of subsidized 
investments. Similarly, the suboptimal R&D investments require the intervention by 
public institutions and hence imply importance of analyzing the effectiveness of 
public subsidies. Chapter 4 of this thesis builds on previous studies but puts emphasis 
on the change in investment behavior as result of the financial crisis 2008. In contrast 
to the studies in Chapter 3 and 4, Chapter 5 of this thesis does not focus on public 
expenditures but focuses on the formation of tax morale and hence tax compliance to 
inform about revenue-side related tax research. Chapter 6 concludes and provides 
implications for policy and future research. 
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3 Long-term Effects of Fiscal Policy and Economic 
Convergence: Evidence from German Bonus 
Depreciation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Motivation 
After German Reunification, the government introduced policy measures to secure 
the economic recovery of the Eastern German economy and to foster economic 
convergence to its Western counterpart. One major policy instrument was the use of 
tax incentives for Eastern German businesses to foster investments and thus to 
stimulate growth. The “new” German market in the Eastern part promised new 
investment opportunities but also uncertainty for firms. Hence, this study aims to 
evaluate the efficiency of tax incentives for business investment. With the unique 
historical setting and data, we are able to address the counterfactual question: How 
did the tax incentives affect the growth of firms in Eastern Germany through the 
channel of increased business investment?  
Among the tax incentives put in place for Eastern German businesses, the most 
important was the Development Area Law17 (DAL). The DAL was enacted in 1991 
and ran out by the end of 1998. It granted generous bonus depreciation for tax 
purposes of up to 50% in the first year. The DAL tax incentives were similar to the 
U.S. bonus depreciation programs in reaction to the terrorist attacks in September 
2001 (Cohen et al., 2002) and the economic crisis in 2008/2009 (Dennis-Escoffier, 
                                                
17 German: Fördergebietsgesetz. 
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2011). However, unlike the U.S. counterparts, the DAL was available to all plants 
located in Eastern Germany and therefore consisted of a large-scale subsidy across 
federal states. Furthermore, compared to the tax incentives in the U.S., the DAL was 
available for various kinds of investments such as equipment investments and 
infrastructure investments, e.g., buildings which may be crucial to secure the long-
term development of businesses. Lastly, the DAL was easily obtained by simply 
checking a field in the tax return form.  
In this paper, we focus on Germany, where, because of the reunification, the tax 
incentive for Eastern Germany aims to enhance investment and employment levels 
and thereby also economic growth. We use administrative plant-level data of the 
manufacturing industry which allows us to use a quasi-experimental setting to 
analyze the effect of tax policy on business development. We use East German plants 
investing during 1995 to 1998 as treatment group and a subsample of West German 
plants as control group. The expiration of the DAL allows us to exploit it in a 
matching estimation strategy. Hence, we are able to contribute to the literature by 
focusing on the effect of investments caused by the DAL on turnover and 
employment levels after the subsidy period (after 1999) and thus, shed light on the 
long-term effects of these tax incentives. 
While we find some evidence for efficient building investments resulting from the 
tax incentives, this is not the case for equipment investments: DAL-incentivized 
investments in equipment have no effect on turnover and are related to lower 
employment as compared to investments in the control group. This is in line with the 
argument of investment shifting to earlier periods to benefit from the tax incentives 
as well as some incidence of overinvestment.  
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3.1.2 Institutional setting 
Subsequent to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the German 
Reunification, policy was determined to support fast economic convergence of the 
two parts of Germany. In July 1990, Chancellor Helmut Kohl promised “flourishing 
landscapes” in the East. However, the initial hope that convergence would happen 
without policy intervention proved to be wrong because the industrial base in the 
East was not competitive. One additional problem was the fast increase in wages in 
Eastern Germany negotiated by the unions and the employer associations (Sinn and 
Sinn, 1994). Thus, the weak industrial base was further weakened by forgone labor 
cost advantages. As a result, policymakers decided to set tax incentives for 
investment in Eastern Germany in order to motivate firms to invest despite high labor 
costs – compared to neighboring countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic. 
While economists argue that fiscal policy in the form of equipment investment 
subsidies can reduce existing tax distortions (Judd, 1999) and foster growth (Long 
and Summers, 1991), German policy, not only subsidized investment in equipment 
but also investment in structures due to the need for initial and major long-term 
investment. As previously mentioned, the two major programs of this policy were the 
Development Area Law (DAL) and the Investment Subsidy Law (ISL). According to 
German government reports on subsidies, the DAL and ISL are among the most 
costly subsidies in the 1990s. In 1996, the DAL deprecation for business investment 
(the ISL subsidy for equipment investment) was the most important (the third most 
important) tax incentive program with tax revenue loss of 4.7 billion € (volume of 
1.3 billion €)18.  
                                                
18 (Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/1525, Drucksache 13/2230, Drucksache 14/1500, 
Drucksache 15/1635, Drucksache 16/6275). 
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Table 3.1: Regional investment subsidies (1995-2013) 
 Development Area Law (DAL) Investment Subsidy Law (ISL) 
Period 01.01.1991 to 31.12.1998 with 
amendments and revisions 
01.01.1991 to 31.12.2013 with amendments 
and revisions 
General rates 50% (1991-1996); 40% (1997-
1998) 
12% (1991 to June 1992); 8% (July 1992 to 
June 1994); 5% (July 1994 to 1998) c; 10% 
(1999); 12.5% (2000-2009); 10% (2010); 7.5% 
(2011); 5% (2012); 2.5% (2013) b 
Increased 
rates 
N.A. + 5% (SME; 1995 to 1998); double of general 
rate for equipment investment (SME; 1999 to 
2013); + 2.5% (border areas; 2001 to 2009) 
Regional 
specifications 
N.A. Berlin: reduced periods (Berlin West); Reduced 
subsidy rates under certain conditions (1996 to 
2012) 
Assessment 
base 
Movable assets (excluding 
aircrafts); immovable assets; 
modernization of buildings 
New and movable assets (excluding aircrafts, 
cars, low-value assetsd); new and immovable 
assets (since 1999); restriction to initial 
investments (since 1999) 
Formal 
requirements 
Tax return Formal application 
Notes: a The latest amendment of the law (ISL 2010) is supposed to run out in 2014. b Subsidy might 
be restricted for sensible sectors like the steel industry, ship building, automotive industry, agriculture. 
c The investment subsidy rate was up to 8% until the end of 1996 if the investment has been started in 
before July 1994. d As excluded by § 6 (2) S.1 of the German Income Tax Act. Source: Eichfelder and 
Schneider (2014) 
The DAL bonus depreciation could simply be declared in the annual tax return for 
investments in the five Eastern federal states (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia) and Berlin. Applying for the 
DAL benefits only required checking this option in the investment tax return forms. 
The DAL was not restricted to specific branches or business types. It was available 
for movable assets (with the exception of aircraft) and investments in structures 
including the modernization of buildings. In addition to regular tax depreciation, it 
allowed a bonus depreciation of 50% of the invested amount. The bonus depreciation 
could be allocated over the first five years following the investment if no other 
special depreciation schemes had been used. Initially, the program was planned to 
expire by the end of 1996. However, a prolongation until December 1998 was 
enacted in October 1995. The depreciation rate was reduced to 40% for investments 
in 1997 and 1998. The ISL19 was enacted at the same time as DAL and ran out at the 
end of 2013. It granted businesses in the five Eastern federal states and Berlin direct 
                                                
19 German: Investitionszulagengesetz. 
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and tax-exempt subsidies. Table 3.1 gives an overview of the most relevant 
regulations of both programs. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we briefly 
describe the related literature and the hypotheses to analyze the effect of the DAL on 
firms. Section 3.3 presents the data. Section 3.4 discusses the identification strategy. 
Section 3.5 reports the empirical results. Section 3.6 discusses the findings of this 
paper and concludes. 
3.2 Related literature and hypothesis development 
3.2.1 Tax policy, investment, and growth 
Both theoretical and empirical findings suggest that bonus depreciation increases 
investment activities (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; House and Shapiro, 2008). And 
clearly, investments affect firm growth. The underlying justification of subsidizing 
investment is that private investors decide on sub-optimally low investments in 
Eastern Germany because of the poor initial economic conditions and uncertainty 
regarding the development in the East after German reunification. If tax incentives, 
however, lead to distorted and inefficiently high investments, investments pushed by 
the DAL bonus depreciation are less productive and result in lower growth.  
Related studies originate from the seminal work of Hall and Jorgenson (1967). The 
neoclassical investment model states that tax policy affects the effective price of 
capital goods measured by the user costs of capital. The user cost of capital is a 
function of several variables such as the price level, after-tax cost of debt and equity, 
physical rate of depreciation and the anticipated changes in the price level of capital 
goods and as well as the tax effect (Hayashi, 1982; Auerbach and Hines, 1988). 
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Hence, tax incentive programs reducing the effective business tax rate theoretically 
have a positive impact on private capital formation (Auerbach and Summers, 1979; 
Judd, 1985; Edge and Rudd, 2011).  
The empirical literature on the study of the impact of taxes on investments is mixed. 
According to House and Shapiro (2008), depreciation allowances should have an 
especially strong impact on long-term business investment. Their explanatory 
approach relates to the fact that investors may shift investment from one period to 
another in order to receive the benefit. Confirming these results, Eichfelder and 
Schneider (2014) show that the DAL significantly increased investment activity. In 
contrast, Yagan (2015) analyzing the 2003 dividend tax cut in the U.S. finds neither 
effect of the tax cut on investment nor on employee compensation. Cohen and 
Cummins (2006) are not able to provide comprehensive empirical evidence by using 
a difference-in-differences estimation strategy.  
While the literature has extensively studied the effects of tax subsidies on investment 
(e.g., Hassett and Hubbard, 2002; Cohen and Cummins, 2006; Dauchy and Martinez, 
2008; Hulse and Livingstone, 2010; Park, 2010; Edgerton, 2011; Eichfelder and 
Schneider, 2014), the literature on the effects of tax incentives on firm growth is 
scarce and mostly deals with the enterprise zone (EZ) programs in the United States. 
For example, Papke (1994) analyzes the effectiveness of the EZ program in the US 
state of Indiana on local employment and investment using a panel of jurisdictions. 
The tax incentive involves tax credits, employment tax credits for firms, and an 
income tax deduction for zone residents. As a result, Papke (1994) argues that the EZ 
program induces a change in asset composition from reduced investments in 
machinery and equipment to more investments in inventories and an even stronger 
decrease in unemployment claims. Another study by Bondonio and Greenbaum 
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(2007) also utilizes the EZ programs as an exogenous variation to analyze the effect 
of tax incentives on economic growth. Overall, their result indicates that EZ 
positively affect employment, sales, and capital expenditure. Both studies neglect the 
direct tax effects on the user cost of capital of capital goods, which in turn might 
have implications for corporate growth. The analysis in Eichfelder and Schneider 
(2014) finds evidence for strong and significant effects of bonus depreciation on 
investment. This applies particularly to long-lived capital goods, such as 
nonresidential real property. Large businesses benefit from a higher relative 
advantage of bonus depreciation. Moreover, investments before the reduction in the 
depreciation allowances in 1997 are more affected.  
The goal of this paper is to analyze the economic efficiency of tax-incentivized 
investments, i.e. whether and to what extent these investments have an effect the 
economic development of firms. 
3.2.2 German bonus depreciation and relative tax advantages  
In order to compare relative tax advantages of the DAL between Eastern and 
Western Germany, we follow Eichfelder and Schneider (2014) by focusing on the 
relative user cost of capital of both parts of Germany. This measure depends, ceteris 
paribus, only on the direct tax effects of the bonus depreciation. Since depreciation 
allowances and subsidies reduce the tax paid, the DAL bonus depreciation reduces 
the user cost of capital for East German plants and increases the net present value of 
an investment and hence the relative DAL tax benefit. Put differently, a high value of 
relative tax-adjusted cost of capital indicates lower tax benefits in the Eastern part 
compared to the Western part of Germany. And clearly, the tax benefit might distort 
investment decisions and result in a shifting of investments to earlier periods.  
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Eichfelder and Schneider (2014) calculate the relative tax-adjusted user cost of 
capital between Eastern and Western plants from 1995 to 2005 for different asset 
classes (for the computational details, see Appendix A in Eichfelder and Schneider, 
2014).20 For the purpose of this study, we focus on average relative tax-adjusted cost 
of capital for large plants (with more than 250 employees) and small and medium-
sized plants (SMEs, with less than 250 employees).  
Figure 3.1 depicts the time series of relative tax-adjusted cost of capital of Eastern 
plants compared to Western plants. In both panels, it becomes apparent that for both, 
large plants and SMEs in Eastern Germany, during the time of DAL bonus 
depreciation (1995 to 1998), the tax adjusted cost of capital for building investments 
was lower than in Western German. As for equipment investments, the changes in 
relative differences in user cost of capital over the sampling period are less 
pronounced which might be explained by the fact that the ISL, which mainly targets 
at equipment investments, is in place throughout the entire period.  
Given the significant subsidy, we expect businesses to undertake more investments 
during the period of the DAL. This increase in investments may also reflect firms’ 
incentive to shift investments to earlier periods in order to benefit from the subsidies 
(Eichfelder and Schneider, 2014). However, tax induced investment behavior might 
not necessarily enhance business development, but might reflect an inefficient 
investment behavior during the subsidy period. If this was true, business growth 
induced by investments during the DAL-period should be lower for East German 
plants as compared to West German plants. 
 
                                                
20 In the following periods (2006 to 2008), there are no relevant changes. Therefore, we abstain from 
reporting these results. 
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Figure 3.1: Average relative tax-adjusted costs of capital (in %, comparison Eastern vs. 
Western plants) of building and equipment investments for large plants and SMEs.  
Source: based on Table 2 in Eichfelder and Schneider (2014) 
Moreover, the tax-adjusted costs of capital for equipment investments decrease even 
further for SMEs after 1998 even though the effect is not very strong. Thus, we 
expect to see no difference in the productivity of equipment investments made with 
or without the DAL. Summarizing, this implies that unproductive equipment 
investments are less likely to result from the DAL. 
3.2.3 Hypothesis development 
If tax incentives are able to raise the level of sub-optimally low investments, such 
that the productivity of investments in the East is the same as the productivity of 
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investments in the West, we expect no difference between growth effects of 
investments by unsubsidized and DAL-subsidized plants.  
Hypothesis 1: DAL bonus depreciation affect the allocative long-term 
efficiency of investment and encourage efficient investment behavior. As a 
result, firm growth resulting from DAL-induced investments is no different 
from the non-subsidized investments.  
As reported in the literature (Cohen et al., 2002; Cohen and Cummins, 2006; House 
and Shapiro, 2008; Eichfelder and Schneider, 2014), bonus depreciation is more 
relevant for capital goods with long regular depreciation periods. This implies a 
larger impact of building investments on growth compared to equipment 
investments. Moreover, building investments are investments in fixed capacities and 
equipment investments are more flexible and mobile technological capacities. Hence, 
the impact of equipment investments on growth is more immediate but possibly less 
persistent, while building investments primarily affect the structural long-term 
development. This and given the fact that initial equipment investments were still 
subsidized after the expiration of DAL, we expect a stronger and more persistent 
relationship between subsidized investments in long-lived capital goods and growth 
as compared to growth effects of short-lived capital goods in DAL-subsidized plants 
Germany.  
Hypothesis 2: The DAL bonus depreciation effect on growth is stronger for 
investments in buildings than in equipment. 
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3.3 Data 
The analysis is based on the German AFID21-panel for the manufacturing and mining 
sector, which comprises a number of mandatory business surveys conducted by the 
German Federal Statistical Office22 (Malchin and Voshage, 2009). We rely on a 
panel from 1995 to 2008 using the Investment Survey of Establishments23, the 
Monthly Report of Plants24, and the Cost Structure Survey of Firms25. The Cost 
Structure Survey is based on a stratified random sample of German firms in the 
manufacturing and mining sector with more than 20 employees. The Investment 
Survey and the Monthly Report collect information on all business plants and firms 
with at least 20 employees in that industry. While the Cost Structure Survey reports 
data on the firm level, the Investment Survey and the Monthly Report provide 
information on the plant level. We also collected data on the district level (GDP per 
capita, population, and unemployment rate) from Regiostat and the German Federal 
Employment Agency to obtain a detailed picture on regional economic conditions. 
Hence, we have a unique firm panel covering the time period from 1995 to 2008. The 
variables used in our analysis are defined in Table 3.2.  
                                                
21 German: Amtliche Firmendaten in Deutschland. 
22 The data is available for scientific research and can only be accessed by remote data processing. It 
is provided by the German Federal Statistical Office. 
23 German: Investitionserhebung bei Betrieben des Verarbeitenden Gewerbes sowie der Gewinnung 
von Steinen und Erden. 
24 German: Monatsbericht bei Betrieben des Verarbeitenden Gewerbes sowie der Gewinnung von 
Steinen und Erden. 
25 German: Kostenstrukturerhebung bei Unternehmen des Verarbeitenden Gewerbes sowie der 
Gewinnung von Steinen und Erden. 
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Table 3.2: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables  
Turnover level ln(turnover) 
Employment level ln(number of employees) 
  
Explanatory variables  
East  = 1 if plant located in Eastern Germany 
Before’99 = 1 if plant existed between 1995 and 1998 
Sum of investments in buildings between 
2000-03  
ln(sum of investments in buildings between 2000-03) 
Sum of investments in equipment between 
2000-03  
ln(the sum of investments in equipment between 2000-
03) 
Sum of investments in buildings between 
1995-98  
ln(sum of investments in buildings between 1995-98) 
Sum of investments in equipment between 
1995-98 
ln(sum of investments in equipment between 1995-98) 
Lagged investments in buildings First lag (t-1) of ln(investments in buildings) 
Lagged investments in equipment First lag (t-1) of ln(investments in equipment) 
Relative predicted difference in building 
investments 
ln(investments in buildings) minus predicted 
ln(investments in buildings) 
Relative predicted difference in equipment 
investments 
ln(investments in equipment) minus predicted 
ln(investments in equipment) 
  
Plant-level control variables 
Capital stock First lag (t-1) of ln(capital) 
Share of exports  Share of exports on turnover, in % 
Share of manufacturing Share of manufacturing, in % 
  
District-level regional control variables  
GDP per capita In 1,000 euros 
Unemployment rate In % 
Population size In 1,000 
 
A major advantage of our data is the detailed information on equipment investment 
and building investment on the plant level. Unlike earlier studies, we are therefore 
able to estimate the impact of investment subsidies on long-term capital goods (with 
a stronger expected effect of the DAL) and short-term capital goods of plants in 
Eastern Germany compared to the Western part. Therefore, the data provides us with 
a powerful identification strategy. Compared to accounting databases (Compustat, 
AMADEUS), our data does not rely on publications of firms, but on a census of all 
business plants of the manufacturing and mining industry with more than 20 
employees. Thus, self-selection of disclosed information is not an issue. In addition, 
the panel does not only include large corporations, but also small and medium-sized 
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businesses. The participation in all business surveys is mandatory. Therefore, 
missing information is limited to a small number of cases. 
We restrict the final sample in a number of ways. We consider a total of 691,822 
observations of business plants from 1995 to 2008, which participated at the 
Investment Survey and the Monthly Report and provide full information on the plant 
code and the firm code. For the sake of different funding criteria for the Berlin area, 
we drop 13,394 observations located in the state of Berlin. We focus on the 
manufacturing sector and do not account for 21,019 observations of firms in the 
mining sector. 
Hence, the sample consists of 657,409 observations26 for 66,024 plants in the 
manufacturing sector. Due to mergers and acquisitions and other forms of 
restructurings, one plant may be part of more than one firm over the whole period. 
We use the full sample containing plant-level data for Western and Eastern Germany 
for our analysis. Table 3.3 summarizes the plant data by region. Panel A describes 
the data for all observations in real terms,27 while the panels B and C refer to 
Western Germany (550,726 observations) and Eastern Germany (106,629 
observations) for 1995 to 2008, respectively. 
                                                
26  This is obtained by reducing the total number of observations 691,822 by observations in Berlin, 
13,394 and the firms in the mining sector, 21,019.  
27 For price adjustment we use the producer price index for the manufacturing sector, which has been 
published by the German Council of Economic Experts (2011), p. 409. 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics by region (full sample) 
Panel A: GERMANY n Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables    
Turnover (1,000,000 Euro) 654,936 28.46 290.31 
Number of employees 654,937 130.00 572.43 
Log turnover 631,145 15.68 1.51 
Log staff 654,937 4.01 1.18 
Real Investments (1,000 Euro)    
Gross investment (1,000 Euro) 595,516 1130.05 11094.20 
Building investment (1,000  Euro) 595,516 132.42 1489.78 
Equipment investment (1,000 Euro) 595,516 989.77 10183.07 
Relative predicted difference in building investments 574,188 0.13 4.35 
Relative predicted difference in equipment investments 574,188 0.24 4.04 
Control variables    
Capital stock (1,000 Euro) 654,937 4932.61 25521.76 
Share of exports (%) 631,145 16.22 22.94 
Share of manufacturing (%) 631,145 94.28 14.45 
GDP per capita (1,000 Euro) 657,355 25.30 9.87 
Population (1,000) 657,355 278.34 254.18 
Unemployment rate (%) 657,355 10.38 4.57 
Panel B: WEST n Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables    
Turnover (1,000,000 Euro) 548,596 31.31 315.37 
Number of employees 548,597 139.81 621.29 
Log turnover 526,675 15.78 1.50 
Log staff 548,597 4.06 1.19 
Real Investments (1,000 Euro)    
Gross investment (1,000 Euro) 498,756 1144.69 11347.77 
Building investment (1,000  Euro) 498,756 127.01 1395.24 
Equipment investment (1,000 Euro) 498,756 1009.55 10424.61 
Relative predicted difference in building investments 478,733 0.04 4.24 
Relative predicted difference in equipment investments 478,733 0.28 4.03 
Control variables    
Capital stock (1,000 Euro) 548,597 5033.59 26431.20 
Share of exports (%) 526,675 17.53 23.43 
Share of manufacturing (%) 526,675 94.10 14.66 
GDP per capita (1,000 Euro) 550,726 26.80 9.94 
Population (1,000) 550,726 302.60 267.98 
Unemployment rate (%) 550,726 8.89 2.97 
Panel C: EAST n Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables    
Turnover (1,000,000 Euro) 106,340 13.78 75.56 
Number of employees 106,340 79.39 154.08 
Log turnover 104,470 15.19 1.45 
Log staff 106,340 3.78 1.08 
Real Investments (1,000 Euro)    
Gross investment (1,000 Euro) 96,760 1054.58 9682.05 
Building investment (1,000  Euro) 96,760 160.32 1903.77 
Equipment investment (1,000 Euro) 96,760 887.82 8833.23 
Relative predicted difference in building investments 95,455 0.59 4.88 
Relative predicted difference in equipment investments 95,455 0.06 4.12 
Control variables    
Capital stock (1,000 Euro) 106,340 4411.65 20181.50 
Share of exports (%) 104,470 9.58 18.95 
Share of manufacturing (%) 104,470 95.23 13.34 
GDP per capita (1,000 Euro) 106,629 17.58 4.49 
Population (1,000) 106,629 153.07 92.99 
Unemployment rate (%) 106,629 18.08 3.50 
Source: Data from the AFiD enterprise panel (1995-2008), own calculations. 
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3.4 Identification strategy 
On average, price-adjusted turnover in Western Germany (31.31 million €) is higher 
than in Eastern Germany (13.78 million €) in the full sample as displayed in Table 
3.3. That holds also for the number of employees with 139.8 staff members on 
average in the West compared to only 79.4 in the East. By simply comparing the 
means of the outcomes of the treatment and control groups, one ignores the 
important differences of plants in each group. 
Our identification strategy comprises of two steps. First, we analyze the effectiveness 
of DAL tax incentives on firm growth in a matching approach without considering 
investments as a driving force of economic growth. As the comparability of Eastern 
and Western plants is restricted due to large structural differences, this step attempts 
to measure the extent of the diverging development in both parts of Germany despite 
the reunification. Second, we analyze the impact of the tax-incentivized investments 
on firm growth in the long-term in a match-paired regression analysis. Using the 
matching result from the previous step, we include investments in the equation as 
they provide a driving force of economic growth. Furthermore, it allows us to explain 
the effectiveness of DAL through the channel of investments and thereby also the 
structural differences of both parts. 
3.4.1 Matching approach 
The main issue in quantifying the effect of DAL on firm growth is that the true level 
of turnover (or any other outcome variable) in the Eastern German plants in absence 
of DAL is a non-observable counterfactual. At each point in time t, each plant i is 
observed in one state, i.e. it is either located in Eastern Germany or in Western 
Germany. Thus, a plant located in Eastern Germany is eligible to benefits from the 
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bonus depreciation granted by the DAL by investing during the period of 1995 to 
1998 (treatment group). On the contrary, Western German plants cannot benefit from 
this subsidy (control group).  
In order to quantify the effect of the bonus depreciation, one compares a plant’s 
observed actual state with its unobserved counterfactual state, i.e. how the plants in 
the control group would have invested if they were subsidized (see, e.g., Morgan and 
Winship, 2007). 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the propensity score matching to reduce the 
bias in the estimation of treatment effects using observational data. The parameter of 
interest is the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), which measures the 
average treatment effect of benefitting from the DAL on average level of turnover (or 
any other outcome variable Yi) and can be formulated as 
ATT = E Yi |DALi =1[ ] = E Y1i |DALi =1[ ]− E Y0i |DALi =1[ ]
unobserved counterfactual
! "## $## .
 
(3.1) 
In words, the expression is the difference between level of outcome of plant i which 
invested in the East during 1995 to 1998 and benefitted from the DAL, Y1i, and the 
outcome level of the same plant i if it hypothetically did not invest in the East during 
1995 to 1998, Y0i. Since the latter is unobservable, an adequate counterfactual has to 
be determined in order to derive the ATT.  
By simply comparing the turnover levels of Eastern German plants and Western 
German plants however yield the ATT with an additional effect from possible 
structural differences of Eastern German plants (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, pp. 12-
15). Put differently, Eastern German plants might be a selective group of plants. 
Comparing the observed differences in turnover leads to the naïve estimator, i.e.  
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E Yi |DALi =1[ ]− E Yi |DALi = 0[ ]
observed  difference  in  turnover  
! "###### $######
=
E Y1i −Y0i |DALi =1[ ]
ATT
! "### $###
+ E Y0i |DALi =1[ ]− E Y0i |DALi = 0[ ]
selection-bias
! "###### $######
.
 
(3.2) 
The observed difference in the outcome variable, i.e. turnover of DAL-benefitting 
plants compared to those who do not benefit from DAL, equals the ATT (first 
summand of the right-hand side) and the selection bias term (second and third 
summands). This bias results from the correlation between the error term and the 
treatment status and reflects the difference in potential outcomes between the treated 
and untreated due to selective choice of investing in Eastern Germany during the 
time of the DAL instead of exogenous treatment. 
This naïve estimator would be equal to the ATT only if the individual outcomes of 
plants from treatment and control groups would not differ in the absence of 
treatment. This would only be possible if Eastern plants yield the same level of 
outcome as Western plants so that it would hold 
E Y0i |DALi =1[ ]− E Y0i |DALi = 0[ ] = 0.  (3.3) 
Equation (3.3) can only hold if the error term of the regression of the outcome on the 
treatment is the same across different treatment statuses, i.e. only if the expected 
outcome of observations in the control group given the treatment status does not 
vary. This allows the identification of the ATT simply by taking the difference in 
outcome between observed entities. 
Since we deal with observational data, we have to build the empirical strategy on 
some identifying assumptions to reduce the bias resulting from selective investment. 
It is likely that the plant’s choice of investing in Eastern Germany during the time of 
the DAL is the result of selective investment behavior according to particular 
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characteristics of the plant. Therefore, investments by East German plants cannot be 
regarded as a random choice of treatment and this may have direct effects on 
turnover levels of the plant. Hence, plants that benefit from the DAL cannot be 
regarded as a random sample. As a consequence, determinants for investing in 
Eastern Germany, and hence to benefit from DAL, can simultaneously influence the 
outcome variable, i.e. turnover or number of employees.  
To cope with the bias stemming from the endogenous investment decision and to 
allow potential endogeneity problems, the econometric literature suggests different 
approaches (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). We use propensity score matching methods 
to minimize the bias from the selective choice of investing in Eastern Germany 
during the time of the DAL.  
The matching approach hinges on the challenge to determine a control group similar 
to the treatment. Only if the matching is successful, the comparison of the outcome 
variable of both groups is meaningful. In order for the propensity score matching 
approach to be valid, the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), also referred 
to as unconfoundedness, has to hold. It requires that the decision to invest in Eastern 
Germany during the time of the bonus depreciation is assumed to be based only on 
observable variables so that differences in outcomes between the treatment and the 
control group are only attributable to the treatment (Imbens, 2004; Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009). With the CIA, one assumes that conditional on observed covariates 
Xi , potential outcomes Y1i,Y0i{ }  are independent of the treatment status DALi , i.e. 
Y1i,Y0i{ }⊥ DALi | Xi . Hence, given the observed covariates Xi , assignment to 
treatment is as good as randomly assigned.  
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Another assumption ensuring the consistent identification of treatment effects by 
matching estimators is overlap or common support. This assumption requires the 
probability of treatment assignment to be bounded away from zero and one 
0 < Pr(DALi =1| Xi ) <1 . (3.4) 
Common support is given for any sample in which plants can actually decide to 
invest and hence to benefit from the DAL (treatment). If the two assumptions of 
unconfoundedness and overlap hold, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) define the 
treatment to be strongly ignorable and in our context we can identify the ATT of the 
DAL bonus depreciation. 
The implementation of the matching estimator consists of two stages. The first stage, 
we compute a balancing score, which represents functions of relevant observed 
covariates in the form of a propensity score by running a probit estimation reflecting 
the probability of receiving treatment determined by the covariates that determine the 
choice of investing in Eastern Germany during the time of the DAL (treatment) 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). We use different specifications28 of matching 
algorithms and different covariate sets. 
Using the estimated propensity scores of treatment status from the first stage, we 
look at its effect on the outcome in the second stage. By matching each treatment 
observation i with one or several control observations j, based on similar propensity 
scores and including a dummy for each block29, we assure the comparability of 
treatment and control group (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998; Smith and Todd, 
2005). Using these matched pairs, we estimate the  
                                                
28 In more detail, we apply different bandwidths for the Kernel matching estimator (0,06, 0.03 and 
0.01) and nearest neighbor matching with one and five neighbors (for results, see Appendix A.1). 
29 This controls for similarities within that group such that the absolute difference in propensity scores 
between i and j is minimized (min |pi – pj| ). 
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ATT = 1NT Y1i − w(i, j)Y0ij∈IC
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∑ . (3.5) 
with IT  being the set of treated firms, NT  the number of treated firms and IC  being 
the set of control firms (Smith and Todd, 2005). The choice between different 
matching algorithms affects the number of control plants as well as the weight 
w(i, j)∈ 0,1[ ]  of each control observation. 
We apply the Kernel matching estimator as proposed by Heckman et al. (1998) and 
Smith and Todd (2005). Kernel matching forms a weighting function by considering 
all observations of the untreated group. The weights reflect the distance between a 
treated observation i and a control observation j. Using a kernel function G(x)  with 
bandwidth parameter h, the weight assigned to control observation j is  
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In our case, we use the Epanechnikov kernel implying that among the untreated 
group, observations are chosen in a moving window within a fixed caliper 
(bandwidth) h from pi − pj < h  (Heckman et al., 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005). 
Thus, we calculate the counterfactual as the weighted average of all control units 
while the weight is higher for observations with similar propensity score. This 
estimator provides the best properties in terms of a tradeoff between bias and 
efficiency (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
58 
 
3.4.2 Matched sample 
We need to include all variables Xi  that influence both the outcome variable as well 
as the treatment variable (DAL-induced investments) in order to support the CIA 
(e.g., Sianesi, 2004; Smith and Todd, 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
The decision to invest during the time of DAL is non-random and can be formulated 
as a capital accumulation optimization problem (e.g., Jorgenson, 1963). Firms 
maximize the present value of a profit stream subject to a production function 
relating the flow of output to flows of labor and capital services (Hall and Jorgenson, 
1967). Plants maximize profits by choosing optimal amounts of input and labor 
under budget time constraints. The degree of the use of the DAL bonus depreciation, 
in turn, is a function of investment requirements and planned investments. We 
therefore include a large set of plant characteristics to capture the plants’ constraints 
and preferences with respect to investment behavior and particularities of the 
businesses. The set of covariates can be differentiated into four groups: structural 
plant characteristics, input structure, capital activity, market participation and 
regional economic characteristics (see Table 3.4 for more details).  
Since we expect differences in size and investment behavior depending on structural 
plant characteristics, we control for type of plant, industry sector, product category, 
and legal form. For instance, single businesses and partnerships are less likely to 
benefit from the DAL due to lower investment levels, which, in turn, result in lower 
growth compared to incorporated multinational firms. Also, we include industry 
dummies to consider industry-wide differences in investments due to different 
requirements. 
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Table 3.4: Description of variables of the conditioning set 
Structural plant characteristics 
 Plant type Dummies indicating whether the plant is a single business, a plant belonging to 
a nationally operating firm with multiple plants, a plant being part of a 
multinational enterprise or a plant owned by a foreign firm. 
Industry sector Dummies indicating the economic branch classified by WZ2003. 
Product category Dummies indicating production of intermediate goods, investment goods, 
commodities, consumer goods or energy. 
Legal form Dummies indicating legal form, which is single business, partnerships or 
corporations. 
Input 
 Material input use Log material use 
 Energy use Log energy use 
 R&D expenditure Log expenditure for R&D 
 R&D wage payments Log wage payments for R&D staff 
Capital activity 
 Interest payments Log interest payments 
 Capital stock Estimated capital stock (see Eichfelder and Schneider, 2014 for detailed 
procedure) 
Market participation 
 Share of exports Share of exports on turnover in % 
 Share of manufacturing Share of manufacturing on turnover in % 
Regional macroeconomic variables 
 Unemployment rate District-level unemployment rate in % 
 GDP per capita District-level GDP per capita 
 Population District-level population 
For instance, to capture the plants’ input choices, we include the input of materials, 
energy use, R&D expenditure and R&D wage payments as well as the square of 
those variables to capture non-linear effects. Non-linear effects might be relevant; as 
for instance firms that invest more in R&D are more likely to have follow-up 
investments due to the sunk-cost characteristic of R&D expenditures (Sutton, 1991). 
We also include interest payments and interest payment squared in the conditioning 
set to proxy for financing structure and capital structure. The capital stock of a plant 
could also influence DAL-induced investments and firm growth. Therefore, we 
control for the estimated capital stock at the beginning of a period and its square to 
capture differences in asset endowments. Moreover, we include the share of exports 
on turnover, the share of manufacturing on turnover to account for the international 
orientation of the business, and the focus of the plant on the manufacturing industry. 
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Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics by region (match-paired sample) 
Panel A: GERMANY n Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables    
Turnover (1,000,000 Euro) 178,302 19.89 145.33 
Number of employees 178,302 104.67 346.53 
Log turnover 178,302 15.49 1.43 
Log staff 178,302 3.96 1.08 
Real Investments    
Gross investment (1,000 Euro) 178,302 969.59 8278.47 
Building investment (1,000  Euro) 178,302 132.05 1211.85 
Equipment investment (1,000 Euro) 178,302 831.63 7580.85 
Control variables    
Capital stock (1,000 Euro) 178,302 4700.79 17488.15 
Share of exports (%) 178,302 12.32 20.72 
Share of manufacturing (%) 178,302 95.10 13.21 
GDP per capita (1,000 Euro) 178,302 19.96 5.78 
Population (1,000) 178,302 198.47 141.76 
Unemployment rate (%) 178,302 15.09 3.86 
Panel B: WEST n Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables    
Turnover (1,000,000 Euro) 89,151 24.84 191.32 
Number of employees 89,151 124.60 462.39 
Log turnover 89,151 15.63 1.49 
Log staff 89,151 4.02 1.16 
Real Investments    
Gross investment (1,000 Euro) 89,151 950.53 8106.85 
Building investment (1,000  Euro) 89,151 113.86 1117.00 
Equipment investment (1,000 Euro) 89,151 831.01 7443.07 
Control variables    
Capital stock (1,000 Euro) 89,151 4953.59 19487.77 
Share of exports (%) 89,151 14.45 21.76 
Share of manufacturing (%) 89,151 94.91 13.32 
GDP per capita (1,000 Euro) 89,151 22.06 6.09 
Population (1,000) 89,151 239.64 166.49 
Unemployment rate (%) 89,151 12.58 2.71 
Panel C: EAST n Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables    
Turnover (1,000,000 Euro) 89,151 14.95 74.76 
Number of employees 89,151 84.74 159.88 
Log turnover 89,151 15.36 1.34 
Log staff 89,151 3.90 0.99 
Real Investments     
Gross investment (1,000 Euro) 89,151 988.65 8446.60 
Building investment (1,000  Euro) 89,151 150.23 1299.56 
Equipment investment (1,000 Euro) 89,151 832.25 7716.20 
Control variables    
Capital stock (1,000 Euro) 89,151 4447.99 15224.10 
Share of exports (%) 89,151 10.18 19.40 
Share of manufacturing (%) 89,151 95.28 13.11 
GDP per capita (1,000 Euro) 89,151 17.86 4.56 
Population (1,000) 89,151 157.29 95.29 
Unemployment rate (%) 89,151 17.60 3.13 
Source: Data from the AFiD enterprise panel (1995-2008), own 
calculations. 
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Finally, in order to approximate regional structural differences, we further control for 
macroeconomic differences in different regions by including the regional 
unemployment rate, regional GDP per capita and population on the district level.  
3.4.3 Long-term effects of bonus depreciation 
We are not only interested in the short-term effects of the bonus depreciation on 
firms by means of increased investments activities, but also in the long-term causal 
effects of the DAL and thus the convergence process between the economy in 
Eastern and Western Germany. In order to study the long-run effects, we make use of 
the matching approach and hence exclude unmatched plants.  This leaves us with a 
total of 178,302 observations in the match-paired sample. Table 3.5 summarizes the 
plant data by affiliation status with West German parent firms. Panel A describes the 
data for all observations (in real terms), while the panels B and C document 
descriptive statistics for Western plants (89,151 observations) and Eastern plants 
(89,151 observations) for 1995 to 2008. 
We consider the panel data between 2000 and 2008 and include the sum of past 
investments between 1995 and 1998 (time period of the DAL) as time-invariant 
explanatory variables. Thus, we estimate the model 
yi,t = γ 0 ⋅east + β1 ⋅ Ii,t−1 + β2 ⋅ Ii,t−1 ⋅east + β3 ⋅Xi,t
+γ 1 ⋅ Ii,95−98∑ + γ 2 ⋅ Ii,95−98∑ ⋅east +α i +δ t + ui,t.
 
(3.7
) 
The dependent variable is either log turnover or log number of employees between 
2000 and 2008. We include a dummy variable equal to one if the plant is located in 
Eastern Germany. Furthermore, we include lagged investments as well as an 
interaction of lagged investment and east. Including the sum of investments between 
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1995 and 1998 and its interaction with the east-dummy allows us to assess the long-
term effects of investments on our dependent variable. A fixed effects approach 
would sweep out firm specific effects but also time-invariant regressors. Hence, we 
apply the random effects model, keeping the known drawbacks of the approach in 
mind.  
We think that growth of plants within one firm and year are likely to be highly 
correlated because any increase in turnover of the plant in one year is likely to 
correlate with the growth of another plant of the same firm in the same year. By 
treating the observations as non-i.i.d., we avoid overstating of the precision of the 
standard estimator’s variance (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Thus, we allow for 
correlation in our dependent variable across plants within a firm-plant-year cell by 
clustering the standard errors by firm-plant-year. 
Furthermore, we include a variable, Δ i,t , in the regression capturing the extent to 
which plants in Eastern Germany invest differently compared to plants in Western 
Germany. This variable is calculated in three steps. We first regress each type of 
investment by Western plants on all available control variables. Then, we predict Iˆi,t  
for both types of investments in Eastern and Western Germany using the estimated 
coefficients. We compare the predicted investments with the actual investments to 
obtain a counterfactual measure of how Eastern plants would have invested if they 
faced the same conditions as the Western counterparts. This is calculated as the 
difference of the actual amount of investment and the predicted investments. We 
denote this measure as the relative predicted difference in investments which is given 
by 
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Average effect of bonus depreciation on DAL-investing plants 
We display the average treatment effects of the bonus depreciation for treated plants 
in Table 3.6. The ATT for turnover is statistically significant and about 0.197. With 
log-transformed outcome variables, the coefficients can be interpreted as semi-
elasticities using an approximation proposed by Kennedy (1981). The relative 
changes in the outcome variable depending on subsidy granting is given by 
exp ATˆTi − 12 ⋅Var ATˆTi( )( )−1  where ATˆTi  is the estimated regression coefficient 
and Var ATˆTi( )  is the variance. For the turnover level, the estimated ATT indicates 
that plants benefitting from the DAL bonus depreciation show a higher level of 
turnover by 21.7%30. Using turnover growth as the dependent variable, we obtain a 
statistically significant negative coefficient of -0.05 indicating that the turnover 
growth is slower for DAL-incentivized investments by Eastern plants by 5%31. Thus, 
DAL investments might have a negative effect on turnover growth and possibly point 
to a hampered convergence process.  
                                                
30 The relative change in turnover by DAL is obtained by using the transformation according to 
Kennedy (1981), i.e. exp(0.1966 - 0.5 · 0.03082) - 1 = 0.2167. 
31 This relative change is also obtained using the transformation according to Kennedy (1981). 
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Table 3.6: Average treatment effect on the treated 
 Turnover Turnover 
growth 
N° employees N° employees 
growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
ATT 0.1966*** 
(0.0308) 
-0.0503*** 
(0.0088) 
0.2326*** 
(0.024) 
-0.0240*** 
(0.0051) 
t-stat 6.39 -5.72 9.36 -4.70 
     
N treatment 6,698 6,698 6,698 6,698 
N control 28,980 28,980 28,980 28,980 
N off-
support 
23,995 23,995 23,995 23,995 
Median 
bias (%) 
2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
Notes: Kernel matching estimation with bandwidth 0.06. The outcome variables are log 
turnover, log number of employees, and their growth rates respectively. Treatment 
dummy is DAL bonus depreciation. The propensity score is estimated via probit (in 
Table A.1).  
Source: AFiD enterprise panel (1995-2008), own calculations. 
After matching, we are able to attribute the effect found to the bonus depreciation 
and to reject our Hypothesis 1 that the DAL is associated to equally productive as 
non-subsidized investments. More precisely, we find that DAL bonus depreciation 
leads to higher turnover levels for Eastern plants while growth of DAL-investments 
is yet lower than that of unsubsidized investments by Western plants. Similarly, this 
also holds for number of employees. Here, the ATT reveals that the DAL bonus 
depreciation increases number of employees by 26.1%32 while its growth slows 
down by 2.4%.  
3.5.2 Matching quality 
The first part of the propensity score matching comprises of the estimation of plant-
individual propensity scores reflecting the predicted probabilities of DAL-
incentivized investment on the basis on observable covariates (the estimated 
coefficients of this step are displayed in Table A.1 of the appendix). Most 
importantly, the results indicate that plants being part of an enterprise group are less 
                                                
32 This relative change and the following are also obtained using the transformation according to 
Kennedy (1981). 
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likely to be located in the East and to benefit from DAL. Then, producers of 
investment goods and producers of consumer goods have a higher likelihood of 
benefitting from the DAL. Also, a plant being incorporated positively affects the 
likelihood of DAL. 
With the estimated propensity scores and the chosen matching method, we are able 
determine the selective choice of investing in Eastern Germany during the time of the 
DAL. Assessing the covariate balance between both groups is crucial in matching 
methods. By looking at the overall statistics on covariate balance, we are able to have 
a glance on the appropriateness of the chosen method. 
Table 3.7: Overall statistics on covariate balance 
Sample  Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Mean bias Median bias 
Unmatched 0.624 26179.42 0.000 22.9 5.7 
Matched 0.034 625.18 0.000 4.6 2.9 
Source: Data from the AFiD enterprise panel (1995-2008), own calculations. 
Table 3.7 indicates a satisfying matching quality. The pseudo-R2 values indicate that 
the explanatory power of the covariates is lower in the matched sample (0.03) than in 
the unmatched sample (0.62) but also show that in the matched sample, systematic 
differences between treatment and control group are eliminated by the matching 
algorithm (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Testing for the hypothesis that all 
coefficients are zero with a likelihood test, can be rejected in the unmatched sample. 
In contrast, we cannot reject the hypothesis in the case of the matched sample. This 
just confirms that by matching the probability to benefit from DAL (being in the 
East) is unrelated to observable firm characteristics. Finally, the mean bias before 
matching equals 22.9% reduces after matching to 4.6%. 
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Figure 3.2: Assessment of the common support assumption  
Notes: Kernel density plots of the propensity to benefit from DAL bonus depreciation with 
bandwidth 0.06.  
Source: Data from the AFiD enterprise panel (2015), own graph. 
We assess the common support condition graphically by depicting the kernel plot for 
the propensity scores for plants with and without treatment (Figure 3.2). The graph 
shows an intersection of the supports of the propensity score of treated and control 
cases so that both treatment and control groups have an overlap in the propensity 
which technically allows us the comparison of both groups conditional on the choice 
of covariates. There is a higher mass of distribution at the lower levels of the 
propensity score for plants without DAL treatment. The reason may be that plants 
who do not benefit from DAL are the numerous plants located in the Western part of 
Germany which are unable to benefit from DAL. Also, a higher mass of distribution 
of the propensity score for DAL-treated plants gives rise to the fact that almost all 
Eastern plants made use of the bonus depreciation. 
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The similarity of the treatment and the control group is crucial for the estimation of 
treatment effects. Therefore, matching should not only balance in propensity score 
but also in the observable plant characteristic. For almost all covariates, the means of 
treatment and control group, we are able to reject the hypothesis of mean difference 
which can be interpreted as an indicator for appropriate matching quality (see Table 
3.8).  
Table 3.8: Sample descriptive statistics after kernel matching with bandwidth 0.06 
 
DAL 
Treatment 
(n = 6,698) 
no-DAL 
Control 
(n = 28,980) 
Std. 
bias 
(%) 
t-stat 
p-value 
of t-tests on 
mean 
differences 
Plant part of an enterprise group 0.022 0.028 -2.9 -2.52 0.012 
Plant part of a foreign enterprise 0.418 0.441 -4.8 -2.75 0.006 
Investment goods producer 0.357 0.361 -1 -0.58 0.563 
Durable goods producer 0.051 0.043 4 2.42 0.016 
Food, drink, and consumer goods 
producer 0.132 0.121 3.4 1.94 0.052 
Energy producer 0.001 0.001 -1.3 -0.96 0.338 
Incorporated 0.809 0.813 -1 -0.62 0.533 
Other legal form 0.003 0.001 2.9 2.09 0.037 
Resource input use 16.500 16.327 8.3 4.59 0.000 
Resource input use² (×1018) 3.000 2.300 1.6 2.06 0.04 
Energy use 13.291 13.127 7.6 4.37 0.000 
Energy use² (×1015) 1.500 1.00 0.6 1.61 0.108 
Interest payments 12.564 12.448 4.7 2.82 0.005 
Interest payments² (×1016) 1.400 1.200 2.5 1.38 0.169 
R&D expenditure 13.134 13.055 3.1 1.84 0.065 
R&D expenditure² (×1016) 178.770 176.640 2.9 1.72 0.086 
R&D wage payments 2.275 2.178 4.8 2.92 0.004 
R&D wage payments² (×106) 7.1 6.0 2.5 1.33 0.185 
Capital stock 15.368 15.078 21.1 12.53 0.000 
Capital stock² 238.050 229.080 20.7 12.39 0.000 
Share of exports 0.240 0.234 2 1.19 0.236 
Share of exports² 0.124 0.122 0.9 0.58 0.564 
Share of manufacturing 0.959 0.959 -0.1 -0.1 0.917 
Share of manufacturing²  0.931 0.932 -0.4 -0.31 0.755 
Unemployment rate 17.956 18.107 -4.3 -2.28 0.023 
GDP per capita 9.806 9.846 -14.1 -9.87 0.000 
Population 11.868 11.856 1.9 1.23 0.219 
Notes: Descriptive statistics of the full sample versus the matched sample after kernel 
matching using bandwidth 0.06.  
Source: Data from the AFiD enterprise panel (1995-2008), own calculations. 
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) the standardized bias gives a more 
robust measure of covariate balance. A standardized bias below 5% is in most of the 
cases given which indicates good matching quality (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
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In some cases such as capital stock the standardized bias remains large which can be 
explained by the fact that Eastern and Western Germany are after reunification in 
terms of infrastructure still in a process of convergence. Overall, matching works 
sufficiently well in obtaining a control group similar to the treatment group. 
The observable determinants of DAL treatment work well conditional on ruling out 
the influence of unobservables such that the remaining assignment to control and 
treatment group is as good as random, given the propensity score. Hence, we are able 
to compute the differences in our outcome variables. 
3.5.3 Long-term effects of DAL-incentivized investments 
Based on the results presented in Section 3.5.1, we suspect that the large differences 
in turnover and employment cannot be directly attributed to the DAL and that the 
longevity of investments plays a crucial role for the development of businesses. 
Therefore, we focus on investments as the channel driving turnover and employment. 
By estimating the random effects specification using the matched sample, we focus 
on long-run implications of investments while taking into consideration the 
differences across both parts of Germany. The results are summarized in Table 3.9.  
The coefficient of the east-dummy is negative and significant in all specifications. 
Thus, the level of turnover in the post-DAL period is lower in East German plants 
compared to West German plants. The elasticity of lagged building investments 
(It-1 Build) implies increases in turnover of 0.01%, when lagged investments increase 
by 10%. However, these elasticities are only significant to the 5% level in columns 
(1) and (2), and become insignificant in column (3) when adding the relative 
predicted difference in investment. Analogously for lagged equipment investments 
(It-1Equip), the elasticities imply changes in turnover between 0.05 and 0.1% as 
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investments increase by 10% in the previous period. The interaction of investments 
in buildings and the east-dummy (It-1 Build · east) is negative but insignificant. On the 
contrary, the interaction effect for equipment investment is positive but insignificant. 
Both results indicate that buildings and equipment investments after 1998 have the 
same effects on turnover for Eastern and Western plants.  
By looking at coefficients of the sum of investments before 1999 (Σ I95-98), we find 
the expected positive and significant relationship between past investments and 
turnover. The elasticities imply increases in turnover of about 0.1% following 
increases in building investments before 1999 (Σ I95-98 Build) of 10%. In case of 
equipment investments (Σ I95-98 Equip), increases in investments during the period 
1995 to 1998 of 10% imply increases in turnover of 0.08%.  
When interacting the sum of buildings investments before 1999 with the east-dummy 
(Σ I95-98Build·east), the coefficient indicates smaller but also positive effects of 
investments before 1999 on turnover in Eastern Germany. That is Eastern plants 
increasing building investments during the DAL period by 10% are associated with 
turnover increases of about 0.08% which is significant at the 5% level. For the 
interaction term, the coefficients show that increases in equipment investments 
during DAL in the East (Σ I95-98 Equip · east) is negative but insignificant.  
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Table 3.9: Long-term effects of DAL-induced investments on post-DAL log turnover and log 
number of employees in a random effects model (2000-08) – matched-paired sample 
  Turnover  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Eastern plants -0.599*** -0.493*** -0.498*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0443) (0.0440) 
    
It-1 Build 0.000944** 0.000903** 0.000669 
 (0.000426) (0.000425) (0.000416) 
It-1 Build · east -0.000467 -8.90e-05 -0.06e-05 
 (0.000997) (0.000982) (0.000977) 
It-1 Equip 0.00469*** 0.00468*** 0.00406*** 
 (0.000910) (0.000908) (0.000892) 
It-1 Equip · east 0.00234 0.00237 0.00264 
 (0.00195) (0.00195) (0.00192) 
    
ΣI 95-98Build 0.0136*** 0.0138*** 0.0132*** 
 (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00148) 
ΣI 95-98Build· east 0.00791** 0.00799** 0.00797** 
 (0.00354) (0.00355) (0.00352) 
ΣI 95-98Equip 0.00864*** 0.00828*** 0.00793*** 
 (0.00180) (0.00181) (0.00180) 
ΣI95-98Equip· east -0.00438 -0.00345 -0.00309 
 (0.00383) (0.00384) (0.00381) 
Δ Build   0.00152*** 
   (0.000388) 
Δ Equip   0.00739*** 
   (0.000900) 
Constant 8.411*** 0.0138*** 7.034*** 
 (0.163) (0.00149) (0.336) 
    
Observations 30,744 30,744 30,744 
    
Capital stock YES YES YES 
Plant-level controls YES YES YES 
Macroeconomic controls NO YES YES 
    
Year effects YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES 
    
Within R2 0.155 0.159 0.161 
Between R2 0.746 0.746 0.749 
Overall R2 0.733 0.732 0.734 
Number of Establishments 8,627 8,627 8,627 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Data from the AFiD enterprise panel (1995-2008), own calculations. 
As expected, the results imply that investing in buildings and equipment during the 
time of DAL increases turnover in the post-DAL period in both parts of Germany. 
However, the respective interaction terms imply that there are differences in the 
development of business depending on the types of investment. Hence, we find no 
effect of subsidized equipment investment on turnover. Nevertheless, building 
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investments that benefitted from the DAL are associated with higher turnover. This 
suggests that investments in infrastructures, i.e. buildings, might have been necessary 
to build the minimum infrastructure and thus to ensure long-term development of 
businesses in Eastern Germany. In comparison, the effect of DAL-benefitting 
equipment investments with shorter longevity suggests less a supporting effect in the 
development of businesses than the building investments. Thus, the results might be 
interpreted as evidence for Hypothesis 2. 
When including the relative predicted difference in investments (column 3 of Table 
3.9) in the estimation equation, the coefficients reveal for both types of investments a 
positive and significant relationship. In economic magnitude, the coefficients for 
building investments reveal that increasing investments of 10% in addition to what 
Western plants would have invested increases turnover by 0.01%. In case of 
equipment investments, this is even larger at almost 0.1%.  
Since the relative predicted difference in investments reflects the investment amount 
that Eastern plants hypothetically invest in addition to what Western plants invest, 
this result reflects how Eastern plants’ overinvesting behavior affects their 
development. The DAL seems to induce higher investment compared to Western 
plants that do not contribute to the development of business and hence reflects 
overinvestment behavior of subsidized plants. Consequently, firm growth resulting 
from DAL-incentivized overinvestments is different than growth from non-
subsidized investments and hence, we are able to reject Hypothesis 1. And again, the 
differences in the coefficients across types of investments suggest that the effect of 
overinvestment by DAL-incentivized equipment investments on turnover is lower 
than that of building investments. In comparison, building investments affecting the 
long-term development and being indispensable to revive the Eastern economy may 
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have suffered less from overinvestment. Thus, we find further evidence for 
Hypothesis 2.  
Table 3.10: Long-term effects of DAL-induced investments on post-DAL log number of 
employees in a random effects model (2000-08) – matched-paired sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N° of employees 
    
Eastern plants -0.295*** -0.232*** -0.234*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0242) (0.0240) 
    
It-1 Build 0.000212 0.000170 0.000108 
 (0.000197) (0.000197) (0.000189) 
It-1 Build · east 0.000845 0.00111* 0.00112** 
 (0.000579) (0.000572) (0.000570) 
It-1 Equip 0.00258*** 0.00258*** 0.00233*** 
 (0.000451) (0.000448) (0.000442) 
It-1 Equip · east 0.00114 0.00113 0.00124 
 (0.00103) (0.00102) (0.00102) 
    
ΣI 95-98Build 0.00653*** 0.00661*** 0.00643*** 
 (0.000914) (0.000916) (0.000911) 
ΣI 95-98Build· east 0.00808*** 0.00805*** 0.00803*** 
 (0.00197) (0.00197) (0.00196) 
ΣI 95-98Equip 0.0117*** 0.0113*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.00104) (0.00105) (0.00105) 
ΣI 95-98Equip· east -0.00646*** -0.00569*** -0.00554*** 
 (0.00212) (0.00213) (0.00212) 
Δ Buildi   0.000285 
   (0.000204) 
Δ Equipi   0.00339*** 
   (0.000415) 
Constant -3.717*** -3.656*** -3.670*** 
 (0.135) (0.222) (0.221) 
    
Observations 30,744 30,744 30,744 
Capital stock NO YES YES 
Plant-level controls NO YES YES 
Macroeconomic controls NO NO YES 
Year effects YES YES YES 
Industry effects NO YES YES 
Industry year effcts NO NO NO 
Within R2 0.480 0.485 0.486 
Between R2 0.884 0.884 0.885 
Overall R2 0.866 0.866 0.867 
Number of Establishments 8,627 8,627 8,627 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: Data from the AFiD enterprise panel (1995-2008), own calculations. 
Since employee growth in a plant also reflects economic growth, we use log 
employment as the dependent variable in (3.7) and (3.9) with the log number of 
employees (see Table 3.10). The coefficients for the dummy indicating the location 
of the plant in Eastern Germany are always negative and significant. By looking at 
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the coefficients for the lagged investments in buildings for both parts of Germany, 
we find no effect on number of employees. Also, when interacting, lagged building 
investments with the east-dummy, we obtain virtually no significant coefficient 
estimates. This however does not hold in the case of lagged equipment investments. 
As in the previous specification with turnover as outcome variable, lagged equipment 
investments are positively associated with number of employees. Regarding the 
interaction term of lagged equipment investments and the east-dummy, we find no 
effect on the number of employees.  
The effects stemming from the sum of investments between 1995 and 1998 are more 
pronounced in case of number of employees as compared to turnover. The 
coefficients for sum of building investments between 1995 and 1998 positively 
affects the number of employees and suggest an increase of about 0.06% following 
increases in building investments of 10%. In Eastern Germany, building investments 
during that same period even reveal a higher elasticity, i.e. 0.08% increase in number 
of employees following a 10% increase in investments. When looking at the 
coefficients for the sum of investments in equipment between 1995 and 1998, the 
coefficients reveal a larger effect of 0.1% following a 10% increase in equipment 
investments during the DAL-period. When interacting the sum of equipment 
investments between 1995 and 1998, the coefficients reveal negative effects on 
number of employees. The elasticity of these investments imply a decrease in 
number of employees of 0.06% following increases in equipment investments during 
the DAL in Eastern Germany. Just like the results for turnover, this finding confirms 
that Eastern plants overinvested in equipment as result of the DAL, which cannot be 
confirmed for building investments. 
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Finally, the relative predicted difference in investments reveal no effect in case of 
building investments but also positive effects in case of equipment investments as in 
the case of turnover. The coefficient implies that increasing equipment investments 
of 10% in addition to what Western plants would have invested increases number of 
employees by 0.03%. Thus, we find qualitatively the same results as for turnover. 
However, but the effects are even more pronounced which gives us additional 
confidence in rejecting Hypothesis 1 and supporting Hypothesis 2. 
This empirical analysis has several limitations. First, the quality of matching 
techniques requires detailed plant-level data. In our analysis, we are able to reduce 
the median bias between treatment and control group to 2.9%. However, matching 
estimators are not robust to a “hidden bias” (Rosenbaum, 2002, pp. 105-110; Morgan 
and Winship, 2007, p. 122; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). This is a general problem 
that can be solved best by sensitivity analyses. Using various matching estimators, 
we are able to sufficiently reduce bias and to obtain robust results (see Table A. 2). 
Second, applying a match-paired sample regression analysis assumes that the 
estimated propensity score of receiving treatment is the true one. In our approach, we 
are unable to consider that the selective choice of investing in Eastern Germany 
during the time of the DAL is estimated and hence, standard errors might be biased 
to the extent that matching is biased. But applying various matching approaches, we 
choose the one with the smallest median bias for the match-paired analysis to ensure 
that subsequent biases are also limited.  
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3.6 Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we study the effects of the DAL bonus depreciation on turnover and 
employment of German businesses. In particular, we focus on the long-term effects 
of DAL-incentivized investments that have implications on the convergence process. 
The potential of the available plant-level data allows us to analyze the effects of 
German tax policy on the real economy. Despite the mentioned drawbacks, the main 
result points that the level of investments during the DAL was higher in the Eastern 
part of Germany as a result of a “gold rush fever” of Western entrepreneurs after the 
German Reunification. As Eastern Germany opened its borders, a new market was 
accessible to investors and entrepreneurs. It seems that the subsidy program 
strengthened the Eastern German market by increased investment but could not solve 
problems associated with riskiness of unestablished markets in terms of incertitude 
and information asymmetries. Consequently, the subsidized investments in long-
lived capital goods seem to at least partially pay out in the long run. Also, since 
Eastern Germany after Reunification had neither the economic nor the infrastructural 
conditions to accommodate new investors, the subsidy seemed to be a suitable 
gateway to ensure the minimum structural capacity in form of buildings. However, 
DAL-incentivized investments in equipment reveal large inefficiencies in the sense 
of overinvestment behavior. The subsidized equipment investments did not enhance 
the development of firm turnover in the same way as the non-subsidized investment. 
This has implications for the evaluation of policies based on tax incentives. While 
this paper can certainly not give a final answer to the question of the long-run 
efficiency of tax incentives or the welfare effect of the policy, our results can add to 
this important debate. 
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Appendix A 
Table A. 1: Estimation of DAL bonus depreciation dummy 
 
Coefficient Std.Err. 
Plant part of an enterprise group -0.5450*** 0.0627 
Plant part of a foreign enterprise 0.0252 0.0312 
Investment goods producer 0.1835*** 0.0397 
Durable goods producer -0.0991 0.0649 
Food, drink, and consumer goods 
producer 0.1460*** 0.0513 
Energy producer 0.4408 0.5135 
Incorporated 0.2430*** 0.0271 
Other legal form 0.2290 0.1886 
Resource input use -0.1001*** 0.0136 
Resource input use² 0.0000 0.0000 
Energy use 0.0593*** 0.0124 
Energy use² 0.0000*** 0.0000 
Interest payments -0.0028 0.0068 
Interest payments² 0.0000*** 0.0000 
R&D expenditure 0.1772*** 0.0389 
R&D expenditure² -0.0089*** 0.0016 
R&D wage payments 0.0887*** 0.0153 
R&D wage payments² 0.0000** 0.0000 
Capital stock -0.3899*** 0.1397 
Capital stock² 0.0172*** 0.0045 
Share of exports -1.3472*** 0.1335 
Share of exports² 0.9907*** 0.1598 
Share of manufacturing 0.2662 0.5148 
Share of manufacturing² 0.2408 0.3497 
Unemployment rate 0.2305*** 0.0027 
GDP per capita -1.8990*** 0.0488 
Population -0.0937*** 0.0193 
Constant 17.3930*** 1.2349 
Year dummies Yes  
Branch dummies Yes  
Observations 60,031  
LR Chi2 26222.92  
p 0.0000  
Log-likelihood -7916.2353  
Pseudo R2 0.6235  
Significance levels *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
Notes: Probit estimation of DAL bonus depreciation.  
Source: Data from the AFiD enterprise panel (1995-2008), own 
calculations. 
A.1 Robustness 
We further check the robustness of the results in additional analyses. Since the 
chosen matching algorithm might drive the results, we also apply kernel matching 
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with different bandwidths and nearest neighbor matching (Table A. 2). Throughout 
all matching algorithms, we are able to confirm robustness in the estimated ATTs. 
Sign and significance are stable for all specifications. The economic magnitude of 
the ATTs only varies slightly with different matching specifications. 
Table A. 2: Robustness check - various matching algorithms 
 Kernel matching Nearest neighbor matching, caliper 0.001 
 0.03 0.01 one neighbor  five neighbors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Turnover     
ATT 0.2126*** 
(0.0311) 
0.2191*** 
(0.0313) 
0.1909*** 
(0.0451) 
0.2077*** 
(0.0375) 
t-stat 6.84 7.00 4.23 5.54 
Turnover growth     
ATT 
 
-0.0512*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0516*** 
(0.0090) 
-0.0370*** 
(0.0159) 
-0.0532*** 
(0.0115) 
t-stat -5.74 -5.75 -2.32 -4.61 
N° employees     
ATT  0.2425*** 
(0.025) 
0.2463*** 
(0.0253) 
0.2395*** 
(0.0355) 
0.2341*** 
(0.0299) 
t-stat 9.65 9.73 6.74 7.82 
N° employees growth 
ATT  -0.0251*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0257*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.02383*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.0284*** 
(0.0075) 
t-stat -4.85 -4.92 -2.43 -3.79 
     
N treatment 6,698 6,698 6,625 6,625 
N control 28,980 28,980 28,060 28,060 
N off-support 23,995 23,995 24,988 24,988 
Median bias (%) 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
Notes: The outcome variables are log turnover, log number of employees, and their growth rates 
respectively. Treatment dummy is DAL bonus depreciation. The propensity score is estimated via 
probit (in Table A. 1). Different specifications estimated are kernel matching with various bandwidths 
and nearest neighbor matching with one neighbor and five neighbors.  
Source: Data from the AFiD enterprise panel (1995-2008), own calculations. 
We also estimate a specification based on Eqn. (3.7) and (3.9) in which we collapse 
the data to a cross-section of establishments in order to estimate the long-run effects 
of average investments between 1999 and 2007, the sum of investments during the 
DAL on average turnover and employment between 2000 and 2008 and the relative 
predicted difference in investments: 
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Table A. 3: Long-term effects of DAL-induced investments on post-DAL log turnover in the 
cross-section (2000-08) – match-paired sample 
  Turnover  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Eastern plants -0.785*** -0.804*** -0.814*** 
 (0.0689) (0.0736) (0.0736) 
I 99-07 Build -0.00211 -0.00188 -0.00737*** 
 (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00254) 
I 99-07 Build · east 0.0125*** 0.0123*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.00400) (0.00402) (0.00401) 
I 99-07 Equip  0.0215*** 0.0213*** 0.00433 
 (0.00316) (0.00314) (0.00409) 
I 99-07 Equip · east 0.0185*** 0.0192*** 0.0195*** 
 (0.00605) (0.00608) (0.00607) 
ΣI 95-98Build 0.00339** 0.00340** 0.00300** 
 (0.00138) (0.00138) (0.00138) 
ΣI 95-98Build· east 0.00329 0.00313 0.00337 
 (0.00349) (0.00349) (0.00347) 
ΣI 95-98Equip -0.00152 -0.00120 -0.00130 
 (0.00158) (0.00159) (0.00158) 
ΣI 95-98Equip· east 0.00173 0.000963 0.00114 
 (0.00358) (0.00360) (0.00358) 
Δ Buildi   0.00681*** 
   (0.00236) 
Δ Equipi   0.0249*** 
   (0.00378) 
Constant 5.815*** 5.332*** 5.308*** 
 (0.131) (0.340) (0.339) 
    
Observations 8,627 8,627 8,627 
R-squared 0.764 0.765 0.767 
Capital stock YES YES YES 
Plant-level controls YES YES YES 
Macroeconomic controls NO YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: Data from the AFiD enterprise panel (1995-2008), own calculations. 
Table A. 3 summarizes the cross-section regression results for the estimates. As 
expected, the results are qualitatively the same as in the random effects specifications 
but are larger in magnitudes. The coefficients of the sum of investments however are 
in almost all specifications insignificant except for past building in both Eastern and 
Western plants. Especially the coefficients for the relative predicted difference reveal 
that long-term effects of the DAL-incentivized investments have long lasting effects 
on firm growth. 
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4 R&D investment behavior during a crisis: What is the 
role of subsidies? 
 
4.1  Introduction 
With increasing importance of technological development, innovations have become 
crucial in fostering economic growth (Schumpeter, 1942; Grossman and Helpman, 
1991; Howitt and Aghion, 1998). Many countries have adopted public innovation 
grants to support private R&D investments. Switzerland, through the Commission 
for Technology and Innovation (CTI), put into place a nationwide grant for R&D 
investments. This allows firms to apply for R&D project related funding. While the 
effect of public policy on firm’s investment in R&D is still not fully understood, the 
effect of R&D policy in times of economic crisis is even less well understood. 
During the last decade, the financial crisis that started in 2008 certainly affected the 
global economy and governments reacted by expansionary fiscal policy that aimed at 
smoothing the downturn. However, there remains uncertainty during economic 
fluctuations and it is important to understand how economic fluctuations influence 
the effectiveness of public subsidies and firm behavior.  
So far attention has been paid to the analysis of effectiveness of public subsidies on 
private investment but only few studies investigate the impact of crises on the 
effectiveness of public subsidies on R&D activity (e.g., Hud and Hussinger, 2015; 
Paunov, 2012). Understanding the impact of economic downturns is crucial to assess 
the interplay both between fiscal policy and economic growth as well as the 
interdependencies between technological change and economic growth. Few studies 
have investigated the behavior of firms regarding R&D investments (e.g. Arvanitis 
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and Woerter, 2014) or disentangled the effects of public funds during the crisis on 
firm R&D investment behavior (e.g., Paunov, 2012).  
This paper relates to different fields of empirical literature. First, we contribute to the 
field of innovation economics by analyzing the effect of public subsidies on R&D 
expenditure. Second, this paper relates to the literature analyzing the real effects of 
tax policy. Finally, this study contributes to the financial economics literature 
analyzing the interplay between governmental policy and firm investment behavior. 
We contribute to these three strands of literature by estimating the impact of public 
subsidies on R&D activity. Also, we analyze the impact of the crisis on subsidy 
effectiveness. Further, we document how different R&D firm behavior during the 
crisis alters the effectiveness of public subsidies. 
We use Swiss firm-level data from 2005 to 2013 comprising of four waves. The 
empirical strategy comprises of three steps. First, we analyze whether R&D public 
subsidies have an impact on R&D activity. This analysis consists of the estimation of 
a counterfactual setting in which subsidized firms (treatment group) and 
unsubsidized firms (control group) are compared. Second, we analyze the impact of 
the crisis on R&D effectiveness with a difference-in-differences matching approach. 
Third, using a specific question in the 2013 survey in which firms indicated their 
reaction to the 2008 crisis, we analyze the impact of persistent R&D investment 
behavior on the effectiveness of subsidies. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature and the 
institutional background. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical strategy. Section 4.5 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 4.6 
discusses the main findings and concludes. 
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4.2 Literature review and institutional background 
4.2.1 Public R&D support and crowding out 
Although, technological development is an important driver of economic growth and 
vice versa (Schumpeter, 1942; Schmookler, 1976; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Howitt and Aghion, 1998), firms have an incentive to 
underinvest in R&D due to the public good characteristic of new knowledge. A 
firm’s decision to underinvest in R&D goes along with the fear of other firms free-
riding by imitating its innovations. This problem of incomplete appropriability of 
R&D returns finally leads to a socially suboptimal level of R&D investment (Arrow, 
1962). Yet, even in the absence of incomplete appropriability of R&D returns a 
socially optimal level of R&D investments cannot be reached due to information 
asymmetries between investors and innovating firms and the general risk associated 
with R&D investments (Griliches, 1986).  
These market failures justify the use of public innovation grants to foster private 
R&D activities. Public funding decreases the costs of private R&D projects by 
facilitating the realization of the innovation project. The term ‘additionality effect’ or 
‘crowding in’ refers to the positive effect of public subsidies on private R&D 
expenditure. However, public R&D support can also lead to ‘crowding out’ of 
private R&D investments. This occurs when public R&D funds substitute private 
ones because application costs for public R&D support are relatively low and in case 
of positive decisions, firms exploit benefits from the grant (for literature review see 
David et al., 2000). 
Existing literature analyzed the effectiveness of public R&D subsidies. However, 
empirical findings do not provide conclusive and generally valid results due to the 
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heterogeneity of institutional backgrounds, underlying data, variables used and 
empirical approaches (recent surveys provided by Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014; 
Becker, 2015). 
Studies such as Hussinger (2008) take potential bias by self-selection into public 
funding into consideration by applying a semi-parametric two-step selection model 
using German data. Her results reject the hypothesis of full crowding out of private 
R&D by public subsidies. Aerts and Schmidt (2008) find similar results using data 
for Flanders and Germany using a nonparametric matching estimator combined with 
a difference-in-difference estimator. Like Hussinger (2008), they reject the crowding 
out hypothesis. However, a more recent study by Dai and Cheng (2015) refutes 
previous results using a generalized propensity score approach and hence, find 
support for a partial or even a complete crowding out of private R&D investments 
for Chinese manufacturing firms. 
4.2.2 The role of business cycles  
The “Schumpeterian” idea of creative destruction views technological development 
as a crucial factor in shaping the business cycle and vice versa. Notably, innovations 
aim at capturing the monopoly rents but at the same time destroy monopoly rents that 
motivated previous innovations (Schumpeter, 1942, pp. 81-86; Aghion and Howitt, 
1992; Francois and Lloyd-Ellis, 2009; Filippetti and Archiburgi, 2011).  
In response to economic downturns, governments support the economy by loosening 
their fiscal policy (Romer, 1993; Makkonen, 2013). One fiscal response to recessions 
is the provision of subsidies such as public innovation grants. Even without public 
support, firms’ R&D investment behavior during recessions is ambiguous: R&D 
investment behavior is ‘pro-cyclical’ when investment effort is reduced; on the 
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contrary, R&D investment behavior is ‘counter-cyclical’ when investment effort is 
increased or unchanged. This behavior is independent of business cycles and is also 
referred to as persistency in investing in R&D (Mansfield, 1969).  
An explanation for persistent R&D behavior, i.e. R&D behavior that is independent 
of business cycles, may be sunk costs (Sutton, 1991). Once a firm decides to engage 
in conducting R&D, it faces several setup costs such as staff and infrastructure. 
Hence, it will not stop ongoing R&D projects until the innovation results in a final 
product. Furthermore, persistency in R&D can be due to accumulation of knowledge 
over time reflected in the human capital and its knowledge, skills and creativity 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982, pp. 275-301; Peters, 2009). Another explanation for 
persistency in R&D is ‘true state dependence’ implying that successful innovations 
enhance the technological opportunities and thus making subsequent innovation 
success more likely (Heckman, 1981; Mansfield, 1969; Arqué-Castells, 2013; Peters, 
2009).  
Also, the opportunity-cost argument implies that firms should undertake R&D 
investments when costs are low, i.e., during a crisis, in order to benefit from those 
investments in better times (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998; Barlevy, 2007). Supply-
side driven factors can explain counter-cyclical R&D investment behavior since 
labor costs, for example are lower during downturns. In other words, it would be 
more cost-effective for firms to employ R&D personnel during downturns. For all of 
the reasons, R&D investment behavior may be largely affected during economic 
downturns as firms face important decisions.  
In contrast, pro-cyclical R&D investment behavior may be explained by demand-side 
driven factors when sales are positively related to the investment innovation 
activities (Schmookler, 1976). Moreover, the availability of external financing is a 
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function of agency costs between investors and firms which are pro-cyclical and 
therefore renders R&D investment pro-cyclical (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989).  
Whether R&D investments are pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical has been subject in 
many studies. Theoretical and empirical studies of the cyclicality of R&D 
investments report mixed findings (Griliches, 1990; Comin and Gertler, 2006; 
Francois and Lloyd-Ellis, 2009; Ouyang, 2011a, 2011b; Huergo, Trenado, and 
Ubierma, 2015).  
Recent studies, e.g., Paunov (2012) and Hud and Hussinger (2015) focus on the 
effect of public subsidies during the crisis and find that they support firms’ R&D 
activities during the crisis. From a macroeconomic perspective, Brautzsch et al. 
(2015) also find positive effects of fiscal policy on the stabilization of the economy 
during recessions. 
This brief literature review suggests ambiguous effects of economic fluctuations on 
R&D investment behavior. In the next section, we will discuss the institutional 
background of the Swiss public innovation funding scheme. 
4.2.3 Public funding by the Commission of Technology and 
Innovation 
Switzerland’s overall investment in R&D was CHF 4.6 billion in 2010, 
corresponding to 0.81% of the national GDP. Compared to the other 31 OECD 
countries, Switzerland ranked 11th regarding the ratio of R&D funding as a share of 
GDP. The Commission for Technology and Innovation (CTI) and the Swiss National 
Science Foundation (SNSF) are the two main public agencies that promote 
innovation. The CTI and the SNSF differ mainly in one aspect: whereas the CTI 
focuses on the financing R&D projects with an immediate commercial objective, the 
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SNSF finances applied research. The firms in our data are mainly financed through 
CTI subsidies (CTI, 2011; Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2012). 
A peculiarity of the Swiss system is its bottom-up indirect approach of supporting 
innovation. Private firms can submit their R&D projects (without requirements 
regarding the technological activities) to a committee. Upon approval, the CTI will 
directly fund the public partner (universities, universities of applied sciences or 
research institutes). Receiving the CTI innovation grant requires the recipient to 
contribute at least 50% of the expected project costs (CTI, 2013).33  
Figure 4.1 depicts the R&D project applications over the period 2005-2014. As it can 
be seen, the number of applications is steady between 400 and 600 until 2008, then 
there is an increase in the number of applications in the crisis years from 2009 to 
2010. The relative percentage of approved projects, however, decreases during the 
time of the crisis and recovers after 2011.  
 
Figure 4.1: Time series of R&D project granting by the CTI 
Source: CTI (2013) 
                                                
33 This cooperation is intended to promote an active collaboration between the private and public 
sector. In the period 2005-2010, 51.6 % of the R&D applications have been granted support (CTI, 
2013). 
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4.3 Data 
We use firm-level data from four waves (2005, 2008, 2011, and 2013) provided by 
the Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF) enterprise panel. The panel consists of about 
6,500 firms in the official business register. Roughly 2,000 firms reply to the 
questionnaire in each wave. The panel includes firms from various sectors such as 
the high-tech sector, traditional, modern and construction sector (see Table B. 1 in 
the appendix for a detailed classification of industries and sectors). As the panel 
provides longitudinal data on the micro-level including information on economic 
outcomes as well as firm-level characteristics, it is well-suited for the purpose of this 
study allowing the analysis of responses in the R&D investment behavior of firms. In 
addition to the regular questionnaire, the 2013 questionnaire included a special 
section asking the firms about the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis.  
Table 4.1: Firms receiving domestic public innovation grants  
Year  2005 in % 2008 in % 2011 in % 2013 in % 
Domestic public 
innovation grants 
No 1,352 92.5% 1,108 92.4% 1,094 89.5% 813 85.9% 
Yes 109 7.5% 91 7.6% 128 10.5% 133 14.1% 
Total   1,461  1,199 1,222 946 
Source: Data from KOF (2016), own calculations. 
We consider the waves 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2013 since information regarding 
receipt of public innovation grants have been collected only in these waves. Table 
4.1 shows the number of Swiss firms in each wave and the percentage of publicly 
subsidized firms. In the following analysis, the treatment group consists of all 
subsidized firms, whereas the control group comprises of the firms without subsidies. 
4.4 Identification strategy 
On average, levels of R&D expenditure (CHF 94 thousands), turnover (CHF 356 
millions), and number of employees (739 employees) of subsidized firms are 
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significantly higher than those of unsubsidized firms as displayed in Table 4.2 
(summary statistics of covariates used are displayed in Table B. 2 in the appendix). 
But clearly, the large differences between the two groups do not result from 
subsidies. The differences, however, point to endogeneity bias as a result of self-
selection into subsidies.  
Table 4.2: Summary statistics, subsidized versus unsubsidized firms (2005 – 2013) 
 Subsidized (N = 461)  Unsubsidized (N = 4,367) p-value 
of t-tests 
on 
mean 
differences 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.  N Mean Std. Dev. 
R&D 
expenditure in 
thousands 
447 94.30 362.08 
 
3,923 39.37 872.11 0.0129 
Turnover in 
thds. 433 356,247.21 1,151,456.64 
 4,060 173,078.21 1,159,220.53 0.0017 
Total number 
of employees 
(full-time 
equivalents) 
461 739.66 2,889.54 
 
4,367 321.75 1,988.46 0.0025 
Source: Data from KOF (2016), own calculations  
Consequently, our empirical strategy comprises of three steps. First, we analyze the 
effectiveness of R&D public subsidies on R&D activity in a matching approach. 
Second, we analyze the impact of the crisis on R&D effectiveness in a difference-in-
differences matching approach. Third, we analyze the impact of persistent R&D 
investment behavior on the effectiveness of subsidies.  
4.4.1 Measuring subsidy effectiveness 
To quantify the effect of public subsidies, one compares a firm’s observed actual 
state with its unobserved counterfactual state, i.e., how the firms in the control group 
would have invested if they were subsidized (see, e.g., Morgan and Winship, 2007).  
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In measuring the average effect of public subsidies on subsidized firms, we formalize 
the parameter of interest as the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) 
where Si is the treatment status34: 
ATT = E Yi | Si =1[ ] = E Y1i | Si =1[ ]− E Y0i | Si =1[ ]
unobserved counterfactual
! "# $## . 
(4.1) 
The ATT measures the difference between the level of outcome of firm i which 
invested in R&D and benefited from public subsidies, Y1i, and the outcome of the 
same firm if, hypothetically, the same firm did not receive a subsidy, Y0i. As the 
counterfactual is unobserved, using observational data to compare the R&D 
investments of subsidized and unsubsidized firms suffers from a self-selection bias 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009, pp. 12-15): 
E Yi | Si =1[ ]− E Yi | Si = 0[ ]
observed difference in outcome
! "#### $####
= E Y1i −Y0i | Si =1[ ]
ATT
! "## $###
+ E Y0i | Si =1[ ]− E Y0i | Si = 0[ ]
self−selection  bias
! "##### $#####
.  
(4.2) 
The observed difference in the outcome variable, i.e. the level of subsidized 
investments compared to those who do not subsidized, equals the ATT (first 
summand of the right-hand side) and the selection bias term (second and third 
summands). This bias results from the correlation between the error term and the 
treatment status and reflects the difference in potential outcomes between treated and 
untreated due to self-selection into subsidy receipt. 
This naïve estimator would be equal to the ATT only if the individual outcomes of 
plants from treatment and control groups would not differ in the absence of 
                                                
34 The following explanations of the applied methods in this section draw on the same background as 
presented in section 3.4.1. Similarities and repetition are intended as both chapters, despite using 
similar methodology, stand for themselves and can be read independently. 
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treatment. In this case, only if subsidized firms would invest exactly the same 
amount. It would hold that 
E Y0i | Si =1[ ]− E Y0i | Si = 0[ ] = 0 . (4.3) 
Equation (4.3) can only hold if the error term of the regression of the outcome on the 
treatment is the same across different treatment statuses, i.e. only if the expected 
outcome of observations in the control group given the treatment status does not 
vary. This would allow the identification of the ATT simply by taking the difference 
in outcome between observed subsidized and unsubsidized firms. 
Since we deal with observational data, we have to build the empirical strategy on 
some identifying assumptions to reduce the bias resulting from self-selection into 
subsidy receipt. It is likely that a firm’s choice of applying for and receiving 
subsidies is the result of self-selection according to particular characteristics of the 
firm. Therefore, subsidy receipt cannot be regarded as a random choice of treatment. 
As a consequence, the determinant of the decision process of applying for and 
receiving subsidies can simultaneously influence the outcome variable, i.e. the level 
of R&D investments.  
Propensity score matching is a commonly used technique to reduce the potential self-
selection bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In order for this approach to be valid, 
the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) or unconfoundedness assumption 
has to hold. The CIA states that conditional on observed covariates Xi , potential 
outcomes Y1i,Y0i{ }  are independent of the treatment status Si , thus Y1i,Y0i{ }⊥ Si | Xi . 
As a result, given the observed covariates Xi, assignment to treatment is almost 
randomly assigned. 
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Another assumption ensuring the consistent identification of treatment effects by 
matching estimators is called overlap or common support assumption. This 
assumption requires the probability of treatment assignment to be bounded away 
from zero and one  
0 < Pr(Si =1| Xi ) <1 . (4.4) 
Common support is given for any sample in which firms potentially can either self-
select into the treatment or the control group. With both assumptions of 
unconfoundedness and overlap holding, we are able to estimate of the ATT of public 
R&D subsidies (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
The implementation of the matching estimator consists of two stages. In the first 
stage, we compute a balancing score, representing functions of relevant observed 
covariates in the form of a propensity score by running a probit estimation that 
reflects the probability of receiving treatment determined by the covariates that 
determine selection into treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).  
In a second stage, we look at the treatment effect on the outcome. By matching each 
treatment observation i with one or several control observations j, based on similar 
propensity scores and including a dummy for each block35, we assure the 
comparability of treatment and control group (Heckman et al., 1998; Smith and 
Todd, 2005). Using these matched pairs, we estimate the  
ATT = 1NT Y1i − w(i, j)Y0ij∈IC
∑
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
i∈IT
∑ . (4.5) 
                                                
35 This controls for similarities within that group such that the absolute difference in propensity scores 
between i and j is minimized (min |pi – pj|). 
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with IT  being the set of treated firms, NT  the number of treated firms and IC  being 
the set of control firms (Smith and Todd, 2005). The choice between different 
matching algorithms affects the number of firms in the control group as well as the 
weighting w(i, j)∈ 0,1[ ]  of each control observation.  
We apply the Kernel matching estimator as proposed by Heckman et al. (1998) and 
Smith and Todd (2005). Kernel matching forms a weighting function by considering 
all observations of the untreated group. The weights reflect the distance between a 
treated observation i and a control observation j. Using a kernel function G(x)  with 
bandwidth parameter h, the weight assigned to control observation j is  
{ }
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In our case, we use the Epanechnikov kernel implying that among the untreated 
group, observations are chosen in a moving window within a fixed caliper 
(bandwidth) h of 0.06 from pi − pj < h  (Heckman et al., 1998; Smith and Todd, 
2005). Thus, we calculate the counterfactual as the weighted average of all control 
units while the weight is higher for observations with similar propensity score. This 
estimator provides the best properties in terms of a tradeoff between bias and 
efficiency (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). We further use different specifications36 
for robustness checks (in Table B. 4 of the Appendix). 
                                                
36 In more detail, we apply different bandwidth parameters for the Kernel matching estimator (0.03 
and 0.01) and nearest neighbor matching with one and five neighbors. Furthermore, we apply a one-
to-one matching which reduces the number of observations because each treated firm is matched only 
to one control firm due to no replacement in matching. 
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4.4.2 Selection into public innovation grants 
We include a large set of firm characteristics to support the CIA in our context. 
Nevertheless, since there might be some unobservable causing correlation between 
the subsidy receipt and R&D investments, we also take into account time-invariant 
observed plant characteristics. The choice of covariates Xi  determining the treatment 
status is determined such that the CIA holds. We need to include all observables 
determining both the outcome variable as well as the treatment variable (subsidy 
receipt) (e.g., Heckman et al., 1998; Sianesi, 2004; Smith and Todd, 2005; Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2008). The set of covariates can be differentiated into four groups: 
structural firm characteristics, economic indicators, innovativeness, and employment 
structure (see Table 4.3 for more details).  
Table 4.3: Description of matching covariates 
Structural firm 
characteristics 
Part of an enterprise group  Dummy indicating whether the firm belongs to an 
enterprise group 
 Foreign owned  Dummy indicating whether the firm belongs to a 
foreign owned corporation 
 SME Dummy indicating whether the firm is a SME (below 
250 employees) 
 Exports  Dummy indicating whether the firm is engaged in 
exporting goods and services 
 Share of exports in turnover in % 
 R&D co-operations  Dummy indicating whether the firm is cooperating in 
R&D with other institutions  
 Log firm age  
Economic indicators Log gross investments Gross investments in real CHF (base year is 2010) 
 Log turnover  
 Log number of employees  
 Number of competitors <= 5 Dummies indicating the number of competitors the 
firm is facing 
 Number of competitors 6-10  
 Number of competitors 11-15  
 Number of competitors 16-50  
Innovativeness Number of patents Number of patents registered at time t 
 Technological potential Self-reported technological potential on a five-scale 
with 1 as very low and 5 as very high technological 
potential 
Employment structure Share of trained employees in % 
 Share of untrained and  partly 
trained employees 
 
 Share of apprentices  
 Share of employees with  
college/university degree 
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The decision to apply for and receiving public innovation grants is non-random and 
can be determined by time-invariant and time-variant firm characteristics. A firm 
being part of an enterprise group may facilitate innovative capacities by benefitting 
more easily from knowledge spillovers in a larger network of firms and easier access 
to information within the enterprise group. Therefore, group membership may signal 
to the subsidy-granting institution a higher likelihood to obtain innovations grants 
(Hud and Hussinger, 2015).  
Since firms with a foreign ownership are also open to foreign markets, these are 
likely to be more innovative (Arnold and Hussinger, 2005). However, the domestic 
subsidy granting institution might reconsider the grant when a foreign headquarter is 
involved because the subsidy granting institution might have a home bias.  
Regarding the size of firms, SMEs are likely to suffer more from cyclical 
fluctuations if they are active in small markets and are not diversified. Larger firms 
with more diversified markets can more easily cope with business climate 
fluctuations (Hud and Hussinger, 2015). Hence, the project evaluation criteria might 
be directly affected by firm size.  
Other studies investigating the relationship between innovation and export market 
argue that export-oriented firms apply more often for R&D subsidies (e.g., Woerter 
and Roper, 2010). This is included as a binary variable. Also, we include the share of 
exports on turnover to capture the intensity of exporting behavior. 
Firms engaging in R&D cooperation are more likely to receive a subsidy. Hence, the 
CTI accounts for this in the evaluation process of subsidy grants. Therefore, we 
include a binary variable for R&D cooperation. As firm age potentially affects the 
decision of the subsidy granting institution, we include log firm age as covariate. We 
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further include log gross investments as covariate, which indicates the general 
economic activity of the firm. This is likely to increase the likelihood for project-
proposal approval. 
Following the large strand of literature that relates competition to innovativeness, 
e.g., in an inverted-U relationship as suggested by Aghion et al., (2005), we include 
dummies capturing the number of competitors of the firm.  
With regard to the innovativeness of firms and its association with R&D subsidy 
receipt, we include a dummy for R&D co-operations, number of patents and 
technological potential. It is unarguably easier for firms with more technological 
potential to innovate and therefore to obtain innovation grants. With a larger stock of 
patents, a firm can also signal a history of successful innovation which increases the 
likelihood of subsidy receipt. Likewise R&D cooperation can serve as a signal for 
innovative success. 
Also, the structure of employment in the firm can affect the innovativeness and thus 
the probability of subsidy receipt. With a higher share on academic employees, 
research might be reinforced, while a higher share of trained employees might also 
indicate a high level of employees with product-specific knowledge (Müller and 
Peters, 2010). As a result, trained and high-skilled workers are more difficult to be 
replaced and therefore enhance the sunk-cost characteristic of R&D investments. 
That is why we include the share of trained, untrained employees and the share of 
apprentices as well as employees with a tertiary degree to control for effects of 
employment structure on selection into treatment.  
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Since we expect differences in subsidy receipt depending on structural industry traits, 
we further include industry branches based on NOGA 2008, which is equivalent to 
the European NACE, Rev. 1.1 industry classification.  
4.4.3 Measuring the impact of the crisis on subsidy effectiveness 
Since the estimated ATT in Equation (4.5) is of cross-sectional nature, it ignores the 
time dimension of the data. The cross-sectional matching estimator builds on the 
assumption of the absence of confounding due to unobserved systematic differences 
at the firm level. By acknowledging that unobserved factors might affect subsidy 
receipt and R&D expenditures, employing a difference-in-difference (DiD) 
propensity score matching takes these time-invariant unobserved firm level 
difference in the outcome into account (Heckman et al., 1998). Hence, the DiD 
matching estimator is given by  
ATTDiD =
1
NT ΔY1i − w(i, j)ΔY0ij∈IC
∑
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
i∈IT
∑ , (4.7) 
where ΔY1i  and ΔY0i  are the differences in the outcome between baseline (2005-08) 
and follow-up period (2011-13) for treated and control firms respectively (cp. 
Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2002; Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir, and van Reenen, 
2002). In the case of longitudinal or repeated cross-sectional data, this approach 
provides a more robust estimator of the treatment under less restrictive assumptions.  
4.4.4 R&D persistency and the crisis 
We analyze the average effect of keeping R&D expenditure despite of the crisis 
constant in a Kernel DiD-matching approach. We rely on the information provided in 
the 2013 questionnaire that provides a special section asking about the short and 
medium-term consequences of the financial crisis 2008. The questionnaire contains 
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one question asking about the firm’s decisions on R&D investments. Out of 935 
firms in 2013, 646 (69.1%) stated that they did not change investment despite the 
2008 crisis. We make use of this information available only for 2013 by carrying it 
backward to past years for each firm to evaluate post-crisis information evaluation of 
R&D investment behavior. 
Hence, we estimate the following equation that gives the effect of persistent R&D 
investment behavior 
ATTDiD =
1
NT (Y1i
no  change −Y1ichange )− w(i, j)(Y0 jno  change −Y0 jchange )
j∈IC
∑
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
i∈IT
∑ . (4.8) 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 The effect of public grants on R&D activity 
The first part of the propensity score matching comprises of the estimation of firm-
individual propensity scores reflecting the predicted probabilities of receiving 
treatment based on observable covariates. We estimate the propensity of successful 
grant on the covariates described in Section 4.2 and successively extent the covariate 
set by adding branch dummies (column 2 of Table 4.4) and year-branch dummies 
(column 3 of Table 4.4).  
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Table 4.4: Estimation of the propensity of successful grant application 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Part of an enterprise group yes/no -0.1041 -0.1787 -0.1899 
 (0.1395) (0.1561) (0.1675) 
Foreign owned yes/no 0.2215 0.2833 0.3721 
 (0.3840) (0.3936) (0.4245) 
SME -0.2939 -0.2987 -0.2296 
 (0.2071) (0.2287) (0.2421) 
Exports yes/no 0.4141* 0.4648 0.4187 
 (0.2482) (0.3132) (0.3382) 
R&D co-operations yes/no 0.5024 0.5070*** 0.4856*** 
 (0.1314) (0.1455) (0.1582) 
Log turnover -0.0449 0.0988 0.1515 
 (0.1214) (0.1490) (0.1573) 
Log number of employees 0.0719 -0.0269 -0.0579 
 (0.1561) (0.1911) (0.2033) 
Log gross investments 0.0585 0.0871** 0.0953** 
 (0.0392) (0.0415) (0.0442) 
Number of competitors <= 5 -0.6476*** -0.8362*** -0.8972*** 
 (0.2281) (0.2637) (0.2820) 
Number of competitors 6-10 -0.4445* -0.6027** -0.6312** 
 (0.2292) (0.2641) (0.2820) 
Number of competitors 11-15 -0.7142*** -0.8212*** -0.8485*** 
 (0.2681) (0.3069) (0.3309) 
Number of competitors 16-50 -0.7381*** -0.7907** -0.8124** 
 (0.2831) (0.3133) (0.3324) 
Share of exports in turnover 0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0018 
 (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0028) 
Log firm age 0.2464 0.1775 0.1644 
 (0.0941) (0.1112) (0.1169) 
Number of patents 0.0051 0.0044 0.0029 
 (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0036) 
Technological potential -0.0309 -0.0356 -0.0657 
 (0.0689) (0.0761) (0.0822) 
Share of trained employees -0.0045 -0.0027 -0.0034 
 (0.0057) (0.0063) (0.0067) 
Share of untrained -0.0024 -0.0031 -0.0037 
and partly trained employees (0.0056) (0.0063) (0.0068) 
Share of apprentices -0.0001 -0.0109 -0.0132 
 (0.0153) (0.0172) (0.0180) 
Share of employees 0.0131 0.0200** 0.0243** 
with college/university degree (0.0080) (0.0090) (0.0100) 
Constant -1.9618 -2.899* -3.3006** 
 (1.2287) (1.5913) (1.6947) 
    
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Branch dummies  YES YES 
Year-branch dummies   YES 
Observations 639 610 545 
LR Chi2 97.99 133.89 135.53 
P (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Log-likelihood -258.18 -234.09 -218.26 
Pseudo R2 0.1595 0.2224 0.2369 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
Notes: Probit estimation of subsidy among all firms in the sample. 
Baseline is number of competitors > 50. 
Source: Data from KOF (2016), own calculations. 
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Moreover, having a higher share of employees with a tertiary degree positively 
affects subsidy probability. Whereas the firm age positively affects the probability of 
receiving subsidies, a more competitive environment decreases it. The coefficients of 
the dummies capturing the number of competitors show a negative and significant 
association with subsidy receipt. Furthermore, technological potential and number of 
patents are not significant and hence suggest no effect on the probability of receiving 
a subsidy. This may seem counter-intuitive but may be explained by the fact that we 
consider all firms in the sample, i.e. firms that applied for public grants and received 
it, firms that applied but did not succeed, and firms that neither applied nor received 
any public grant. The group of firms that neither applied nor received a grant may 
represent a considerable share of all firms and thus might drive the probability of 
subsidy receipt. 
Table 4.5: Overall statistics on covariate balance 
Covariate sets (1)  (2)  (3) 
Sample  Unmatched Matched  Unmatched Matched  Unmatched Matched 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.01  0.16 0.01  0.16 0.01 
LR chi2 97.67 2.66  97.12 1.88  91.38 4.32 
p>chi2 0 1.0  0 1.0  0 1.0 
Mean bias 28.4 3.6  28.9 3.3  28.2 4.7 
Source: Data from KOF (2016), own calculations. 
With the previously estimated propensity scores and the chosen matching method, 
we are able ensure comparability of treatment and control group. Assessing the 
covariate balance between both groups and thus the appropriateness of the model is a 
crucial element of matching methods: we do this by looking at the overall statistics 
on covariate balance of the three sets of covariates. Table 4.5 indicates satisfying 
matching quality in all three specifications. The pseudo-R2 values indicate that the 
explanatory power of the covariates is lower in the matched sample (0.01) than in the 
unmatched sample (0.16) and also show that in the matched sample, systematic 
differences between treatment and control group are eliminated by the matching 
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algorithm for all covariate sets (Imbens, 2004, 2014). Testing the hypothesis that all 
coefficients are zero with a likelihood ratio test can be rejected in the unmatched 
sample. In the case of the matched sample, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis. 
This evidence confirms that in the matched sample the probability to receive 
subsidies is unrelated to observable firm characteristics and can therefore be 
considered as randomized. Finally, assessing the mean bias before matching of all 
specifications shows that in specification 2 before matching is at 28.9% and can be 
reduced to the lowest mean bias of 3.3% after matching among the three covariate 
sets. In specification 1 and 3, the mean biases after matching are reduced to 3.6% and 
4.7% respectively. In the following, we focus on covariate set 2 that obtains the 
lowest mean bias. 
We assess the common support condition graphically by depicting the kernel plot for 
the propensity scores for plants with and without treatment estimated (Figure 4.2). 
The propensity score lies between zero and one for treatment and control group and 
show both distributions sharing an area of common support so that identification of 
subsidized and unsubsidized firms featuring similar probabilities is achievable. The 
higher mass of distribution at the lower levels of the propensity score for firms 
without subsidy indicates that firms not receiving subsidies are smaller firms which 
are unlikely to obtain public funds.  
100 
 
Figure 4.2: Assessment of the common support assumption 
Notes: Kernel density plots of the propensity to receive and to not receive public R&D 
subsidy with covariate set 2 and bandwidth 0.06.  
Source: Data from KOF (2016), own graph 
After matching, the covariates reveal in a two-tailed t-test no difference between 
subsidized firms and unsubsidized firms, which again confirms the matching quality 
(see Table 4.6). Overall, matching works sufficiently well in obtaining a control 
group similar to the treatment group. The observable determinants of receiving the 
grant work well, conditional on ruling out the influence of unobservables. Given the 
propensity score, the remaining assignment to control and treatment group is as good 
as random. Thus, we are able to compute the differences in our outcome variables by 
taking potential self-selection bias into account. 
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Table 4.6: Sample descriptive statistics after matching  
 Unsubsidized 
(Control) 
N = 305 
Mean 
Subsidized 
(Treatment) 
N = 101 
Mean 
t-Test p-value 
of t-tests on 
mean differences 
Covariates     
Part of an enterprise group  0.541 0.558 -0.26 0.797 
Foreign owned  0.036 0.037 -0.05 0.962 
SME 0.541 0.566 -0.38 0.701 
Exports  0.937 0.928 0.27 0.785 
R&D co-operations  0.640 0.646 -0.10 0.917 
Log turnover 13.333 13.272 0.32 0.752 
Log number of employees 5.309 5.215 0.58 0.561 
Log gross investments  10.013 9.885 0.46 0.644 
Number of competitors <= 5 0.315 0.330 -0.23 0.816 
Number of competitors 6-10 0.342 0.332 0.16 0.876 
Number of competitors 11-15 0.126 0.118 0.19 0.851 
Number of competitors 16-50 0.099 0.089 0.26 0.797 
Number of competitors >50 0.117 0.131 -0.31 0.758 
Share of exports in turnover 59.144 59.247 -0.02 0.983 
Log firm age 4.031 3.969 0.63 0.532 
Number of patents 10.117 9.462 0.25 0.802 
Technological potential 3.297 3.377 -0.63 0.529 
Share of trained employees 41.617 41.606 0.00 0.996 
Share of untrained and 
  partly trained employees 22.422 22.812 -0.15 0.882 
Share of apprentices 5.214 5.139 0.11 0.909 
Share of employees with  
  college/university degree 11.084 10.873 0.11 0.909 
Notes: Descriptive statistics of the full sample versus the matched sample after kernel matching 
using covariate set 2 and bandwidth 0.06.  
Source: Data from KOF (2016), own calculations. 
As Table 4.7 shows, the average treatment effect of the subsidy on the treated on 
R&D expenditure is negative but not significant in all specifications37. The point 
estimates vary slightly depending on the chosen covariate set used in the estimation 
of the propensity score. Applying a kernel matching using bandwidth 0.06 and 
covariate set 2 (column 2 of Table 4.7), the matching quality is sufficient to ensure 
comparability between treatment and control groups with a mean bias of 3.3%. Thus, 
subsidized firms show no significant differences in R&D activity which points to 
potential crowding out of R&D public subsidies in the cross-section. The implication 
                                                
37 The ATT estimate’s t-statistic in column 3 of Table 4.7 is the largest (1.59) among the 
specifications in the table. However, due to the relatively small sample size, the t-statistic does not 
reveal any significance below the threshhold of 10 %. 
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is that potential crowding out might be a serious problem, as public R&D subsidies 
do not enhance investments in R&D.  
Table 4.7: Estimates of average treatment effects on the treated 
 Kernel matching 
 Bandwidth 0.06 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
ATT -0.0576 
(0.5860) 
-0.6212 
(0.5905) 
-1.0212 
(0.1550) 
t-stat -0.10 -1.05 -1.59 
N treatment 116 111 118 
N control 484 405 352 
N off-support 36 91 73 
Mean bias (%) 3.6 3.3 4.7 
    
Structural characteristics YES YES YES 
Economic indicators YES YES YES 
Innovativeness YES YES YES 
Employment structure YES YES YES 
Year dummies  YES YES 
Branch dummies  YES YES 
Year branch dummies   YES 
    
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Notes: Estimated average treatment effect of funding by Kernel matching 
(bandwidth 0.06) in the region of common support for three different sets of 
covariates. The respective propensity scores are estimated via probit (in 
column 2 of Table 4.4). The outcome variable is log R&D expenditure. 
Treatment dummy is grant.  
We discard observations with an estimated propensity score outside the 
interval [0.02, 0.98] as suggested by Crump et al. (2009) to guarantee 
sufficient overlap. 
Source: Data from KOF (2016), own calculations. 
4.5.2 Impact subsidy treatment during the crisis 
So far, we ignored the time dimension of the available data. The results in Table 4.8 
show estimated parameters of the Kernel DiD-matching using covariate 
specification 2 with the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods as baseline and follow-up 
period respectively. The comparison groups comprise of subsidy receipt as treatment 
and non-subsidy receipt as control group. In the first column of Table 4.8, we display 
the kernel-weighted matched log mean outcome variable for the control group in the 
baseline case with its standard error, t-statistic, p-value, and the number of 
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observations respective for each case. By comparing the differences of treatment and 
control in the baseline case (cp. column 3) with those of the follow-up case (cp. 
column 6), we are able to obtain a DiD estimate of the average treatment effect as 
given by Equation (4.8) (cp. column 7). The ATT for R&D expenditures is negative 
but not significant. This insignificant ATT gives rise to concern that subsidy receipt 
might have crowded out private R&D investment during the crisis. This implies 
during the recession, public subsidies are not able to enhance private R&D 
investments.  
Table 4.8: Estimates of the impact of the crisis on R&D expenditure 
 Before crisis (2005-08)  Crisis (2009-11)  
R&D Exp. Control  Treated Difference  Control Treated Difference DiD 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
8.5442 9.0108 0.4666  8.4173 7.4574 -0.9599 -1.4265 
   Std. Error 0.6875 0.6717 0.9611  0.3358 0.3358 0.4749 1.0721 
   t 12.4283 13.4154 0.4855  25.0637 22.2053 -2.0211 -1.3306 
   P>|t|   0.6276    0.0438 0.1839 
   n   102 22   303 88   
   N        515 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
Notes: DiD kernel matching with bandwidth 0.06. The outcome variable is log R&D expenditure. The 
propensity score is estimated via probit (in column 2 of Table 4.4). Treatment dummy is grant. The 
baseline is before-crisis period.  
Source: Data from KOF (2016), own calculations. 
4.5.3 Impact of R&D investment behavior during the crisis  
With the results presented in section 4.5.2, we shed light on the impact of subsidy 
treatment during the crisis on R&D investing. The results raise the question of how 
firm behavior affects the impact of public R&D subsidies on firms. To investigate 
this matter, we also rely on a kernel matching DiD approach using covariate set 2. 
We introduce change in R&D investment behavior as comparison group to compare 
the impact of subsidies depending on R&D investment behavior during the crisis. 
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Table 4.9: Estimates of the impact of R&D investment behavior on subsidy effectiveness 
 Change in R&D behavior  No change in R&D behavior  
R&D Exp Control Treated Difference a Control Treated Difference DiD 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
8.8095 5.3142 -3.4953***  8.3995 8.2313 -0.1682 3.3271*** 
  Std. Error 0.7576 0.7576 1.0714  0.4243 0.4243 0.6001 1.228 
   t 11.6283 7.0146 -3.2624  19.7945 19.398 -0.2804 2.7093 
   P>|t|   0.0012    0.7794 0.0071 
   n   66 16    181 51     
   N              314 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
Notes: DiD kernel matching with bandwidth 0.06. The outcome variable is log R&D expenditure. 
The propensity score is estimated via probit (in Table 4.4). Treatment dummy is grant. The baseline 
is a dummy indicating change in R&D investment behavior due to the crisis.  
Source: Data from: KOF (2016), own calculations. 
Table 4.9 provides estimates of the differential effects of R&D behavior on subsidy 
effectiveness using kernel DiD-matching. We estimate the difference-in-differences 
estimator by comparing the average outcomes of treatment and control each for firms 
changing and firms not changing R&D behavior. Similarly to Table 4.8, Table 4.9 
displays the estimated coefficient for control (cp. column 1) and treatment group 
(col. 2) and their differences for each firms changing R&D behavior (col. 3) and also 
firms not changing (columns 4, 5, and 6 respectively). Finally by comparing the 
difference in the differences (col. 7), we obtain the effect of subsidies when not 
changing R&D investment behavior despite of the crisis on R&D expenditure.  
We find that firms keeping R&D constant despite of the crisis while obtaining public 
subsidies increase R&D expenditure. The DiD coefficient is positive and significant 
at the 1%-level. Relating this result to the previous result of Section 4.5.2, the search 
for public funds and persistent R&D investment behavior positively affect the 
economy during the crisis by alleviating the crowding out of private R&D 
expenditure by public subsidies. To conclude, we find that firms keeping R&D 
constant during the crisis may contribute to the effectiveness of public subsidies. 
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4.5.4 Study limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, the data available, although rich in terms of 
information of about 6,500 firms in the Business Register of the Federal Statistical 
Office of Switzerland, does not constitute a longitudinal dataset with repeated 
observations on the same cross section (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 6; Angrist and Pischke, 
2009, pp. 222-227). The data are repeated cross-sections with only a little number of 
firms with repeated observations. Applying a matching approach to investigate the 
effectiveness of subsidies is thus appropriate when ignoring the time-dimension and 
estimating the average effects in a cross-section. Nevertheless, in order to properly 
consider the crisis-period and to ensure the comparability of treatment and control 
group, we apply the difference-in-differences matching method using repeated cross-
sections which provides a robust and appropriate choice under less restrictive 
assumptions (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2002). Second, the questionnaire is not 
obligatory for firms such that a non-response bias might be an issue. We are unable 
to control for this setback as response rates are not reported. Notwithstanding, the 
matching methods applied conditional on the common support assumption ensure 
appropriate comparison of treatment and control group despite selectivity in 
answering the questionnaire. Third, applying matching techniques requires detailed 
data on firm characteristics to determine selection into treatment on observables. 
Hence, matching can only be as good as the data. In our analysis, we are able to 
reduce the mean bias between treatment and control group to 3.3% in the main 
specification. Still matching estimators are not robust to a “hidden bias” (Rosenbaum, 
2002, pp. 105-110; Morgan and Winship, 2007, p. 122; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). Using various matching estimators, we are able to sufficiently reduce bias and 
to show robustness of the results. 
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There is room for future research. It may be benefitting to include information on the 
selection processes of applications such as the scores of project applications in order 
to better understand the underlying mechanisms to understand the effectiveness of 
public subsidies on firms. Using this additional information would allow researchers 
to use methods such as regression discontinuity design or instrumental variables to 
better inform about the effectiveness of subsidies. Furthermore, it may be interesting 
to include information on the “intensity” of public support measured by subsidy 
volume, for example by using data by the subsidy granting institutions. This may 
provide deeper insights on the effectiveness of public policy on the economy. Also, 
we are not able to distinguish effects of the R&D subsidies on the extensive margin, 
i.e. whether there is a rise in the share of R&D performers (Huergo et al., 2015).  
4.6 Concluding remarks 
To sum up, this study analyzes the effects of public subsidies on R&D activity over 
the period 2005 to 2013, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the global economy. First, 
the average effect of R&D subsidies on receiving firms reveals no significant 
difference between subsidized and unsubsidized Swiss firms in terms of R&D 
activity. This result underlines the issue of crowding out of private R&D investments 
by public funding and sheds light on the effectiveness of public subsidies. Crowding 
out behavior raises the concern that low application costs cause an exploitative 
behavior of firms regarding public subsidies (David et al., 2000). The setting of the 
financial crisis of 2008, however, underlines the need of considering business cycles 
in the evaluation of effectiveness of public funds.  
Second, when considering that the crisis hit in the relevant period, crowding out may 
seem plausible if we consider that firms were adapting to the crisis by altering their 
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investment decisions. Hence, we find that granting of public subsidies during the 
crisis did not alter R&D expenditure. The reason for this might be that firms during 
the crisis that were in need of financial help made use of the availability of public 
funds to overcome financial constraints.  
Third, by analyzing the differential effect of persistently keeping R&D investments 
constant despite of the crisis, we find confirmation for crowding out and that not 
changing R&D behavior reduces the extent to which crowding out affects R&D 
expenditure. The reasons for such persistency in R&D investments during economic 
downturns are sunk costs, opportunity costs or accumulation of knowledge (Sutton, 
1991; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Schmookler, 1976).  
We are careful in interpreting the results as the empirical strategy applied bears 
several limitations that may affect inference and policy implications. Nevertheless, 
our results have important implications for public policy. We show that firm 
behavior driven by uncertainties of the economic crisis drive the crowding out by 
firms. Also, we cannot rule out that public innovation grants failed to provide to the 
stabilization of the economy. However, if public policy is ineffective in securing 
private R&D spending during recessions, then firms bear the economic costs of the 
crisis by persistently investing at the price of lower economic outcome. And if 
persistence in R&D behavior is crucial for coping with recessions, public policy may 
consider taking this into account for by extending the share of supported firms. 
However, public subsidies aiming at increasing the extensive margin may attract 
firms to overinvest in R&D only to benefit from the public funds.  
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Appendix B 
Table B. 1: Industry and sector classification based on NOGA 2008 
Manufacturing 
1 Food Traditional 
2 Textile Traditional 
3 Clothing Traditional 
4 Wood Traditional 
5 Paper Traditional 
6 Graf. Industrie Traditional 
7 Chemistry High-Tech 
8 Plastics High-Tech 
9 Nonmetallic minerals Traditional 
10 Metal manufacturing Traditional 
11 Metalware Traditional 
12 Machinery High-Tech 
13 Electrical High-Tech 
14 Elektronics/Instruments High-Tech 
15 Watches Traditional 
16 Vehicles High-Tech 
17 Other industries Traditional 
18 Energy Traditional 
Construction 
19 Construction 
 Services 
20 Wholesale Traditional 
21 Retail Traditional 
22 Hospitality Traditional 
23 Traffic Traditional 
24 Banks/Insurance Modern 
25 Real estate/rent Traditional 
26 Computer science services/ R&D Modern 
27 Business services Modern 
28 Personal services Traditional 
29 Telecommunications Modern 
30 Education Traditional 
31 Health service Traditional 
32 Waste treatment Traditional 
33 Entertainment, culture, sports Traditional 
Source: Data from KOF (2016) 
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Table B. 2: Summary statistics of covariates, subsidized versus unsubsidized firms 
 Subsidized  Unsubsidized p-value  
of t-tests on  
mean 
differences 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.  N Mean Std. Dev. 
Gross investments in millions 425 28.30 192.00  3,908 8.04 61.10 0.0306 
Log investments 425 9.73 2.67  3,908 8.59 2.70 (<0.0001) 
Number of competitors <= 5 443 0.38 0.49  4,234 0.33 0.47 0.0403 
Number of competitors 6-10 443 0.32 0.47  4,234 0.31 0.46 0.6695 
Number of competitors 11-15 443 0.10 0.30  4,234 0.13 0.34 0.0482 
Number of competitors 16-50 443 0.09 0.29  4,234 0.12 0.32 0.0404 
Number of competitors > 50 443 0.11 0.31  4,234 0.12 0.32 0.5196 
Share of exports in turnover 435 54.13 38.11  4,251 28.83 36.24 (<0.0001) 
Log firm age 450 3.92 0.80  4,230 3.79 0.86 0.0011 
Part of an enterprise group 
yes/no 260 0.49 0.50  2,323 0.39 0.49 0.0022 
Foreign owned yes/no 460 0.20 0.40  4,344 0.18 0.39 0.3068 
SME 461 0.64 0.48  4,367 0.80 0.40 (<0.0001) 
Exports yes/no 453 0.86 0.34  4,335 0.61 0.49 (<0.0001) 
R&D co-operations yes/no 448 0.66 0.47  4,048 0.23 0.42 (<0.0001) 
Share of trained employees 416 41.17 19.70  4,106 46.95 21.90 (<0.0001) 
Share of untrained and partly 
trained employees 416 21.54 19.93  4,106 23.91 23.53 0.0233 
Share of apprentices 416 4.46 4.74  4,106 5.47 6.92 0.0001 
Share of employees with 
college/university degree 416 13.34 17.70  4,106 7.01 12.42 (<0.0001) 
R&D yes/no 461 0.93 0.25  4,367 0.62 0.49 (<0.0001) 
Turnover / total number of 
employees 433 468,418.12 1,141,576.32  4,060 549,250.57 4,561,181.59 0.37 
Hightech 461 0.55 0.50  4,367 0.32 0.47 (<0.0001) 
Traditional 461 0.54 0.50  4,367 0.58 0.49 0.1019 
Modern 461 0.09 0.28  4,367 0.16 0.36 (<0.0001) 
Construction 461 0.02 0.15  4,367 0.05 0.22 0.0001 
Source: Data from KOF (2016), own calculations.  
 
B.1 Robustness 
We further check the robustness of the results in several additional analyses. Based 
the previous result on R&D activity, we find potential crowding out in the cross-
section. We would expect that this results from the 2008 financial crisis which 
substantially affected R&D investment behavior and the allocation of funds. Since 
we are also concerned that this crowding out might be driven by unobserved trends 
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before and after the crisis, we exclude years 2005 and 2013, and repeat the matching. 
The estimates in Table B. 3 indicate qualitatively the same results and suggest 
robustness across macroeconomic fluctuations. The effect on R&D expenditure is 
negative but insignificant. In the crisis years (2008 and 2011), public subsidies do not 
result in significant changes in private R&D investments; however, excluding non-
crisis years might bias the inference. 
Table B. 3: Estimates of average treatment effects on the treated during crisis years  
 Kernel matching 
 Bandwidth 0.06 
 Only years 2008, 2011 
  
ATT -0.9652 
(1.018) 
t-stat -0.95 
N treatment 60 
N control 108 
N off-support 233 
Median bias (%) 7.3 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 
0.01. 
Notes: Sub-sample is restricted to only crisis years. The 
propensity score is estimated via probit (unreported). The 
outcome variable is log R&D expenditure. Treatment dummy is 
subsidy receipt. Source: Data from KOF (2016), own 
calculations. 
 
Since the results might be driven by the chosen matching algorithm, we also apply a 
one-to-one matching as well as nearest neighbor matching with different 
specifications (Table B. 4). In all specifications, the effect of the subsidy grant on 
R&D expenditure is negative but imprecise and thus point to the same interpretation 
as before. In the case of one-to-one matching, the bias after matching remains 
substantially high. This is due to the high loss on observations as a result of imposing 
the common support assumption. Hence, across different specifications and different 
matching algorithms, we find null effects of public subsidies on R&D expenditure.  
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Table B. 4: Estimates of average treatment effects on the treated with different matching 
algorithms 
 Kernel 
matching 
 Nearest neighbor 
matching, 
caliper 0.001 
 One-to-
one 
matching 
 0.03 0.01 one neighbor five neighbors 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
ATT -0.5201 
(0.6543) 
-0.5891 
(0.6897) 
-1.0910 
(0.8707) 
-0.9437 
(0.8810) 
-0.5681 
(0.5111) 
t-stat -0.79 -1.09 -1.25 -1.07 -1.11 
N treatment 118 118 56 56 118 
N control 339 339 106 106 118 
N off-support 90 90 385 385 311 
Median bias 
(%) 
6.3 7.4 7.3 7.5 37.1 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
Notes: The propensity score is estimated via probit (in column 2 of Table 4.4). The 
outcome variable is log R&D expenditure. Treatment dummy is subsidy receipt.  
Source: Data from KOF (2016), own calculations. 
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5 Social capital, religiosity, and tax morale 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In most European countries, public authorities claim taxes on employees’ incomes by 
wage tax deduction, i.e. a source tax. The opportunities for tax evasion are thereby 
restricted. Yet, it is possible for taxpayers to engage in the shadow economy and hide 
earnings from public authorities (Kirchler, 2007, p. 72), resulting in losses of tax 
revenue. However, tax authorities can influence taxpayers’ behavior to comply with 
their individual tax obligations through various channels, one of which might be 
social capital. It is the goal of this study to understand how citizens’ attitudes towards 
taxes are shaped by social capital.  
Drawing on Becker's (1968) general model of the economics of crime, Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973) formally explain individual tax evasion 
behavior by focusing on extrinsic factors such as the audit probability and the penalty 
level as well as the individual's risk preference (see Alm, 2012, for a literature review 
on tax evasion). Asserting that people pay taxes despite low audit probabilities and 
low penalty levels, these models fail to explain tax compliance and ultimately lead to 
the “tax compliance puzzle” (Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992). This paper 
relates to previous attempts to explain tax compliance by shedding light on tax 
morale, i.e. the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, which is found to be an important 
factor for the actual compliance behavior (Cummings et al., 2009).  
The literature has primarily focused on the channels of tax morale by exploring the 
correlation between individual characteristics and tax morale (Grasmick, Bursik, and 
Cochran, 1991; Torgler, 2006) as well as contextual factors such as tax progressivity 
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(Doerrenberg and Peichl, 2013). Other studies explain tax morale as result of a 
psychological contract between taxpayers and tax authority in form of an implicit 
contract exchanging tax payments for the benefit from public goods (Feld and Frey, 
2002, 2007). I contribute to the literature by shedding light on the effect of social 
capital as exchange on the attitudes of individuals towards taxes.  
By introducing the concept of social capital for determining tax morale, this study 
refers to the aggregate of resources between people and institutions that facilitate 
social cooperation and thus the production of a common good (Bourdieu, 2012; 
Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993). Previous studies investigating the relation between 
social capital and tax morale find positive correlations but do not address causation 
(e.g., V. Braithwaite, 2003; Torgler, 2003, 2005; Alm and Gomez, 2008; Lago-Peñas 
and Lago-Peñas, 2010). The novelty of this study is the implementation of an 
instrumental variable approach in quantifying the effect on tax morale, instrumenting 
for social capital with religious fractionalization38 and religiosity to account for 
potential endogeneity problems of social capital. This approach allows the 
identification of the effect of social capital on tax morale. The validity of instruments 
is given by the fulfillment of the relevance and exogeneity conditions. Prior studies 
have included religiosity as explanatory variable, which point to a positive 
correlation but neglect that religiosity may only affect tax morale through the 
channel of social capital (Grasmick et al., 1991; Torgler, 2006). 
So far, social capital considerations in the context of tax morale have been the 
subject of research in few studies such as Torgler (2003) and Alm and Gomez 
                                                
38 We will use the words “secularization” and “religious fractionalization” interchangeably, although 
we more frequently use the term “religious fractionalization”. In the literature, “secularization” is 
preferred when referring to the process of cultural shift toward nonreligious values while “religious 
fractionalization” points to the quantification of the same process (cp. Alesina et al., 2003; Becker and 
Woessmann, 2013). However, both terms rely on the same notion. 
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(2008). Using the example of Spain, Alm and Gomez find a positive correlation 
between one’s perception of the benefits derived from public goods and tax morale. 
Similar studies such as Kogler et al. (2013) or Gangl, Hofmann, and Kirchler (2015) 
provide a “slippery slope” framework that considers simultaneously power of the 
authority and trust in the authority as determinants of tax compliance. Only few prior 
studies have put social capital in the center of research on tax compliance. I extend 
these analyses by investigating the causal relationship. The results indicate a large 
effect of social capital on tax morale, consistent with existing literature, but less 
reliable effects for less secularized countries. The findings point to the relevance of 
enhancing trust between citizens and the government to secure tax revenues. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the conceptual background. 
Section 5.3 presents the data. In Section 5.4, I discuss the empirical strategy. 
Section 5.5 presents the study’s findings. Finally, Section 5.5.5 discusses the main 
results and concludes. 
5.2 Conceptual Background 
5.2.1 Typology of tax behavior 
While tax compliance refers to the individuals’ decision to comply with tax rules, tax 
avoidance denotes any action reducing the tax liability. This term, however, does not 
only implies illegal activities but also legal activities such as income splitting of 
spouses, postponement of taxes and tax arbitrage. The more specific term tax evasion 
refers to illegal and intentional actions by individuals to reduce their legally due tax 
payments. Evasion activities involve overstating deductions, exemptions, or credits 
as well as filing wrong tax returns or engaging in barter activities (Alm, 2012). 
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Tax morale at the aggregate societal level captures nonpecuniary motivations for tax 
compliance, collective intrinsic motivation to pay taxes as well as guilt or shame by 
non-compliance (Schmölders, 1960; Cummings et al., 2009; Luttmer and Singhal, 
2011). Although the concept of tax morale refers to the aggregate and national level, 
it is rooted in the microeconomic level as individuals’ motivational postures 
originating in the knowledge and attitudes towards taxes that individuals develop in 
social interaction with each other (Kirchler, 2007, p. 102; Dell’Anno, 2009). 
Following Torgler (2003) and Feld and Frey (2007), tax morale can be summarized 
as the social and psychological motivations of citizens to pay taxes as 
microeconomic factor in the determination of compliance behavior.  
The theory of reasoned action and planned behavior explains the theoretical link 
between tax morale and tax compliance (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). 
This link has also been subject to studies investigating attitudes towards taxes, i.e. 
tax morale, as one of the most important determinants of tax compliance (Lewis, 
1982, p. 177; Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992; Cummings et al., 2009).  
5.2.2 Tax morale, a psychological tax contract, and institutional 
trust 
Tax morale has been seen for a long time as an exogenously given black box 
(Dell’Anno, 2009). With neoclassical models and their inability to explain the tax 
compliance puzzle, research in this field undergoes a shift to behavioral economic 
and economic-psychological models. Research on tax behavior focuses on attitudes, 
norms and fairness as well as decision anomalies (Alm and Torgler, 2011; Kirchler 
2007, pp. 2-3).  
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Every citizen more or less worries about paying taxes. However, tax knowledge is 
subjective and limited. Due to the complexity of the tax law, citizens may retaliate by 
adopting a negative attitude towards paying taxes which exacerbates the lack of 
interest in the tax system (McKerchar, 2001; Carnes and Cuccia, 1996). 
Consequently, people create social representations of the tax system. Social 
representations are the result of interactions with each other in which they evaluate 
the tax system to create a familiar environment and to cover up the inability in 
understanding the tax system. In the plainest form, a figurative illustration is the 
metaphor of tax auditors and the tax authority as ‘cops’ and taxpayers as ‘robbers’ to 
be punished for stealing by not complying with tax law (Kirchler, 2007, pp. 29-31).  
Although by legal definition of taxes, i.e. citizens paying taxes do not have a claim 
on benefits provided by the government, the relationship of taxpayers with the tax 
authority can be characterized as a give and take or reciprocal exchange in the sense 
of Gouldner (1960) and Fehr and Gächter (2000). This norm of reciprocity 
accomplishes an exchange of taxpayers giving payments to the government in return 
for public goods. As a consequence, taxpayers evaluate the quality of the public 
goods provision, which they cannot precisely assess but which allows a general 
impression of the exchange (Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976). Moreover, Pommerehne 
and Frey (1992) have shown empirically that perceived public spending is positively 
related to tax compliance and negatively to tax cheating. Building on these notions, 
Feld and Frey (2002) present this relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities 
as a relational psychological tax contract implying the consideration of emotional ties 
and loyalty in the exchange. The psychological or implicit trait of the contract stands 
in contrast to formal contracts in which the parties face sanctions if the fulfillment of 
the contract is outstanding. As a consequence, tax authorities treat the taxpayers 
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respectfully by not putting them into the suspicion of being evaders. The center of 
this psychological contract builds on trust between taxpayers and tax authorities 
which ensures partners to mutually behave honestly. Hence, the enforceability of the 
psychological tax contract, and with it tax morale, positively relates to the level of 
development of institutions and also taxpayers’ participation rights in these 
institutions. Any disrespectful treatment of the taxpayers by the government risks 
noncompliance and would lead to tax evasion. This serves as a mechanism of 
punishment of revenue-maximizing governments by taxpayers (Schnellenbach, 
2006).   
5.2.3 Social capital, reciprocity, and trust 
Establishing trust facilitates the exchange between taxpayers and the government. 
Fukuyama (1995, p. 26) defines trust as the expectation of cooperative behavior 
based on shared social norms within a community. This view on trust gives rise to 
examine the concept of social capital that incorporates trust as one of its key 
component. Bourdieu (2012), Putnam (1993), and Coleman (1988) introduced this 
concept by differentiating three dimensions of capital, i.e. economic, cultural, and 
social capital. The idea of social capital builds on the notion that individuals and 
groups benefit from resources generated in relations with each other. These resources 
can be beneficial to individuals or groups (Paxton, 1999). Putnam’s concept of social 
capital distinguishes three components which all aim at improving the efficiency of 
society by simplifying coordinated action: first, trust; second, social norms and 
obligations; and third, social networks of citizen’s activity in the form of voluntary 
associations (1993, pp. 167-176).  
Coleman (1988) emphasizes the role of social structure in his concept of social 
capital. In more detail, he views social capital as “inhert[ing] in the structure of 
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relations between actors and among actors.” (p. S98). Based on this understanding, 
social capital is a resource which facilitates the production of some good at the 
community level. Putnam (1993) even refers to social capital at the contextual level 
as a “public good” with positive spillover effects on other members of society and 
thus enhancing efficiency of public institutions and economic performance.  
Social capital provides trust between actors which in turn translates into reciprocate 
behavior and thus reduces risk and enforcement costs allowing efficient economic 
transactions without expensive bonding and insurance devices (Luhmann, 1988, 
2003; Scholz and Lubell, 1998). Reciprocity can take two directions: positive 
reciprocity means cooperative reciprocal behavior while negative reciprocity means 
retaliatory reciprocal behavior (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). As Putnam (1993) asserts, 
trust creates reciprocity and voluntary associations while reciprocity and associations 
create trust (pp. 163-185). 
In order to consistently measure social capital in the context of tax morale, I focus on 
trust on the individual level. This measure connects to the theoretical definition of 
social capital (Paxton, 1999). An individual can trust certain individuals as well as 
more generalized and abstract people or institutions (e.g. Giddens, 1990). For the 
purpose of this paper, I focus on trust in governmental institutions because these are, 
in the context of tax morale, the recipients of tax payments.  
5.2.4 Religious fractionalization, morality, and social capital 
Studies on the relationship between religion and economics have emerged early and 
put the implications of religion for economics in the center of research. Since Adam 
Smith (1863) who investigates economic outcomes as function of religiosity and 
Max Weber (1930) who determines the protestant ethic as a key driver of economic 
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progress, the field of economics of religion more recently undergoes a resurgence 
(Anderson, 1988; Hull and Bold, 1994; Iannaccone, 1998; Hull, 2000; Weber, 
Parsons, and Giddens, 2007). Only few studies exist that investigate religion as a 
driver of tax compliance (e.g., Tittle, 1980; Grasmick et al., 1991; Torgler, 2006; 
Kanniainen, Pääkönen, and Schneider, 2004). These studies widely attribute 
religiosity to higher tax compliant behavior.  
The views on religion and individuals’ behavior diverge in two directions. I 
distinguish the ‘Old View’ and the ‘New View’ on religiosity. The ‘Old View’ 
regards religiosity as influence on individual behavior regards religion as internal 
moral enforcement (Smith, 2009; Anderson, 1988). This view is based on a strong 
emphasis on the morality of religion, e.g., the Ten Commandments as a moral 
system. Thus, social norms, social control, a sanctioning system, shame and guilt 
play a distinct role in irrational behavior (Hirschi and Stark, 1969; Tittle and Welch, 
1983; Grasmick et al., 1991; Stark, Iannacconne, and Finke, 1996; Iannaconne, 
1998). In contrast, the ‘New View’ interprets religion as rational behavior 
representing the “secularization thesis” (e.g., Hardin, 1982, 1997). As in Hardin’s 
economic theory of knowledge, religiosity has a functionalist property to economize 
and simplify actions by internalizing the values of the religious community (Hardin, 
1997).  
Advocates of the ‘Old View’, such as Anderson and Tollison (1992), assert religion 
as “supernatural police” enabling the enforcement of social norms, thereby viewing 
religion as a moral enforcement. Nevertheless, this might only hold if one affirms 
that individual decision making is solely a function of religion. Another point 
advocating for the ‘Old View’ puts forward that the relationship between morality 
and religiosity are stronger social ties between people through the means of religion 
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(Smith, Sawkins, and Seaman, 1998). This point however ignores that religiosity 
may not only affect morality directly but rather religiosity affects morality indirectly 
through the means of social capital. Religiosity breeds social interaction and 
engagement among individuals as well as trustworthiness between other members of 
the religious group.  
However, religiosity is neither the center of moral behavior nor is morale behavior 
the center of religion. The secularization process implies strong societal and cultural 
changes to non-religious values in European countries (cp. Becker and Woessmann, 
2013). In contrast to Smith (2009) or Margolis (1997), who link morality directly to 
religiosity, I argue that moral behavior does not originate from religiosity but rather 
religiosity conflates into its outcome, i.e. social capital as horizontal trust in each 
other, vertical trust in governmental institutions and civic or voluntary engagement 
(e.g., Putnam and Campbell, 2012, pp. 463-471). 
From a functionalist perspective, transaction and enforcement costs decrease by 
providing mutual trust which decreases risk and uncertainty by common values 
among member of a religious group and thus, economizes and simplifies decision 
making due to facilitated interaction between like-minded people (Hardin, 1997; 
Heiner, 1983). This point additionally informs about social capital as the 
intermediary between religiosity and morale because social capital becomes more 
important under conditions of secularization where religion plays a minor role in 
people’s everyday life. Of course, if individuals perceive religion as a rational factor 
in decision making, religion may help in the development of social capital (Hardin, 
1997). 
Combining the notions of the ‘New View’ on religion and the secularization thesis, 
religious fractionalization and religiosity theoretically provide valid instruments to 
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identify the effect of social capital on tax morale. An instrumental variable has to be 
strongly correlated with the endogenous variable, i.e. social capital, but at the same 
time the instrument has to influence the outcome variable only indirectly via its 
effect on social capital (Cameron and Triverdi, 2009, pp. 95-98).  
5.2.5 Hypothesis development 
The ideas laid out in the previous sections point to the importance of trust for 
citizens’ attitudes towards taxes. In the context of tax compliance and morality, Alm 
and Torgler (2011) refer to a new “trust” paradigm building on the foundation of 
ethics. The more taxpayers trust the government, the more they are willing to 
participate in that group by complying and cooperating. With this in mind, tax 
administrations may influence tax compliance by eroding taxpayers’ ethics. Other 
empirical studies imply that tax morale is stronger with higher trust in the 
government and its institutions (Falkinger, 1988; Pommerehne and Frey, 1992; 
Torgler, 2003, 2005; Fjeldstad, 2004). These studies, however, ignore a potential bias 
resulting from a post-rationalization of tax cheating.  
To sum up, I test the following  
Hypothesis: If taxpayers place more trust in governmental institutions, it 
facilitates the exchange between taxpayers and the government and the 
government can expect more of its citizens to adopt a positive attitude toward 
taxes. 
5.3 Data 
This study exploits data by the European Values Study (EVS). The EVS survey is a 
European socio-political and value oriented survey, which offers individual-level and 
nationally representative data from 1981 to 2008 in four waves. Only the third wave 
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conducted between 1999 and 2001 is relevant for this study as data on the main 
variables are only available in this wave.  
5.3.1 Outcome variable: tax morale 
Following the literature on tax morale, I use answers to a specific question as 
dependent variable (e.g. Torgler and Schneider, 2005; Torgler, 2006; Alm and 
Torgler, 2006; Alm and Gomez, 2008; Torgler, Schneider, and Schaltegger, 2010). 
The question asks  
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between …  
Cheating on tax if you have the chance. 
This answer to this question is a ten-point scale with 1 as “never justified” and 10 as 
“always justified”. I recode this variable to 1 as “always justified”, i.e. low tax 
morale, and 10 “never justified, i.e. high tax morale.  
This measure of tax morale has found large consensus among empirical studies of tax 
morale and was used in other surveys as well: the World Values Survey (Alm and 
Torgler, 2006), International Social Survey Program (Torgler, 2005), or the 
Afrobarometer (Cummings et al., 2009). However, this measure is potentially biased. 
First, individuals might overstate tax morale and individuals who evade taxes might 
consciously lie about past tax behavior (Andreoni et al., 1998). As noted by Frey and 
Torgler (2007), asking about tax morale instead of tax evading behavior reaches a 
higher level of honesty. Second, taxpayers may justify tax evasion if the government 
lavishes tax revenue and the measure of tax morale might be biased in more corrupt 
countries. Since this study focuses on democratic European countries, the mentioned 
question is appropriate to measure tax morale. 
123 
5.3.2 Main explanatory variables: social capital 
Social capital can be measured in various ways (Paxton, 1999). This study focuses on 
the dimension of social capital reflecting Trust in institutions. The main explanatory 
variable is individuals’ self-indicated level of confidence in institutions. This 
dimension of social capital theoretically affects an individual’s morale towards 
paying taxes. The underlying question asks 
Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much 
confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or 
none at all?  
With variations regarding the institution as follows 
The legal or justice system39 / The social security system / Parliament. 
Answers each of the question are on a 4 point Likert scale with 1 as “a great deal” 
and 4 as “none at all” at the extremities. Recoding the respective variables into 0 as 
“none at all” and 3 as “a great deal” facilitates the interpretation of signs. By 
aggregating the three answers to these questions, I build an indicator of aggregate 
trust in governmental institutions on a 10-scale. 
5.3.3 Covariates 
In order to adjust for individual-level corruptness as attitudes towards free-riding, I 
include a question asking for justification of Avoiding a fare on public transport on a 
10-point scale. I recode this variable due to lack of variance at higher values, to a 4-
point scale with 1 as “never justifiable” and 4 as “always justifiable”.  
                                                
39 Item in EVS 1999 (ZA3811); EVS 2008 (ZA4800): The justice system ; while item in EVS 1981 
(ZA4438); EVS 1990 (ZA4460): The legal system 
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Following Torgler (2006), I include a risk aversion dummy to consider the fact that 
tax compliance decisions involve risk attitudes. The respective question relates to 
individual attitude towards Good job security which is coded as dichotomous. 
Following the existing literature on tax morale, I control for socio-demographic 
characteristics (Torgler 2003; Torgler and Schneider 2005; Alm and Torgler 2006). 
More precisely, I control for age by including age dummies of respondents’ age 
intervals. Age is divided into six intervals with 15 to 24 years as the youngest and 65 
and over as the oldest. Furthermore, I include a dummy indicating sex equal to one if 
the respondent is female. Also, I include the respondent’s highest education level 
ordered in eight categories. Moreover, I include dummies indicating the marital 
status and dummies indicating the employment status. Finally, I do not include 
income but dummies for respondents’ self-indicated socio-economic class.  
5.3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics: main variables 
 N Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
Outcome variables      
   Tax morale  12,793 8.37 2.38 1 10 
   Cheating on state benefits 12,680 2.23 2 1 10 
      
Explanatory variable      
   Individual trust in institutions 12,793 3.97 1.89 0 9 
      
Instruments      
   Religious fractionalization 12,793 0.23 0.17 0.01 0.54 
   Religious identity salience 12,793 3.76 1.62 0 6 
   Time in church 10,666 0.73 1.06 0 3 
   Population density 8,352 145.24 60.6 74.61 242.56 
Source: Data from EVS (2011), own calculations.   
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the relevant variables of the sample used 
in this study. From the original 47 countries in the survey, the final sample consists 
of Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, and 
Luxembourg with 12,793 observations as I adjust for control variables with many 
missings.  
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics: control variables  
Variable N Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
      
Free-riding 12,793 1.03 1.25 0 3 
Risk-aversion  12,793 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Age 12,793 45.69 16.98 15 97 
15-24 12,793 0.11 0.32 0 1 
25-34 12,793 0.2 0.4 0 1 
35-44 12,793 0.2 0.4 0 1 
45-54 12,793 0.17 0.37 0 1 
55-64 12,793 0.15 0.36 0 1 
65 and more years 12,793 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Female 12,793 0.53 0.5 0 1 
      
Highest educational level attained  12,793 4.4 2.16 1 8 
Inadequately completed elementary education 12,793 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Completed (compulsory) elementary education 12,793 0.24 0.42 0 1 
Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational 12,793 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Complete secondary school: technical/vocational 12,793 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory 12,793 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Complete secondary: university-preparatory 12,793 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Some university without degree 12,793 0.07 0.26 0 1 
University with degree 12,793 0.11 0.31 0 1 
      
Current legal marital status respondent 12,793 2.74 2.2 1 6 
Married 12,793 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Cohabiting 12,793 0 0 0 0 
Divorced 12,793 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Separated 12,793 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Widowed 12,793 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Single 12,793 0.24 0.43 0 1 
      
Socio-economic status respondent 12,793 1.53 0.94 0 3 
Manual workers, unskilled, unemployed 12,793 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Manual workers, semi-skilled 12,793 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Middle, non-manual workers 12,793 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Upper, upper-middle class 12,793 0.16 0.36 0 1 
      
Employment status 12,793 3.12 2.06 1 8 
Employment: Full time 12,793 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Employment: Part time 12,793 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Employment: Self employed 12,793 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Employment: Retired 12,793 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Employment: Housewife  12,793 0.1 0.3 0 1 
Employment: student 12,793 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Employment: Unemployed 12,793 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Employment: Other 12,793 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Source: Data from EVS (2011), own calculations.   
As shown in Table 5.2 (descriptive statistics of the control variables), the average 
respondent is 46 years old and 47% are males. About 18% have either a university 
degree or attended courses at university. Almost a third of the sample (32%) have 
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begun or finished university-preparatory school40. In comparison, 22% have started 
or completed technical or vocational training. The individuals in the sample have 
rather high levels of education. Also, the socio-economic status reveals large 
variation: 16% of the respondents consider themselves as part of the upper and 
upper-middle class while 38% are non-manual workers of the middle class. Then, 
31% belong to the group of semi-skilled manual workers while 16% are unskilled 
manual workers or unemployed.  
5.4 Identification strategy 
5.4.1 Endogeneity of social capital 
Social capital can be captured on various levels and by various measures. The reason 
why I focus on trust in governmental institutions is that it is a measure of vertical 
trust and reflects best the exchange between taxpayers and tax authorities. Beginning 
with simple linear regressions to investigate the effect of social capital on individual 
tax morale, I estimate the correlation between both variables in the following 
equation 
yc,i =α + β ⋅SCc,i + γ ⋅Xi +δc + uc,i , (5.1) 
where c indicates country and i indicates individuals. The dependent variable yc,i 
comprises self-indicated tax morale on the individual level. SCc,i represents an 
aggregated indicator of individuals’ general trust in governmental institutions. Xi is a 
vector of individual level control variables and δc is a vector of country dummies to 
capture unobserved heterogeneity across countries. 
                                                
40 University-preparatory schools are secondary schools preparing students for higher education. In 
Germany, the most common school form is the Gymnasium. In other European countries such as 
France, this school form is called lycée. 
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However, the estimation of this equation involves the problem of endogeneity of the 
explanatory variable social capital which ultimately leads to systematic biases by 
estimating simple regression equations. Formally, endogeneity formally occurs if the 
explanatory variable of interest is correlated with the error term, i.e. 
Cov(uc,i | SCc,i ) ≠ 0.   
Endogeneity in this setting occurs because causality between tax morale and social 
capital may run both ways. Instead of being the cause for tax morale, social capital 
may be the result of hindsight rationalization of negative tax attitudes. More 
intuitively, the problem of endogeneity arises because people tend to rationalize their 
tax attitudes and behavior ex-post, i.e. people justify perceptions of injustice (by the 
government) with negative tax attitudes, which ultimately leads to systematic biases 
in estimating the effect of social capital on tax morale (Kirchler, 2007, p. 91). Hence, 
both variables are interdependent and lead to a simultaneity bias.  
If an omitted factor negatively affects social capital but which is not directly related 
to tax morale and thus leading to a decrease in tax morale of individuals, then the 
error term uc,i of Equation (5.1) is negative. This negative error reduces tax morale, 
which in turn reduces social capital (due to post-rationalization of negative attitudes). 
Under those circumstances, social capital and the error term in Equation (5.1) are 
positively correlated and therefore lead to a downward bias of the effect by estimated 
by OLS.  
If the cause-effect relationship between trust and tax morale is unclear due to 
potential hindsight bias and post-rationalization, the direction of this relationship 
must be studied with the econometric tools at hand, e.g., an instrumental variables 
approach.  
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5.4.2 Instrumental variables approach 
Subsequently, I estimate tax morale in European countries by instrumenting for 
social capital with religious fractionalization and religiosity. This approach allows 
coping with the endogeneity problem arising from the simultaneity of tax morale and 
social capital.  
Secularization and religiosity may theoretically be valid instruments. First, this 
requires both variables to be highly correlated with individual-level social capital and 
second, they have to influence the outcome variable only through social capital.  
The first requirement of relevance can be expressed as  
Cov(zc,i | SCc,i ) ≠ 0.  (5.2) 
with zc,i being the instrument and SCc,i the causal explanatory variable. The second 
requirement of exogeneity states  
Cov(zc,i | uc,i ) = 0  (5.3) 
implying that the instrument is not affecting the outcome variable directly and 
therefore uncorrelated with the error term of the reduced form.  
I illustrate the IV two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) analysis in two equations. In the 
first stage, I regress social capital on religiosity and other covariates. Under the 
assumption of validity of the instruments, the predicted values of social capital SĈc,i 
correspond to the exogenous part of SCc,i 
SCc,i = π 0 +π1 ⋅ Instrumentsc,i +π 2 ⋅Xi +δc + ec,i . (5.4) 
In the second stage, the outcome variable is regressed on the predicted values of 
social capital SĈc,i and further covariates 
icciicic uXy ,,, CˆS ++⋅+⋅+= δγβα . (5.5) 
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Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. I rely on several test statistics to 
evaluate the conditions of relevance and of exogeneity of the instrumental variables.  
5.4.3 Instrumenting for social capital 
In order to consistently estimate the effect of social capital on tax morale, I use as 
instrument the measure of fractionalization proposed by Alesina et al. (2003), which 
can be applied to various contexts besides religion. The ‘New View’ on religiosity 
justifies instrumenting social capital with religious fractionalization because this 
measure reflects the secularization process of Western countries which potentially 
affects social capital but not tax morale. Formally, this measure of religious 
fractionalization reflects the degree of heterogeneity in religious group affiliation as 
one minus the Herfindahl index of religious group shares. More precisely, it 
measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population 
belong to different groups. Using the EVS data, I calculate the fractionalization of 
religious groups in a country as follows 
FRACTj =1− sij2
i=1
N
∑  (5.6) 
with sij as the share of group i (i = 1, …, N) in country j. 
As presented in Table 5.1, the average probability of two random individuals 
belonging to different groups is 23% with a smallest probability of 1.46% in Italy 
implying very a low level of secularization and the highest probability of 53.84% in 
Germany implying a high level of secularization. 
Furthermore, I make use of religiosity as additional instrument. The EVS Survey 
provides various questions regarding religious beliefs and religious behavior. 
Following the concept of religious identity salience, I use questions regarding the 
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self-indicated importance of religion to measure the extent of respondents’ 
internalized religious convictions and the religious influence in daily decisions 
(Rohrbaugh and Jessor, 1975; Wimberley, 1989). Self-indicated religiosity is coded 
as a three-scale variable taking values 1 for being a convinced atheist, 2 for being a 
non-religious person and 3 for being a religious person. Moreover, I consider a 
question regarding the importance of religion on a four-scale and aggregate these two 
questions as an equally weighted average of the two variables times two. As a result, 
the aggregated measure of religious salience is a seven-scale variable with an 
average value of 3.76 (as shown in Table 5.1). I focus on this aggregated individual-
level variable on religious identity salience as second instrument.  
5.5 Results 
 
Figure 5.1: Plot of tax morale against trust in governmental institutions  
Notes: Total sample unadjusted for missings in control variables for 47 European countries 
Source: Data from EVS (2011), own graph. 
Slope coefficient: 0.122 (SE: 0.003) 
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As presented in Figure 5.1, plotting average tax morale and average trust in 
governmental institutions, both at the country-level, shows that the unconditional 
correlation of both variables is positive and implying higher tax morale of 0.12 by a 
unit increase of trust in governmental institutions. It should be noted, however, that 
looking at the raw association between country-level tax morale and country-level 
governmental trust neglects structural differences between countries.  
5.5.1 Regression estimates of the effect of social capital 
First, I will present the results from simple ordinary least squares models where I 
include the set of control variables successively. The coefficients presented in Table 
5.3 can be interpreted as marginal effects.  
Table 5.3: OLS regression analysis for tax morale 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
       
Trust institution 0.101*** 0.0634*** 0.0617*** 0.0647*** 0.0636*** 0.0988*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0112) 
Free-riding  -0.603*** -0.599*** -0.548*** -0.547*** -0.574*** 
  (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0178) 
Risk averse   0.248*** 0.229*** 0.215*** 0.131*** 
   (0.0424) (0.0426) (0.0428) (0.0430) 
Demographic background    YES YES YES 
Education     YES YES YES 
Marital status    YES YES YES 
Socio-econ status      YES YES 
Employment status      YES YES 
Constant 7.968*** 8.737*** 8.580*** 7.913*** 7.532*** 8.166*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0525) (0.0605) (0.127) (0.161) (0.177) 
Country dummies NO NO NO NO NO YES 
       
Observations 12,793 12,793 12,793 12,793 12,793 12,793 
R-squared 0.006 0.107 0.109 0.128 0.134 0.181 
       
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes: The dependent variable is tax morale on a ten-scale.  
Source: Data from EVS (2011), own calculations. 
Column 1 of Table 5.3 reveals the unconditional association between the variable of 
interest, social capital, and tax morale. It reveals that individuals having higher trust 
in governmental institutions are on average more motivated to pay taxes than 
individuals having less trust. Discrete changes in the social capital increase tax 
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morale scores by 0.10. The significance of all relationships remains stable when 
successively adding control variables but the magnitude of the marginal effect 
decreases. The reason for this may be reverse causality from post-rationalization of 
tax non-compliant attitudes. When adding free-riding behavior as covariate, the 
coefficient for social capital becomes smaller which may indicate that individuals 
having a priori lower tax morale select themselves into lower tax morale. Adding risk 
aversion, demographic background, education, marital status, socio-economic status 
employment status does not change magnitude or statistical significance (columns 3 
to 5). In column 6 of  
Table 5.3 when adding country dummies, the coefficient estimate is of about the 
same magnitude 0.10 as in the unconditional association of column 1. Similarly, this 
also holds for the coefficient of free-riding. However, the coefficient of risk-aversion 
decreases when successively adding more control variables. The reason for this 
might be that risk-aversion varies largely across countries which is captured by 
including country dummies. This could be some evidence on selection based on 
personality characteristics. While people that are more risk-averse are potentially less 
likely to engage in social representations of governmental institutions, they are hence 
more willing to comply with tax rules. For risk-loving people this might hold the 
other way around.  
Social capital may vary across countries and hence drive the results (e.g., Paxton, 
1999; Putnam, 2001). However, the results could also be driven by variation from 
differences in the development of political systems such as in post-communist 
transition economics. Therefore, I further separate the sample in different groups of 
countries: all EU countries, new EU members and old EU members to capture 
differences in the correlation between tax morale and social capital (columns 1 to 3 
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of Table 5.4). As the relationship could also be driven by absolute differences in 
social capital across individual groups, e.g., the religious groups, I also generate 
samples distinguishing between majority religions to minority religions (columns 4 
and 5 of Table 5.4). Overall, the coefficient estimates of the main explanatory 
variable remain unchanged and imply a statistically significant relationship between 
trust in governmental institutions and tax morale. 
Table 5.4: OLS regression analysis for tax morale by group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES All EU New EU Old EU Majority 
religion 
Minority 
religion 
      
Trust institution 0.0988*** 0.0885*** 0.101*** 0.0788*** 0.115*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0209) (0.0130) (0.0161) (0.0155) 
Free-riding -0.574*** -0.528*** -0.584*** -0.576*** -0.564*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0322) (0.0210) (0.0265) (0.0240) 
Risk-averse 0.131*** 0.0221 0.154*** 0.176*** 0.0812 
 (0.0430) (0.0755) (0.0508) (0.0646) (0.0576) 
Constant 8.166*** 8.661*** 7.164*** 9.023*** 7.659*** 
 (0.177) (0.357) (0.202) (0.287) (0.348) 
Country dummies NO NO NO NO YES 
      
Observations 12,793 2,713 10,101 6,448 6,366 
R-squared 0.181 0.206 0.173 0.160 0.210 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes: The dependent variable is tax morale on a ten-scale. All models control for age and sex, 
education, marital status, socio-economic status, and employment status as well as country dummies.  
Source: Data from EVS (2011), own calculations. 
5.5.2 Instrumental variable analysis 
Similarly to the OLS analysis, Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 present instrumental variable 
estimates for all countries with the relevant information by successively adding 
covariates and then looking at different country sets and subsamples in the full 
specification.  
As shown in Table 5.5, I find in all specifications a positive significant coefficient of 
trust in institutions but increase in size indicating a strong positive causal effect. 
Adding successively control variables decreases the coefficient of the effect of 
institutional trust while the coefficients of control variables remain stable. The 
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economic magnitude suggests that discrete upward changes in trust in institutions 
increases tax morale by 0.60 points and shows that the downward bias by estimating 
OLS in the presence of simultaneous causality is reduced by the IV analysis (cp. 
column 6 of Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5: IV analysis for tax morale  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
       
Trust institution 1.176*** 0.811*** 0.787*** 0.566*** 0.575*** 0.569*** 
 (0.113) (0.106) (0.107) (0.0972) (0.105) (0.106) 
Free-riding  -0.497*** -0.497*** -0.483*** -0.484*** -0.482*** 
  (0.0253) (0.0251) (0.0220) (0.0238) (0.0240) 
Risk averse   0.172*** 0.193*** 0.175*** 0.157*** 
   (0.0503) (0.0459) (0.0473) (0.0477) 
Demographic 
background 
    YES YES 
Education      YES YES 
Marital status     YES YES 
Socio-econ status       YES 
Employment status       YES 
Constant 3.699*** 5.658*** 5.643*** 5.987*** 5.684*** 5.513*** 
 (0.450) (0.441) (0.436) (0.412) (0.483) (0.460) 
       
Instrument tests       
 Rank LM stat  207.2 171.8 167.5 167.8 145.1 142.3 
 (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) 
 J stat  1.240 1.844 1.932 1.258 7.802 4.868 
 0.266 0.174 0.165 0.2621 0.00522 0.0274 
Endogeneity test 156.542 
(<0.000) 
69.341 
(<0.000) 
63.955 
(<0.000) 
31.95 
(<0.000) 
29.033 
(<0.000) 
27.841 
(<0.000) 
F-stat (first stage) 109 511.7 355.6 149.8 71.86 52.05 
Stock Yogo test 106.6 87.96 85.73 85.87 73.96 72.45 
Observations 12,793 12,793 12,793 12,793 12,793 12,793 
       
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes: The dependent variable is tax morale on a ten-scale. Instruments used are religious 
fractionalization (country-level) and religious identity salience (individual level). The provided test 
statistics correspond to the null hypotheses of lack of correlation/relevance for Rank LM statistic; joint 
instrument exogeneity for J statistic; and exogeneity of country trust for endogeneity test statistic.  
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 19.93, 15% maximal IV size 11.59, 
20% maximal IV size 8.75, 25% maximal IV size 7.25.  
Source: Data from EVS (2011), own calculations.  
As in the OLS analysis, I create sub-samples to analyze them in the IV framework 
(see Table 5.6). All coefficients are relatively stable and range from 0.6 to 1.0. Only 
when restricting the sample to new EU countries, the coefficient for social capital 
decreases to 0.3 and is significant only at the 5%-level. Similarly when restricting the 
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individuals to those with the same confession as the majority religion in column 4 of 
Table 5.6, the coefficient for social capital becomes small and insignificant.  
Table 5.6: IV analysis for tax morale by group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES All EU New EU Old EU Majority 
religion 
Minority 
religion 
      
Trust institution 0.569*** 0.308** 1.015*** 0.125 0.802*** 
 (0.106) (0.151) (0.179) (0.136) (0.160) 
Free-riding -0.482*** -0.493*** -0.486*** -0.568*** -0.432*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0351) (0.0315) (0.0295) (0.0360) 
Risk-averse 0.157*** -0.105 0.235*** 0.348*** 0.0299 
 (0.0477) (0.0769) (0.0646) (0.0639) (0.0708) 
Constant 5.513*** 7.165*** 3.998*** 7.702*** 4.136*** 
 (0.460) (0.713) (0.715) (0.599) (0.681) 
      
Instrument tests      
 Rank LM stat 142.3 41.54 73.04 76.65 68.93 
 (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) 
 J stat 4.868 40.34 3.711 24.36 3.088 
 0.0274 (<0.000) 0.0541 (<0.000) 0.0789 
Endogeneity test 27.84  
(<0.0001) 
2.38  
(0.12) 
41.24  
(<0.0001) 
0.02  
(0.8997) 
30.12  
(<0.0001) 
F-stat (first stage) 52.05 17.04 33.30 27.36 29.26 
Stock Yogo test 72.45 21.16 37.01 38.26 35.14 
Observations 12,793 2,706 10,087 6,442 6,351 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes: The dependent variable is tax morale on a 10-scale. All models are adjusted for age and sex, 
education, marital status, socio-economic status, and employment status as well as country dummies.  
Instruments used are religious fractionalization (country-level) and religious identity salience 
(individual level). The provided test statistics correspond to the null hypotheses of lack of 
correlation/relevance for Rank LM statistic; joint instrument exogeneity for J statistic; and exogeneity 
of country trust for endogeneity test statistic. Stock-Yogo (2005) weak ID test critical values: 10% 
maximal IV size 19.93, 15% maximal IV size 11.59, 20% maximal IV size 8.75, 25% maximal IV 
size 7.25.   
Source: Data from EVS (2011), own calculations.  
The reason for this is that the new EU members and majority religion individuals 
who may not have chosen consciously their religion but may have been born into 
their confession. Therefore, it is likely that neither secularization nor religiosity has 
an impact on social capital and as a result, the endogeneity test in columns (2) and 
(4) of Table 5.6 cannot be rejected. The inability to reject exogeneity points to the 
inappropriateness of instrumenting for social capital for these groups.  
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Also, by looking at the J-statistics of joint exogeneity of the instruments with the 
error term for new EU and majority religion groups (col. 2 and 4 of Table 5.6, 
respectively), the hypothesis can be rejected at the 1%-level (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 
1982). Both instrument tests therefore imply the unsuitability of instrumenting for 
trust in institution with religious fractionalization and religiousness in both groups. 
5.5.3 Instrument validity 
Underidentification and rank condition 
In order to fulfill the relevance condition, the excluded instruments must be tested for 
correlation with the endogeneous regressors. The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic of 
underidentification rejects the hypothesis of lack of correlation (Kleibergen and 
Paap, 2006). Hence, the equation is identified and consistent estimates can be 
produced (Murray, 2006).  
Overidentifying restrictions 
The rank condition requires sufficiently high correlation between instruments and the 
endogenous variable to unique coefficient parameters. In large samples, one needs 
higher correlation between instruments and endogenous variables than the minimal 
level required by the rank condition to identify the equation. To avoid instruments 
that satisfy the rank condition but are not sufficiently correlated with the endogenous 
regressor for the large-sample approximations, I assess the adequacy of instruments 
with a test of overidentifying restrictions (Murray, 2006). 
When testing the hypothesis that all instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, 
the Hansen J-statistic cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level (Sargan, 1958; 
Hansen, 1982). Only exceptions are columns 2 and 4 of Table 5.6 covering only new 
EU members and majority religion individuals respectively. As for the main 
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specification of Table 5.5, the J-statistic reveals enough correlation between the 
instruments and endogenous variables while the excluded instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term. This indicates suitability of the chosen instruments 
of religious fractionalization and religious identity salience. 
Weak instruments 
As a rule of thumb to detect weak instruments, one can rely on the F-statistic of the 
first stage regression, which raises concern if it is lower than ten (Staiger and Stock, 
1997). In all specifications this concern is ruled out. Nevertheless, this rule may lead 
to different inferences for different estimators and may also lead to rejection of weak 
instruments in the presence of large samples. To account for this problem, I rely on 
the weak instruments test suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005). The Stock Yogo test 
statistic is based on the F-statistic form of the Cragg-Donald (1993) statistic. The null 
hypothesis tests whether the instruments suffer from a specified bias resulting from 
weak instruments. I focus on the measure of maximal size of the bias that is based on 
the performance of the Wald test for the endogenous regressor. With weak 
instruments the Wald test rejects too often. The true rejection rate RT under the null 
reads 
RT = Prβ0 W IV >
χn;α
2
n
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
 (5.7) 
with χn;α
2 as the α -level critical value of the chi-squared distribution with n degrees 
of freedom. The size-based weak instrumnent set, ω size,
 
consists of instrumental 
variables leading to a size of at least r >α , 
ω size = Ζ :Rmax ≥ r{ }.  (5.8) 
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If the true rejection rate would be 5%, one has to set a higher rejection rate r that can 
be considered acceptable as worst-case limiting rejection rate (10%, 20%, etc.). The 
presence of weak instruments leads to a rejection rate of r when the true rejection 
rate is 5% (Stock and Yogo, 2005). Instead of the Cragg-Donald F statistic, I report 
the Wald F statistic based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic because I take into 
account the presence of heteroscedasticity. The underlying Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald 
F statistic of 72.45 (cp. column 6 of Table 5.5) with the critical values by Stock and 
Yogo (2005) confirms (in the case of one endogenous regressor and two excluded 
instruments) that weak identification by the chosen instruments is not a problem.  
Endogeneity 
Another question arising when applying an instrumental variables approach is 
whether the included endogenous regressor can be appropriately treated as 
exogenous. This is fundamental for the justification of the IV approach, as otherwise 
OLS would yield more consistent estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, pp. 98-
102). To test the hypothesis that the endogenous variable of institutional trust is 
exogenous, I rely on the Durbin-Watson-Hausman test (Nakamura and Nakamura, 
1985). In the main specifications of Table 5.5 and columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 5.6, 
exogeneity of institutional trust is rejected.  
5.5.4 Robustness  
The findings are also robust to the choice of outcome variable when interchanging 
the tax morale variable with abuse of government claims. As expected, the sign of 
the effect of social capital on attitudes towards abusing the social security system is 
negative and significant in almost all country sets (cp. Table 5.7). However, for three 
of the five country sets, the overidentifying restriction test suggests that the 
instruments are possibly correlated with the error term. Thus, with the instruments 
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(religious fractionalization and religious identity salience), the effect of social capital 
on social security abuse may not be consistently estimated.  
Since, there could also be another set of variables that possibly could serve as 
instruments, I substitute religious fractionalization with population density on the 
country-level, which I merge from the World Bank database. Also, following the 
literature on religion and delinquent behavior, I moreover use as robustness checks, 
instead of religious identity salience, church attendance to measure religiosity in the 
form of a “behavioral adherence” to a religious group’s normative expectations 
(Hirschi and Stark, 1969; Burkett and White, 1974; Jensen and Erickson, 1979; Tittle 
1980; Grasmick et al., 1991). The related question asks on a 4-scale for  
Spend[ing] time with people at your church, mosque or synagogue.  
Table 5.7: Robustness check - IV analysis for unjustified claiming of government benefits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES All EU New EU Old EU Majority 
religion 
Minority 
religion 
      
Trust institution -0.493*** -0.247** -0.672*** 0.0558 -0.605*** 
 (0.0959) (0.121) (0.151) (0.113) (0.140) 
Free-riding 0.297*** 0.269*** 0.343*** 0.391*** 0.255*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0261) (0.0266) (0.0247) (0.0312) 
Risk-averse -0.127*** -0.0806 -0.165*** -0.235*** -0.0552 
 (0.0423) (0.0601) (0.0540) (0.0535) (0.0622) 
Constant 5.720*** 3.091*** 6.496*** 3.143*** 6.606*** 
 (0.419) (0.577) (0.609) (0.502) (0.601) 
      
Instrument tests      
 Rank LM stat 137.2 41.12 69.53 77.11 65.91 
 (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) 
 J stat 3.978 12.82 15.06 15.44 18.01 
 0.0461 (<0.000) (<0.000) 0.445 (<0.000) 
Endogeneity test 39.76 3.818 29.13 0.584 30.83 
 (<0.000) 0.0507 (<0.000) (<0.000) (<0.000) 
F-stat (first stage) 40.81 8.952 31.95 20.35 24.04 
Stock Yogo test 69.72 20.94 35.19 38.51 33.57 
Observations 12,752 2,712 10,040 6,424 6,328 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes: Instruments used are religious fractionalization (country-level) and religious identity salience 
(individual level). The provided test statistics correspond to the null hypotheses of lack of 
correlation/relevance for Rank LM statistic; joint instrument exogeneity for J statistic; and exogeneity 
of country trust for endogeneity test statistic.  Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal 
IV size 19.93, 15% maximal IV size 11.59, 20% maximal IV size 8.75, 25% maximal IV size 7.25.  
Source: Data from EVS (2011), own calculations. 
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Both variables theoretically link to social capital and through this channel to tax 
morale. As displayed Table 5.8, the results indicate a positive parameter estimates. 
Nevertheless, the IV test statistics reveal potential correlation of the instruments with 
the error term (overidentifying restrictions test) and weak instruments (Stock Yogo 
test). Hence, the results imply that religious fractionalization and religious identity 
salience serve as better instruments than the previously tested. 
Table 5.8: Robustness check - IV analysis for tax morale 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES All EU New EU Old EU Majority 
religion 
Minority 
religion 
      
Trust institution 1.129*** 2.121*** 0.394*** 3.855 0.757*** 
 (0.292) (0.778) (0.103) (4.279) (0.247) 
Free-riding -0.428*** -0.245** -0.600*** -0.231 -0.454*** 
 (0.0510) (0.118) (0.0322) (0.462) (0.0469) 
Risk-averse -0.129 -0.106 0.0667 0.181 -0.162* 
 (0.0854) (0.186) (0.0714) (0.285) (0.0939) 
Constant 3.361*** 0.628 6.278*** -6.531 4.571*** 
 (1.158) (3.097) (0.446) (16.18) (0.975) 
      
Instrument tests      
 Rank LM stat 24.42 8.742 124.7 0.806 20.90 
 (<0.000) 0.0126 (<0.000) 0.00194 (<0.000) 
 J stat 0.130 4.002 31.89 0.0182 15.07 
 0.718 (<0.000) (<0.000) 0.893 (<0.000) 
Endogeneity test 29.07 23.43 12.37 9.606 23.47 
 (<0.000) 0.0455 (<0.000) 0.668 (<0.000) 
F-stat (first stage) 21.69 3.490 28.62 1.690 17.34 
Stock Yogo test 12.17 4.366 66.54 0.399 10.59 
Observations 6,855 2,038 4,817 3,063 3,792 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Notes: All models control for age and sex, education, marital status, socio-economic status and 
employment status as well as country dummies.  Instruments used are population density (country-
level) and religious behavior adherence (individual level). The provided test statistics correspond to 
the null hypotheses of lack of correlation/relevance for Rank LM statistic; joint instrument exogeneity 
for J statistic; and exogeneity of country trust for endogeneity test statistic. Stock-Yogo (2005) weak 
ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 19.93, 15% maximal IV size 11.59, 20% maximal IV 
size 8.75, 25% maximal IV size 7.25.   
Source: Data from EVS (2011), own calculations. 
5.5.5 Study limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, since social capital can be captured on many 
levels and it can be pivotal through different channels, no uniform way of 
measurement is possible but rather different measures pick up different dimensions 
of social capital (Paxton, 1999). One drawback is hence the focus on social capital as 
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trust in the fulfillment of the transactional exchange between taxpayer and the 
authority. Nevertheless, Cheung and Chan (2010) argue that focusing on measures 
based on exchange captures the instrumental nature of social capital for morale. 
Second, due to missings in responses to some questions crucial to this study, the 
study cannot account for all countries in Europe across all survey waves. Hence, 
potential bias in the measurement of the true effect of social capital on tax morale 
might be a problem. Moreover, non-response bias might be an issue with the data 
employed. As response rates are not reported, sensitivity analyses regarding this 
issue cannot be performed (Inglehart et al., 2000). Nontheless, since the main results 
are robust across different sets of countries, I suspect that neither country-non-
participation nor survey non-response affect the observed effect. Further, if there was 
a direct effect of religion on tax morale, applying an IV approach would lead to bias 
(Angrist and Krueger, 2001). While Torgler (2006) and others have shown an 
association of religion to tax morale, I argue, in the vein of Putnam and Campbell 
(2012), that in between religion and morale, it is social capital that accounts for the 
effect. Since the findings are robust across multiple combinations of chosen 
instruments, a direct effect of religion of tax morale can potentially be ruled out. 
Also, the larger association by applying IV methods indicates that measurement error 
in individual level social capital can be limited (Angirst and Krueger, 2001). 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
With the shift of religious affiliation to secularism, people are thought to be less 
charitable in giving whether to the church or any other societal institutions. Despite 
the increase in the number of religiously unaffiliated people, this has found to be the 
supposedly misleading relation between morale in giving and religiousness (Putnam 
and Campbell, 2012). Instead the missing link between giving and believing is social 
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capital provided by religious affiliation. This in turn fosters the achievement of better 
usage of social resources and thereby facilitating exchanges between entities and 
hence, fostering morale. With this in mind and acknowledging the ongoing 
secularization process, public policy might enhance tax morale to reduce fraudulent 
behavior by applying this insight. Exemplary attempts to apply this insight have been 
implemented in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (Cabinet Office, 2012; 
OECD, 2013).  
The results of this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that social capital in the 
form of trust in governmental institutions lead to improved individual-level tax 
morale. The results of the IV analysis permit the reduction of the endogeneity bias 
and yield qualitatively the same results using OLS. Post-rationalization of tax morale 
leads to a simultaneity bias between tax morale and social capital and implies an 
underestimation of the effect in the presence of an omitted factor that is directly 
related to social capital but not to tax morale. With a large economic magnitude of 
the causal effect of social capital on tax morale, these findings suggest that so far 
evidence has largely underestimated the relationship of social capital and tax morale.  
The findings of this study highlight the importance of institutional trust and agree 
with prior studies focusing on the relationship between tax morale and social capital 
(Scholz and Lubell, 1998; Feld and Frey, 2002; Torgler, 2003; Alm and Gomez, 
2008; Hammar, Jagers, and Nordblom, 2009; Russo, 2013). 
This cross-national study provides evidence on the benefitting effects of individual 
level social capital for tax morale and thus for tax compliance. When using an 
instrumental variable approach, I am able to reduce endogeneity bias. In line with the 
scarce literature on social capital and tax morale, I find that the aforementioned 
effect is positive and stronger than previously determined. The findings on the effect 
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of social capital on tax morale provide insights by explaining the residual of the tax 
compliance puzzle. Finally, the results underpin the relevance of social incentives for 
economic outcomes, in this case tax compliance and hence tax revenue. 
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6 Outlook 
The role of government policies in supporting long-term growth puts forward the 
importance of taxation for firms and individuals alike who bear the burden of taxes. 
While the question of why public policy affects taxpayers is obvious and intuitive, 
the more important question to be answered is how public policy affects the behavior 
firms and individuals. The answer to this question is ambiguous and less intuitive. 
Hence, the objective of this study is to investigate how government policy shapes 
firm behavior and attitudes towards taxes of private entities. In three empirical 
analyses, I gained deeper insights into the impact of policy instruments on economic 
activity and the formation of the relationship between the government and its 
taxpayers. 
6.1 Implications for policy  
The results of this dissertation have relevant implications for public policy. First, the 
new market in Eastern Germany opened the gateway to opportunities of growth in a 
highly uncertain environment. Public policy in the form of tax incentives in an 
environment with information asymmetries and undeveloped infrastructure, however, 
can lead to unproductive investments. This holds in particular for short-lived capital 
goods, e.g. equipment investments. The results imply that the broad range of 
subsidies and tax incentives in the light of German Reunification did not necessarily 
foster sustainable growth in Eastern Germany. Potential adverse selection of 
unproductive overinvestments led to inefficiencies of subsidized investments. Under 
those circumstances, public policy should take into account the risky environment 
when designing measures to sustain economic growth and to prevent setting false 
incentives.  
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Second, economic fluctuations have a strong influence on firm behavior and hence 
on the effectiveness of subsidies. The financial crisis of 2008 reduces the 
effectiveness of R&D subsidies, which lead to a crowding out of private R&D by 
public funds. In the presence of a large recession, this has important implications for 
public policy: firms’ persistent investment behavior despite of the crisis might 
support the effectiveness of public subsidies. If firm investment behavior is affected 
by the riskiness of the environment, public policy should account for these. 
Third, social capital positively affects tax morale at the individual level. This implies 
that social-based factors may be able to explain parts of the tax compliance puzzle. 
Instead of focusing on enforcement-based policy such as penalties or audits, tax 
authorities may enhance cooperative tax behavior by putting emphasis on 
strengthening taxpayers’ attitudes towards taxes as an approach to reducing 
fraudulent tax behavior.  
6.2 Implications for future research 
I am confident that my contribution to a deeper understanding of the role of public 
policy for firm behavior and individual attitudes can offer a gateway for future 
research. All three studies are based on data on the micro-level, i.e. firm, plant or 
individual level, which allow the use of microeconometric approaches. With the 
availability of micro-level data and more sophisticated research designs, empirical 
economics experienced a “credibility revolution” during the last 25 years (Angrist 
and Pischke, 2010).  
Given the complexity of markets and tax systems as well as the irrationality of 
individual behavior, the field of behavioral economics emphasizes the need to 
account for the context in which individuals are framed and the need for recognition 
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of underlying cognitive processes in individual decision-making (Alm, 2010). In this 
vein, Slemrod and Weber (2012) point out that counterfactual analyses in social 
sciences are subject to measurement errors as they underlie individual behavioral 
choices. Hence, they encourage randomized field experiments in behavioral public 
economics. This leaves space for future tax research to inform public policy. 
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